Parris v. New York City Housing Authority, 18 Civ. 8299 (VM)

364 F.Supp.3d 284

Nathaniel PARRIS, Plaintiff,

v.NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY and Darrell Laval, Defendants.

18 Civ. 8299 (VM)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed February 26, 2019

Marcel Florestal, Florestal Law Firm, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jane Elizabeth Lippman, New York, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Nathaniel Parris ("Parris") filed this action against defendants New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") and Darrell Laval ("Laval," and together with NYCHA, "Defendants") in New York State Supreme Court, New York County (the "State Court"), alleging various federal- and state-law violations. (See"Complaint," Dkt. No. 1-3.) On September 12, 2018, Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removed the action to this Court. (See Dkt. No. 1.)

According to the Complaint, Parris formerly worked as a Regional Asset Manager for NYCHA. Laval, who is the Director of Mixed Finance at NYCHA, formerly supervised Parris's work. Parris alleges that Laval retaliated against him in response to Parris complaining of Laval's mistreatment of him. Parris also alleges that Laval retaliated against him in response to Parris cooperating with an investigation by the Inspector General's Office against Louis Rodriguez, who, according to Parris, is Laval's close friend and staff member. On or about May 4, 2017, Parris filed an internal complaint with NYCHA against Laval. Later that month, NYCHA brokered a confidential conciliation agreement between Parris and Laval. Parris alleges that Laval subsequently violated the terms of the conciliation agreement by, among other things, denying him a promotion for which he was qualified. Separately, Parris alleges that NYCHA failed to intervene or supervise Laval throughout this time. According to Parris, he was forced to resign from his position at NYCHA on September 2, 2017, due to the stress caused by his interactions with Defendants.

The Complaint asserts seven causes of action: (1) retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 etseq., against Defendants; (2) retaliation under the New York False Claims Act, N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 187 etseq., against Defendants; (3) a Monell claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (the "Monell Claim") against NYCHA; (4) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the " Section 1983 Claim") against Laval; (5) breach of contract against Laval; (6) defamation and defamation per se against Laval; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress against NYCHA.

On September 14, 2018, Defendants wrote to Parris's counsel, in accordance with the Court's Individual Practices, to advise him of perceived deficiencies in the Complaint that, in Defendants' view, warrant dismissal of this action. ("September 14 Letter," Dkt. No. 3.) Defendants first argue that Parris's claims for retaliation under the federal and state False Claims Acts are attempts to bring a qui tam action without complying with the qui tam procedural requirements. Secondly, Defendants argue that Parris's Monell and Section 1983 Claims are deficient because the Complaint "fails to allege any actionable predicate conduct," nor does it "plead a policy, custom, or practice so as to establish municipal liability." (Id. at 2.) Thirdly, Defendants argue that Parris's breach of contract claim fails because NYCHA is not a party to the conciliation agreement and because the agreement does not give rise to a claim for breach of contract. Fourthly, Defendants argue that Parris's claim for defamation and defamation per se is deficient because the Complaint does not allege the requisite elements for such a claim. Finally, Defendants argue that Parris's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails because the Complaint does not allege any sufficiently outrageous conduct by Laval.

By letter dated September 21, 2018, Parris's counsel responded to the September 14 Letter and opposed Defendants' position regarding each cause of action. ("September 21 Letter," Dkt. No. 4.) Parris argues that his first two causes of action state a prima facie case for retaliation under the federal and state False Claims Acts. According to Parris, this action is therefore not subject to the federal and state qui tam procedural requirements. Secondly, Parris argues that the Complaint adequately alleges factual predicates for the Monell and Section 1983 Claims, which arise from Laval's acts of retaliation and NYCHA's failure to train and supervise Laval, respectively. Thirdly, Parris argues that the conciliation agreement is a binding agreement that gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. Fourthly, Parris argues that the Complaint adequately alleges the requisite elements for defamation and defamation per se claims by "clearly articulat[ing] the time, place and manner [of the statements], and also alleg[ing] an attack on [Parris's] professionalism." (Id. at 2.) Finally, Parris disagrees with Defendants' contention that Laval's actions were not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

By letter dated September 24, 2018, Defendants informed the Court that the parties, by their own efforts, were unable to resolve their dispute. ("September 24 Letter," Dkt. No. 5.) Accordingly, Defendants requested a pre-motion conference to discuss their contemplated motion to dismiss.

On October 11, 2018, the Court held a telephone conference (the "October 11 Telephone Conference") during which it heard arguments from the parties and reached certain conclusions. (See Dkt. Minute Entry for 10/11/2018.) The Court granted Parris leave to amend the Complaint to cure defects in the first and second causes of action. The Court also directed Parris to amend the Complaint to remove the third and fourth causes of action, but the Court and the parties agreed that Parris could state a non-Monell negligence claim. Regarding the fifth cause of action, the Court directed Parris to submit an additional letter addressing whether there exists a legal basis for sustaining a claim for breach of contract arising from an alleged violation of the terms of a conciliation agreement. Regarding the sixth cause of action, the Court indicated that the Complaint appears to contain sufficiently particular factual allegations supporting Parris's claim for defamation and defamation per se. Finally, regarding the seventh cause of action, the Court indicated that the Complaint does not appear to contain sufficiently particular factual allegations to support Parris's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court proposed that it would construe Defendants' September 14 Letter as a motion to dismiss and issue a ruling thereon, a proposal to which both parties agreed.

Consistent with the Court's directive, Parris filed an amended complaint on October 18, 2018. ("Amended Complaint," Dkt. No. 6.) The Amended Complaint asserts five causes of action: (1) retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 etseq., against Defendants; (2) retaliation under the New York False Claims Act, N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 187 etseq., against Defendants; (3) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against NYCHA; (4) breach of contract against Laval; and (5) defamation and defamation per se against Laval.

On the same day, Parris also submitted a letter in further support of his argument that an alleged violation of the terms of a conciliation agreement can form the basis for a breach of contract claim. ("October 18 Letter," Dkt. No. 7.) While Parris states that "[he] has found numerous cases in which a [p]laintiff has sued a [d]efendant for breach of a conciliation agreement brokered by a third[-]party entity," he cites only one such case. (Id. ) Specifically, Parris contends that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained a claim for breach of contract arising from a violation of a conciliation agreement in Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).

On October 22, 2018, Defendants responded to the October 18 Letter, arguing in further support of their position that a conciliation agreement cannot form the basis for a breach of contract claim. ("October 22 Letter," Dkt. No. 8.) According to Defendants, the case to which Parris cites in his October 18 Letter is inapposite because, unlike the conciliation agreement at issue in Doe, the conciliation agreement at issue in this action does not itself give rise to liability. Furthermore, Defendants contend that "there is no statutory or other authority to sanction a breach of contract action for the alleged failure to comply with the terms of a conciliation agreement facilitated by [ ] NYCHA." (Id. at 1.)

On October 26, 2018, Parris submitted a reply to the October 22 Letter, arguing that his breach of contract claim is brought under contract law -- not federal or state statutory law -- and is thus analogous to the claim at issue in Doe. ("October 26 Letter," Dkt. No. 9.)

On November 1, 2018, Defendants filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. ("Answer," Dkt. No. 10.) In addition to denying Parris's substantive allegations, Defendants assert six defenses. (See id. at 5.)

The Court now construes Defendants' September 14 Letter as a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (" Rule 12(b) (6)"). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This standard is met "when the plaintiff...