Parks v. Romanowski

ROBERT EARL PARKS, Petitioner, v. KENNETH ROMANOWSKI, Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-13132

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

May 10, 2016

Honorable Linda V. Parker

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner Robert Earl Parks ("Petitioner") has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his state conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(f) (sexual penetration causing personal injury to the victim and using force or coercion to accomplish penetration). In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises several issues regarding his right to present a defense, the state prosecutor's conduct, the state trial court's rulings and omissions, his trial attorney's performance, the denial of his motion for substitution of counsel, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the cumulative effect of errors. Respondent Kenneth Romanowski urges the Court through counsel to deny the petition. Having reviewed the pleadings and state-court record, the Court finds that Petitioner's claims lack merit. Accordingly, the Court will deny the petition.

I. Background

Petitioner was charged in Macomb County, Michigan with one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, and one count of unarmed robbery. He was tried without a jury in Macomb County Circuit Court where the evidence established that,

on the day at issue, defendant argued with CW—his then girlfriend—at their home. There was testimony that defendant struck her several times, dragged her by her hair into their bedroom and shut the door. Once in the bedroom, defendant again began to strike her. CW testified that she thought that he was going to kill her; she said she was crying and asked him to stop hitting her. At some point defendant ordered her to take her clothes off and get on the bed. He then began to penetrate her while she cried and, at one point, wretched. Even after he went to the attached bathroom, she did not move from the bed because she was scared and did not believe she was free to leave. When he returned from the bathroom he ordered her to "stop acting that way" and asked how he was going "to bust a nut with your crying and acting this way."

After defendant forced CW to have sex, he took her to a cellular telephone store to purchase a cell phone that she had allegedly promised him. An employee saw CW and recalled that she appeared frightened. Defendant purchased a cell phone with his debit card but told CW that she had to reimburse him. He then took her to a bank where he used her debit card to withdraw $200. After returning to the home, defendant left without CW to withdraw another $300 from her account. She then went to a neighbor's home and called the police.

Defendant testified at trial and admitted that he slapped CW and dragged her into the bedroom by her hair during an argument. However, he stated that she consented to having sex with him to makeup after their argument.

People v. Parks, No. 303683, 2012 WL 3101832, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31, 2012)(unpublished).

On February 8, 2011, the trial court acquitted Petitioner of unarmed robbery, but found him guilty, as charged, of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On April 5, 2011, the court sentenced Petitioner as a habitual offender to imprisonment for twenty-five to forty years with no credit for days served because Petitioner was on parole when the crime occurred.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, but remanded his case for re-sentencing because Petitioner did not properly waive his right to assistance of counsel at sentencing. See id.¹ On April 1, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded to review the issues, see People v. Parks, 493 Mich. 952; 828 N.W.2d 44 (2013), and on June 25, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. See People v. Parks, 494 Mich. 873; 832 N.W.2d 218 (2013).

On July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleges as grounds for relief that: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (3) the trial court abused its discretion and denied him a fair trial; (4) trial counsel failed toadequately perform his professional responsibilities; (5) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial; (6) the trial court failed to assess his ability to reimburse the county for court-appointed attorney fees; (7) the trial court erred by denying his motion for substitute counsel; and (8) the evidence was insufficient. (ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 19-35.)

Although Respondent maintains that Petitioner did not exhaust state remedies for two of his claims and that he procedurally defaulted three other claims, "the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default raise only federal-state comity concerns and are not a jurisdictional limitation of the power of the court." Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991). Petitioner's claims lack merit or are not cognizable on habeas review. The Court therefore finds it more efficient to proceed to the merits of Petitioner's claims than to analyze whether they are exhausted or procedurally defaulted. The alleged failure to comply with the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines is excused.

II. Standard of Review

"The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). Pursuant to § 2254, the courtmay not grant a state prisoner's application for the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court's adjudication of the prisoner's claims on the merits

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the "contrary to" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000) (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court for Part II).

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id., 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S. Ct. at 1522. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2066 n.7 (1997), and'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,' Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (per curiam)." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010).

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004)). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on his claims "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id., 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

III. Analysis

A. Claim 1: Constitutional Right to Present a Defense

Petitioner alleges he was deprived of his right to present a defense because evidence was suppressed and two witnesses were not allowed to testify. The evidence in question consists of a medical report summarizing the results of a physical examination of the complainant, a recording of the complainant's 911 call to the police, lab reports, and pictures taken of the complainant following the alleged rape. Petitioner claims that none of this evidence was provided before trial and that two witnesses (the medical technician who examined the complainantafter the alleged rape and his friend Rhonda Allen) were never called to testify.

Petitioner claims that the medical technician would have testified that the complainant was not physically injured, and Ms. Allen would have testified that Petitioner spent a night with her. According to Petitioner, Ms. Allen's testimony would have demonstrated that the complainant had a motive to falsify her accusation against Petitioner.

The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed Petitioner's claim for "plain error" because Petitioner did not preserve the claim for appeal. The Court then concluded that Petitioner did not establish that the trial court plainly erred.

The Supreme Court has said that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984)). In this case...