Parise v. Carlamy Realty LLC

1

2022 NY Slip Op 33713(U)

LAURIE PARISE, ARTHUR JENS, CHARLES AN, Plaintiff, v. CARLAMY REALTY LLC and WEBER FARHAT REALTY MANAGEMENT INC., Defendants.

Index No. 152681/2016, Motion Seq. No. 004

Supreme Court, New York County

October 28, 2022

Unpublished Opinion

MOTION DATE 02/01/2022.

PRESENT: HON. LOUIS L. NOCK, Justice.

DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION

LOUIS L. NOCK, J.S.C.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 004) 107,108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127 128, 129, 130, and 131 were read on this motion to FIX A CHARGING LIEN.

Upon the foregoing documents, the motion by nonparty Crumiller P.C. ("movant"), to fix a charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 is decided in accordance with the following memorandum decision.

This is an action for rent overcharge in violation of Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2525.6(b) and for other related relief. Movant law firm represented plaintiffs Laurie Parise and

Arthur Jens, starting with the commencement of the action and until December 12, 2019, when movant was discharged as counsel. For a time, movant also represented plaintiff Charles An until a conflict of interest arose among the plaintiffs regarding settlement goals and Mr. An sought new counsel. At the time it was discharged, movant filed a notice of charging lien in the amount of $116,730 (Notice of Charging Lien, NYSCEF Doc. No. 101). Parise and Jens (the "objecting plaintiffs") filed an objection to the lien on January 8, 2020, in which they alleged that the lien was improper because movant was discharged for cause; the amount sought was excessive and did not "represent a quantum meruit valuation of [movant's] work performed in this action"; and included work done for Mr. An's benefit that was, therefore, not chargeable to the objecting plaintiffs (Notice of Objection to Charging Lien, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102). Movant now seeks, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, to fix the amount of the charging lien at $114,952.00.

"From the commencement of an action ... the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his or her client's cause of action . . . which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client's favor, and the proceeds thereof.... The court upon the petition of the client or the attorney may determine and enforce the lien." (Judiciary Law § 475.) Where an attorney is discharged by his or her client without cause prior to the conclusion of the action, "the attorney is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services rendered" (Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 44 [1990]). However, "[w]here the discharge is for cause, the attorney has no right to compensation or a retaining lien, notwithstanding a specific retainer agreement" (id).

The Court of Appeals has previously held that "where an attorney's representation terminates and there has been no misconduct, no discharge for just cause and no unjustified abandonment by the attorney, the attorney's right to enforce the statutory charging lien is preserved" (Klein v Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 464, rearg denied 87 N.Y.2d 1056 [1996]). A discharge is not for cause where the attorney's conduct "did not fall below the ordinary and reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the profession" (Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein v Zuker, 203 A.D.2d 119, 119 [1st Dept 1994] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Further, dissatisfaction with reasonable strategic choices by the attorney does not constitute cause for discharge (Callaghan v Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d 500, 501 [2d Dept 2008]).

The objecting plaintiffs present two categories of issues in opposition to the motion: first, a variety of alleged instances of misconduct culminating in a for cause termination of movant; and second, challenges to the amount movant seeks. The court will address each matter in turn.

Applying the above cited caselaw to the objections asserted by the objecting plaintiffs, much of what is alleged does not rise to the level of impropriety necessary to find that movant's termination was for cause, falling instead into that category of "of personality conflicts misunderstandings or differences of opinion having nothing to do with any impropriety by either the client or the lawyer" (Klein, 87 N.Y.2d at 463). Possibly rising above that category and to a level of impropriety that would justify a finding that the termination was for cause, the objecting plaintiffs do claim that movant entered into a stipulation regarding the payment of rent during the...