Parker v. Canton Manor

373 So.3d 1036

Patricia Smith Parker, Appellant

v.Canton Manor and Mississippi Health Care Association, Appellees

Patricia Smith PARKER, Appellant

v.CANTON MANOR and Mississippi Health Care Association, Appellees

Patricia Smith Parker, Appellant

v.Canton Manor and Mississippi Health Care Association, Appellees

NO. 2022-WC-00206-COA CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2022-WC-00207-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

5/2/2023

Rehearing Denied September 5, 2023

MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BENNIE L. JONES JR., ROBERTA LYNN HAUGHTON, West Point

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: BETTY B. ARINDER, LANA E. GILLON, Ridgeland

EN BANC.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Patricia Smith Parker filed two workers’ compensation claims. She alleged that she had been injured in two workplace incidents and that the disabling character of her injuries did not become apparent until less than two years before she filed her claims. Accepting those allegations as true, Parker’s claims are not barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. However, Parker’s employer/carrier Canton Manor and the Mississippi Health Care Association (collectively, "Canton Manor") moved to dismiss Parker’s claims, arguing that they were time-barred. Although Canton Manor presented no evidence in support of its affirmative defense, the Workers’ Compensation Commission accepted Canton Manor’s argument and dismissed Parker’s claims. We hold that the Commission erred by dismissing Parker’s claims because Parker alleged facts that, if true, were sufficient to bring her claims within the statute of limitations, and Canton Manor presented no evidence to meet its burden of proving its affirmative defense. Therefore, we reverse the Commission’s orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On June 7, 2021, Parker filed two petitions to controvert with the Commission. Her first petition alleged that on December 11, 2018, while she was employed at Canton Manor, a nursing home, she "was grabbed around her neck and thrown to the floor by a resident," and the resident "grabbed her by her neck [again] as she tried to get up." Parker alleged that she "experienced discomfort immediately after the incident." However, Parker alleged that she did not begin to experience "severe pain … due to the totality of [this and other] previous injuries" until May 3, 2020. Parker also alleged that her period of temporary disability began on May 3, 2020.

¶3. Parker’s second petition alleged that on April 18, 2019, while she was employed at Canton Manor, "[a] resident hit her shoulder with excessive force." Parker alleged that her "shoulder was injured and bruised[,] … and she experienced extreme burning." However, Parker alleged that she did not begin to experience "severe pain … due to the totality of [this and other] previous injuries" until May 3, 2020. Parker also alleged that her period of temporary disability began on May 3, 2020.

¶4. Canton Manor answered and alleged that Parker’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Canton Manor then filed nearly identical one-page motions to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations barred Parker’s claims because each was filed more than two years after the date of her injury, and no compensation had been paid. See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-35(1) (Rev. 2021). In response, Parker argued that her claims were timely because each was filed within two years of the time when the compensable nature of her injury became reasonably apparent to her. Neither party submitted any evidence or requested an evidentiary hearing. A telephonic hearing was held before the administrative judge (AJ) but was not transcribed. The AJ then issued nearly identical orders dismissing each case. The AJ found that Parker "was fully aware that she sustained an injury at work on" the date of each underlying incident, that neither injury was "a latent injury," and that the statute of limitations barred both claims.

¶5. Parker filed a petition for review by the full Commission in both cases, and Canton Manor responded. Canton Manor attached minutes from its "Safety Committee" meeting dated December 28, 2018, as Exhibit A to its response in the first case. According to Canton Manor, the minutes document the December 2018 incident involving Parker as follows: "resident playing too rough & staff & resident went to floor." Canton Manor attached an employee incident report dated April 1, 2019, as Exhibit A to its response in the second case. According to Canton Manor, the incident report documents the April 2019 incident involving Parker, although it does not match the date alleged in Parker’s petition. The incident report states that a resident "hit" Parker, resulting in "redness/swelling to [Parker’s] right upper arm." Canton Manor did not file a motion to introduce additional evidence before the full Commission, as required by the Commission’s rules. See Miss. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Proc. R. 9; Short v. Wilson Meat House LLC, 36 So. 3d 1247, 1254 (¶¶34-35) (Miss. 2010). The Commission subsequently entered one-page orders affirming the AJ’s decisions and dismissing Parker’s claims with no additional analysis. Parker appealed from both final judgments, and this Court consolidated her two appeals.

ANALYSIS

[1–3] ¶6. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Commission properly dismissed Parker’s claims because they are barred by the statute of limitations.¹ In general, a workers’ compensation claim must be "filed … within two (2) years from the date of the injury." Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-35(1). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[t]he word ‘injury’ in the two-year statute refers to a compensable injury." Quaker Oats Co. v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Miss. 1979) (emphasis added) (quoting Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Tupelo Inc. v. Long, 362 So. 2d 182, 185 (Miss. 1978)). Therefore, "the statute of limitations does not begin to run until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained." Id. (quoting Tabor Motor Co. v. Garrard, 233 So. 2d 811, 814 (Miss. 1970)). The Supreme Court has further clarified that a "compensable injury" is a "disabling injury" that occurred at work. Id. at 1366 (emphasis added). Thus, if an employee suffers an injury that "initially [seems] insignificant, but … progresse[s] over a period of time to disabling proportions," the statute of limitations does "not begin to run until the disabling characteristics of the work-related injur[y] … bec[o]me known." Id. As this Court has explained, "[c]ertainly there is no purpose in encouraging the filing of a claim when a minor injury occurs during employment that does not seem to have any long-term significance." Cooper v. Miss. Dep’t of Rehab. Servs., 937 So. 2d 51, 54 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). The injury in this scenario is known as a "progressive injury." Baker v. IGA Super Valu Food Store, 990 So. 2d 254, 260 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).²

[4, 5] ¶7. "Generally, the time when [a compensable] injury becomes reasonably apparent is an issue of fact for the Commission to determine." Smith, 102 So. 3d at 323 (¶16). And "[w]e are bound by the Commission’s findings of fact when that decision is based upon substantial evidence." Id. But in this case, the Commission’s decision was not based on any "evidence," substantial or otherwise. As discussed above, Canton Manor filed a single-page "Motion to Dismiss" in each case. Canton Manor did not submit any evidence in support of its motions but simply argued that Parker’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations based on Parker’s own allegations.³

[6] ¶8. Canton Manor’s motion was in substance a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In essence, Canton Manor’s argument was that Parker’s "allegations, taken as time," "show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations."⁴ In a typical case, if a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to bring her claims within the statute of limitations, the court cannot grant a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.⁵ "[A] complaint should not be dismissed based on the statute of limitations unless it appears beyond any doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts under which her complaint was filed within the limitations period." Robinson v. Singh, 303 So. 3d 65, 73 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied, 303 So. 3d 420 (Miss. 2020). This is because on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim—including a motion based on the statute of limitations—"[t]he [c]ourt must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and consider only whether any set of facts could support [the plaintiff’s] action." McGowen, 319 So. 3d at 1088 (¶5) (quoting City of Vicksburg v. Williams, 191 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (¶7) (Miss. 2016)).

[7, 8] ¶9. We further note that Parker was under no burden to submit evidence in response to Canton Manor’s motions to dismiss. As this Court recently explained, "a motion to dismiss … tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, not the plaintiff’s ‘proof.’ … A complaint should not be dismissed … unless the plaintiff fails to allege facts that would support a claim; at this stage, we must assume that there is proof of the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations." White v. White, 355 So. 3d 233, 242-43 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), cert. denied, 355 So. 3d 774 (Miss. 2023). Therefore, the non-moving party "has no burden of proof’ in responding to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 242 n.6 (quoting Metrolis v. Mugshots Tupelo LLC, No. 1:16-cv-109-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 6952121, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 28, 2016)). Moreover, regardless of a case’s procedural posture, "the plea of statute of limitations is an affirmative defense for which the party asserting it has the burden of proof." Huss v. Garden, 991 So. 2d 162, 165 (¶4) (Miss. 2008) (emphasis added).

[9] ¶10. Because no evidence was...