Parker v. State

1

Timothy Lamont Parker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

No. 24A-CR-614

Court of Appeals of Indiana

November 7, 2024

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jane Spencer Craney, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No 49D28-2203-F1-7355

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Talisha R. Griffin Sarah Medlin Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BROWN, JUDGE

[¶1] Timothy Lamont Parker appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for attempted murder and burglary as level 1 felonies. He contends that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial, that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2] On March 13, 2022, Andrew Mumford was at his apartment complex and walked back to his apartment after retrieving some trash bags from a maintenance worker. Shortly thereafter, Parker approached and knocked on Mumford's door. Mumford eventually opened the door and Parker, a stranger to him, asked him for a trash bag. Mumford gave Parker a trash bag, spoke with Parker for approximately thirty seconds, and then turned to retreat inside of his apartment. Mumford "took a couple steps in" and suddenly realized that he had not heard the noise of his door closing. Transcript Volume II at 69. Mumford's door is an "ordinary apartment door" but it "has a self[-]closer on it," and it automatically closes "quick and fast." Id. at 69-70. Mumford looked out of the corner of his eye and observed Parker "coming in the door." Id. at 70. Parker "had to push" on the door to enter "because like the door closes fast . . . on its own." Id.

[¶3] Mumford "hollered at [Parker]" and asked him what he was doing. Id. Parker began attacking Mumford and yelling "about some girl in here" while Mumford responded, "there ain't no girl in here." Id. at 71. Parker was "steadily coming after [Mumford]" and "talking crazy." Id. As Mumford tried to fight Parker off, Mumford "fell by the sink" and was unconscious "for about maybe thirty seconds, maybe a minute." Id. at 72. When Mumford woke up, Parker had him "pinned down" and was trying to "poke [him] with a stick." Id. Mumford broke the stick and yelled out for help that "this guy is over here trying to kill me." Id. at 73.

[¶4] The building's janitor, Leveal Buels, heard Mumford yelling for help so he entered Mumford's apartment. Buels observed Parker "over . . . Mumford, with a hammer axe type thing, going down at him and . . . Mumford was using his hands trying to protect himself." Id. at 112. Buels saw that Parker had Mumford "pinned down" as Parker tried to strike him "towards the head area." Id. at 113. Buels yelled at Parker to stop and told him he was calling police. Buels observed that if Mumford had not been holding Parker off, Parker's weapon would have hit Mumford "in the head or neck, somewhere up above his shoulders because that's where he was coming down at him." Id. at 114. Buels impression was that Parker was "serious" and clearly "trying to hurt [Mumford]." Id.

[¶5] Parker "took off running" with what surveillance video shows appears to be something like "a drywall hammer" in his hand as well as a blanket from Mumford's apartment. Id. at 135; State's Exhibit 39. Police located Parker near the apartment building. Parker told one of the officers that "they took my daughter" and claimed that Mumford and others had abducted children.

State's Exhibit 1. Police discovered a hammer/hatchet with Mumford's blood on it around the corner from where they located Parker, and they found a bloody stick in Mumford's apartment. Parker's clothing also had Mumford's blood on it. Mumford suffered multiple lacerations and a left tibia fracture requiring two operations as a result of the attack.

[¶6] On March 18, 2022, the State charged Parker with attempted murder as a level 1 felony, burglary as a level 1 felony, robbery as a level 2 felony, aggravated battery as a level 3 felony, and battery by means of a deadly weapon as a level 5 felony. On November 15, 2023, Parker filed a motion requesting a waiver of jury trial hearing and a written waiver of jury trial. The court held a hearing and accepted Parker's waiver of jury trial. The State alleged Parker was an habitual offender on December 5, 2023.

[¶7] The court held a bench trial on January 22, 2024. The court found Parker not guilty of robbery, guilty of the remaining counts, and found that he was an habitual offender. Following a sentencing hearing on February 14, 2024, the court sentenced Parker to concurrent sentences of forty years each for attempted murder and burglary, enhanced by twenty years for the habitual offender enhancement. The court vacated the convictions for aggravated battery and battery by means of a deadly weapon based upon double jeopardy concerns.

Discussion

I.

[¶8] Parker first asserts that reversal is warranted because "he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial." Appellant's Brief at 14. "The jury trial right is a bedrock of our criminal justice system, guaranteed by both Article [1], Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2016). Broadly stated, "federal and Indiana constitutional jury trial rights guarantee the same general protection-a criminal defendant must receive a jury trial, unless he waives it." Id. Pursuant to Indiana constitutional jurisprudence, "in a felony prosecution," that "waiver is valid only if communicated personally by the defendant[.]" Id. Personal waiver of the right to a jury trial may be either in writing or in open court. Id. at 1159.

[¶9] Here, Parker, along with his attorney, signed a "Waiver of Trial By Jury" form which provided that he understood his right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and that the waiver would leave the decision to the "Judge of this Court . . . without the use or intervention of a jury." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 175. During the hearing, Parker confirmed his signature on the waiver form and indicated that his lawyer had explained the document to him. When asked if he was satisfied with his lawyer's services, Parker responded, "I definitely am, Your Honor." Transcript Volume II at 28. When asked if he believed that waiver of trial by jury was in his best interests, Parker responded, "Well, yes, I do." Id. The court asked Parker to explain his understanding of the waiver, and Parker stated in part, "by waiving my trial by jury means that I won't have a jury of twelve people . . . come in here and determine my fate ...." Id. at 29. The court then reminded Parker at least three more times that due to the seriousness of the charges against him, he had the right to a jury trial; asked him again if he believed that waiver of his right was in his best interests, to which he responded affirmatively; confirmed that he understood that "there is no turning back" once the waiver is accepted by the court; and confirmed he had not been threatened or promised anything in exchange for his waiver, and that his waiver was a product of his free will. Id. at 30.

[¶10] Despite his signed waiver form and multiple clear waiver statements made in open court, Parker suggests his knowing waiver was somehow invalidated when, Magistrate James Snyder, the judicial officer who presided over the waiver hearing, explained the effect of waiver by stating, "if you are to waive the right to a trial by jury, only one individual is making that decision and it's going to be me." Id. Parker argues that "the [bench] trial to which he agreed to was before Judge Snyder" but that Judge Pro Tempore Jane Spencer Craney, and not Magistrate Snyder, presided over his bench trial. Appellant's Brief at 14. We are not persuaded by Parker's argument as nothing in the record indicates that his knowing oral waiver was premised on Magistrate Snyder's isolated general explanatory statement that was made after Parker had already repeatedly confirmed his understanding of, and his intention to waive, his right to a jury trial. Moreover, Parker's written waiver alone was sufficient to support a knowing waiver. See Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. 1998) (observing that "[a] written waiver executed by the defendant is adequate.") Based upon this record, we conclude that Parker knowingly waived his right to a jury trial.

II.

[¶11] Parker next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A. Burglary

[¶12] Regarding Parker's burglary conviction, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 provides that a person "who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with the intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony." However, the offense is "a Level...