Parker v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.

573 F.Supp.3d 686

Richard PARKER, Plaintiff

v.ACE AMERICAN INS. CO. d/b/a Chubb, Defendant

No. 20-cv-1773 (VLB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed December 2, 2021

Elisabeth M. Swanson, Goff Law Group, West Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Kurt M. Mullen, Nixon Peabody LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DKT. 18

Vanessa L. Bryant, United States District Judge

This matter is an insurance coverage dispute arising from an automobile accident that injured Plaintiff Richard Parker ("Mr. Parker" or the "Plaintiff") while he was operating a vehicle on his employer's behalf. Mr. Parker seeks to recover underinsured motorist benefits under a commercial automobile insurance liability policy issued by ACE American Insurance Company ("ACE" or the "Defendant") to his employer. [Dkt. 1-1 (Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 17-21]. ACE properly removed the suit to this Court from the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. [Dkt. 1 (Not. of Removal)].

At issue is whether Mr. Parker's employer, Ryder Systems, Inc. ("Ryder"), purchased uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage limits of $1,000,000 or the statutory minimum under Connecticut law ($25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident). Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Ryder intended to purchase the minimum available coverage limits under Connecticut law and Mr. Parker recovered more than that sum from the tortfeasor's insurer, the Court grants ACE's motion for summary judgment and enters judgment for ACE.

Preliminary Matters

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff failed to comply with D. Conn. L. R. 56(a)(2), which requires that:

(i) A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall file and serve with the opposition papers a document entitled "Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment," which shall include a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Local Rule 56 (a)1 Statement followed by a response to each paragraph admitting or denying the fact and/or objecting to the fact as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) ...

Instead, Plaintiff filed a Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement which was improper because Plaintiff is not moving for summary judgment. See [Dkt. 22-1 (Pl. Statement of Material Facts)]. ACE argues that the Court should deem Plaintiff's failure to respond as an admission of the material facts as set forth by ACE. [Dkt. 23 (Def. Repl. Br.) at 3-5]. Plaintiff then filed a pleading captioned, "Second Amended Statement of Material Facts in Dispute," which still fails to cure the deficiency ACE raised. See [Dkt. 25]. ACE then moved for permission to respond to Plaintiff's supplemental pleading. [Dkt. 26 (Def. Mot. to File Repl.)].

The Court denies ACE's request to deem its statement of material facts admitted and denies its request to respond to Plaintiff's supplemental pleading as unnecessary. As demonstrated by ACE's response to Plaintiff's "Local Rule 56(a)(1)" Statement, there is substantial agreement on the material facts for purposes of Defendant's summary judgment motion. Whether these facts were deemed admitted or put to proof would not affect the outcome.

Background

The following facts are taken from the Local Rule 56 statements of material facts and evidence cited by the parties. The facts are read in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Mr. Parker. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).¹ For ease of reference, exhibits will refer to evidentiary exhibits included with the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 18] and Plaintiff's Opposition [Dkt. 22] by exhibit only. i.e. [Def. Ex. 1] and [Pl. Ex. A]. Given the procedural error in Plaintiff's statement of material facts addressed above, the citation of Defendant's response to Plaintiff's supplemental pleading is applicable where the parties agree as to the fact stated. END FOOTNOTE

Mr. Parker, a Connecticut resident, was an employee of Ryder Truck Rental, LT. [Dkt. 24 (Def. Resp. to Pl. Stat. of Material Facts.) ¶ 1]. Mr. Parker is seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued by ACE to Ryder for the October 1, 2019 to October 1, 2020 policy period (the "Policy"). [Def. Resp. to Pl. Stat. of Material Facts.) ¶ 2]; [Def Ex. 4 (Policy no. ISA-H25290112)].

On October 2, 2019, Plaintiff was operating a truck in Connecticut when the vehicle was struck by Moet Bacote. [Def. Resp. to Pl. Stat. of Material Facts. ¶¶ 3-5]. For purposes of the motion, ACE does not contest that Mr. Parker was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. [Def. Resp. to Pl. Stat. of Material Facts. ¶ 4]. Plaintiff was injured during the accident. [Def. Resp. to Pl. Stat. of Material Facts. ¶ 3]. For purposes of determining the applicable underinsured motorist coverage limit, the extent of Mr. Parker's injuries is not at issue. See [Dkt. 14 (Rule 26(f) Report) at 6, 10] (joint proposal for phased discovery and dispositive motion practice)]; [Dkt. 16 (Scheduling Order)].

In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that $900,000 remains available in underinsured motorists’ coverage under the Policy. [Dkt. 22 (Pl. Mem. in Opp'n) at 8]. Considering that Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Bacote's insurance policy is exhausted and Plaintiff's workers’ compensation claim is on-going (rather than settled), the Court infers that Plaintiff recovered $100,000 from Mr. Bacote's insurer. See [Dkt. 1-1 (Compl.) ¶ 17] (exhaustion of tortfeasor's insurance) and [Dkt. 12 (Pl. Mot. to Remand) at 2](citing Plaintiff's open workers’ compensation claim). At this juncture, the amount recovered is immaterial insofar as that it is more than the applicable underinsured motorist coverage limits, which, under Connecticut law, cannot be less than $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-112(a) and 38a-336(a)(1)(D).

Rosa Rodriguez, a Senior Risk Manager for Ryder, completed a questionnaire and coverage selection/rejection forms in different states for uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage and personal injury protection coverage. [Def. Ex. 6 (Rodriquez Decl.) ¶¶ 1-4]. Ms. Rodriguez entered Ryder's coverage selections into the "Chubb Accelerator." [Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 5]. The Accelerator is Chubb's proprietary web-based tool to assist insureds in documenting their coverage selections and for e-signing state specific coverage selections/rejection forms. [Def. Ex. 5 (Icenogle Decl.) ¶¶ 5-7].

Ms. Rodriguez checked boxes on the Chubb Accelerator Questionnaire indicating that Ryder wished to reject uninsured and underinsured coverage if permitted by state law and carry the minimum amount of coverage when required by state law. See [Dkt. 28](re-filed copy of Exs. A to Defs. Ex. 5-6, Chubb Accelerator Questionnaire].

Initially, the responses to the Chubb Accelerator Questionnaire that were electronically filed as exhibits to Mr. Icenogle and Ms. Rodriguez's declarations were not visible to the Court. Defendant's courtesy copy of the exhibits, however, included the responses excerpted in its Memorandum of Law. The Court ordered ACE to re-file the questionnaire electronically in a format that permitted the Court to view the responses to the questions posed by the form. Plaintiff stipulated to the authenticity of the re-filed document. See [Dkts. 27-28].; see also [Def. Ex. 6 (Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 7]("The questionnaire reflects that Ryder rejected UM and UIM coverage where permitted by law. For states where rejection of bodily injury UM or UIM coverage is not permitted by law, Ryder intended to purchase the minimum amount of UM or UIM coverage.").

Michael Icenogle, ACE's Underwriting Manager responsible for the Ryder account, attested that he understood that Ryder intended to reject uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage were permissible by law and carry the minimum coverage amount, if required. [Def. Ex. 5 (Icenogle) ¶ 12].

After Ms. Rodriguez completed the Chubb Accelerator Questionnaire, the on-line tool incorrectly auto-populated coverage limits on the Connecticut Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage Selection Informed Consent Form. [Def. Ex. 6, Ex. B (09/23/2019 Form)]; [Pl. Ex. A](same) (hereinafter the "Connecticut Consent Form"). The form explains the various types of uninsured and underinsured coverages. [Id. ]. The form explains that "You have the right to choose the amount of coverage. It can be as low as $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident, or as high as twice your policy's bodily injury liability coverage limit. The amount of liability coverage you buy will govern the maximum amount of UM/UIM coverage you can buy." [Id. at 1]. The form states that the Policy's bodily injury liability limit is $1 million. [Id. at 2].

The following page of the Connecticut Consent Form, which states the available coverage limits, is internally inconsistent. [Id. at 3]. The form offers three optional coverage levels and corresponding premiums: Double BI Limit, BI Limit, and Minimum Limit. [Id. ]. The "Minimum Limit" box is checked with a corresponding premium amount of $7,721. [Id. ]. However, below this section there is a listing of "Other Options," with different potential limits. [Id. ]. There, the box "Other" is filled in with $1 million listed and a corresponding premium of $7,721. The quoted premium in this section for the $1 million coverage limit is the same as the "Minimum Limit," whereas $1 million in coverage (the "BI Limit") was quoted above at $12,185. Ms. Rodriguez electronically signed the disclosure form on September 23, 2019. [Id. ]

After the issuance of the Policy and the accident, Ms. Rodriguez hand-signed a corrected disclosure form listing the split limits as $25,000/50,000, with the same corresponding...