Parker v. Corpening

CHRISTOPHER J. PARKER, Plaintiff, v. HUBERT CORPENING, et al., Defendants.

1:16-cv-23-FDW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION

December 21, 2018

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's pro se Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 74), in which he requests a hearing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 92), and Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. No. 100).

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff, a North Carolina prisoner currently incarcerated at the Tabor Correctional Institution,¹ filed this action on January 28, 2016 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and North Carolina negligence law. He named as Defendants Marion C.I. Superintendent Hubert Corpening and Staff Psychologist Valerie A. Carswell. The Complaint passed initial review on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims and on Plaintiff's state law negligence claims. (Doc. No. 39). Defendants were served, (Doc. No. 46), and filed an Answer, (Doc. No. 49). The Parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment are now pending before the Court.

(1) Complaint (Doc. No. 1)

Plaintiff alleges that he has a history of mental health issues dating back to 1998. A psychologist at Scotland C.I. re-diagnosed him with depressive disorder which caused him to be a threat to himself and others. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6). That psychologist referred Plaintiff to a psychiatrist in Raleigh who prescribed medicine and said Plaintiff would be shipped to an institution where he would start treatment for his mental illness and receive medication. (Doc. No. 1 at 11). Plaintiff was told all his paperwork and files would be shipped along with him.

Plaintiff was transferred to Marion C.I. where Defendants denied him "any help or his medications" after Plaintiff repeatedly informed Defendants of his diagnosis and need for treatment. (Doc. No. 1 at 6). After Plaintiff informed Defendants of his condition, he was still housed around general population inmates who are not mentally ill. Plaintiff began experiencing frustration, confusion, and difficulty distinguishing reality from fiction. As a result, he cut himself with razorblades, set fires to burn his own skin, and ate feces and smeared it on his body and cell. (Doc. No. 1 at 6).

Plaintiff informed Defendants of his need for treatment on numerous occasions including a grievance dated October 6, 2014. On December 23, 2014, the third-step grievance response agreed that Petitioner was prescribed mental health medications. (Doc. No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff made this information available to Carswell and Corpening, who again denied him treatment and medication. By this time, Plaintiff had gone 16 months without his medication or any treatment for his mental illness.

On January 11, 2015, Plaintiff received a disciplinary incident report. Defendant Carswell wrote a statement saying that she reviewed Plaintiff and found no action where medications were prescribed despite Plaintiff having informed her of the grievance disposition to the contrary. (Doc.No. 1 at 13). Carswell insisted that Plaintiff does not need the previously prescribed medications that he should be "accountable for all his actions [because] his mental health illness is no excuse." (Doc. No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff complains that Defendants' actions were deliberately indifferent and negligent.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-5).

(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 74)

Plaintiff argues that the records attached to his Complaint show that he was prescribed mental health medication and that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.

He argues that his October 8, 2014, grievance proves that he was complaining about needing mental health medications and that the Step-One and Step-Two grievance responses stating that Plaintiff is not currently prescribed mental health medication, show that Defendant Carswell knew what was going on. The Step-Three response shows that Plaintiff is currently prescribed mental health medication and that staff adequately addressed Plaintiff's concerns, and therefore a real dispute exists about whether Plaintiff was prescribed mental health medications.

The Disciplinary Hearing Records show that Plaintiff wrote that he needed his mental health medication that was being denied by Defendant Carswell, and that Carswell stated that Plaintiff was not prescribed medication and that there is no mental health reason he should not be held accountable for his actions. Carswell further stated that Plaintiff does not need the previously prescribed medications. Carswell sounded confused in her statements.

Plaintiff wrote to the head nurse asking the name of the mental health doctor from Scotland prison who diagnosed him, and what the diagnosis was. The nurse responded that the diagnosis was depressive disorder, and the doctor's name was Robert E. Deakins. Plaintiff argues that thediagnosis shows he must have been prescribed mental health medication and that a real dispute exists.

Plaintiff argues that Superintendent Corpening is liable under 1983 if he became aware of a violation of his rights through grievance appeals and disciplinary decisions and failed to take steps to remedy it. He also states that a supervisor can be found personally involved in a violation if he develops an unconstitutional policy or allows an unconstitutional policy to continue.

(3) Defendants' Response (Doc. No. 76)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is vexatious, frivolous, and without merit. The first five paragraphs of the Motion are substantially identical to the allegations in the Complaint and refer to the exhibits attached to the Complaint. Plaintiff failed to prove any elements of his cause of action against Defendants and has not proffered any testimony or evidence in support of his motion other than the self-serving allegations in his Complaint and its exhibits. Defendants have denied all of Plaintiff's claims including claims for negligence and medical indifference.

(4) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 92)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's deliberate indifference and negligence claims fail because they are refuted by the undisputed medical records, and that Defendant Corpening is not subject to supervisory liability. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the claims against them in their individual capacities, the claims against them in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity, and no evidence exists of aggravated conduct sufficient to create an issue of fact as to punitive damages.

Plaintiff's deliberate indifference and negligence claims fail because Plaintiff is not entitled to unqualified access to mental health care and treatment of his choice. His disagreement over thecare provided does not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Plaintiff was not deprived of mental health care and there is no evidence to support a showing of serious harm related to his mental health. Undisputed medical evidence shows that Plaintiff received continuous and appropriate mental health treatment. There is no evidence that Defendants' actions were grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive, or that they knew and disregarded an excessive risk to his health.

Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims fail because Defendant Corpening did not supervise or have control over the medical staff, and NCDPS Policy and Procedures provide that clinical matters are solely in the province of license health care providers, not correctional staff like the Acting Superintendent.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for claims against them in their individual capacities because they did not transgress any "bright line" area of law. (Doc. No. 93 at 17). They acted reasonably and appropriately with regards to Plaintiff's subjective mental health needs.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on their official capacity claims because the suit against them is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiff's punitive damages claims because no evidence exists of aggravated conduct sufficient to create an issue of fact as to punitive damages.

(5) Plaintiff's Response (Doc. No. 98)

Plaintiff cites case law setting forth the deliberate indifference standard that applies to serious medical needs. He also cites case law regarding the qualified immunity standard. He further states:

If any negative entries have been put in your prison records because of your suit or the actions you are suing about, you may be able to avoid mootness by asking the court to order the prison officials to remove (or 'expunge') these entries from yourrecords. The federal courts have held that a case is not moot if it could still cause[] you some related injury.

(Doc. No. 98 at 4).

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendants to "expunge entries that speaks negative, when it has nothing to do with the case itself." (Doc. No. 98 at 2).

(6) Defendants' Reply (Doc. No. 99)

Defendants argue that the Responses to Plaintiff's October 8, 2014, grievance show that Plaintiff was never prescribed mental health medications at the relevant time period at Marion C.I. The Step-Three grievance response contains a typographical error that excludes the word "not" from the sentence "currently prescribed mental health medications." (Doc. No. 99 at 2). The responses to Plaintiff's January 28, 2015, grievance also show that Plaintiff was not prescribed any mental health medications and that his concerns regarding mental health treatment and medications had been adequately addressed. Plaintiff was not denied any mental health medications at Marion C.I. because he was not prescribed to receive such medications at that time and therefore he was not "denied" mental health...