Parrott v. State

312 Ga. 580

864 S.E.2d 80

PARROTT

v.The STATE.

S21A0753

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: October 5, 2021

Hunter Joseph Rodgers, Keegan Christian Gary, Paulding County Public Defender's Office, 280 Constitution Blvd Suite 1086, Dallas, Georgia 30132, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Anthony Brett Williams, A.D.A., Matthew Wayne Rollins, Paulding County District Attorney's Office, 280 Constitution Boulevard, Room 2072, Dallas, Georgia 30132, for Appellee.

Warren, Justice.

Jimmy Lloyd Parrott was convicted for, among other things, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer in violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5). After his initial probationary sentence for that offense was deemed void, he was resentenced to five years in prison. Parrott appeals from that resentencing, challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing provision of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) under the Equal Protection Clause. Parrott also contends that his resentencing violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. In 2014, Parrott pleaded guilty to six traffic-related offenses, including being a "habitual violator" under OCGA § 40-5-58 and felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5). In accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Parrott to a combination of prison time, probation, and fines. As relevant to this appeal, Parrott received a sentence of five years, with two to serve in prison, for the habitual violator offense, and a consecutive sentence of five years’ probation, plus a $5,000 fine, for felony fleeing.

After he completed his first sentence and began serving the consecutive sentence for felony fleeing, Parrott moved to vacate as void the probation portion of that sentence, arguing that the applicable statute, OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5), did not authorize probation.¹ Parrott insisted, however, that the fine portion was still valid, so there was no need for resentencing. The trial court agreed that the probation portion of Parrott's sentence was void, but it vacated his entire sentence for felony fleeing—including the fine portion—and announced its intent to resentence Parrott on that count.

Parrott objected to the resentencing, contending, among other things, that resentencing him for felony fleeing would violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy and that the sentencing provision of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court overruled Parrott's objections but gave him a chance to seek the withdrawal of his guilty plea, which Parrott declined. After a sentencing hearing, the court resentenced Parrott to five years in prison, without a fine.

2. We first address Parrott's claim that OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. In that regard, Parrott argues that OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) on its face treats him differently than others in a similar situation because, he says, that provision mandates prison time for indigent defendants—like himself—who are unable to pay the $5,000 fine, whereas those who can afford the fine can avoid a prison sentence. Parrott's argument is without merit.

Even if Parrott is correct that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits differentiating between indigent and non-indigent defendants in the way he claims—a question we need not decide here—nothing in the plain language of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) conditions the imposition of a fine on the defendant's ability to pay or otherwise treats indigent defendants differently from those who are not indigent. See OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) ; Nicely v. State , 291 Ga. 788, 792, 733 S.E.2d 715 (2012) ("[T]o show a denial of equal protection, one first must demonstrate that the law treats him differently than similarly situated persons."). Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing court imposed a prison term on Parrott because he could not afford to pay a $5,000 fine, or that Parrott could have averted a prison sentence if he had demonstrated an ability to pay a fine. Accordingly, the trial court properly overruled Parrott's objection to resentencing based on equal protection grounds.

3. Parrott alternatively contends that, when the trial court resentenced him for felony fleeing, it imposed multiple punishments for a single crime in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See Medina v. State , 309 Ga. 432, 435, 844 S.E.2d 767 (2020) (noting that the double jeopardy clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions protect the defendant from, among other things, "multiple punishments for the same offense") (citation and punctuation omitted).²

As an initial matter, Parrott did not receive "multiple punishments for the same offense" simply by virtue of being resentenced. A trial judge has the authority to "correct a void sentence at any time," Rooney v. State , 287 Ga. 1, 2, 690 S.E.2d 804 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted), and "a sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow." von Thomas v. State , 293 Ga. 569, 571, 748 S.E.2d 446 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). On appeal, neither party disputes that Parrott's original sentence of five years’ probation for felony fleeing was void, and we agree with that conclusion based on OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) ’s express textual prohibition on the imposition of probation for a violation of that statute. See OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) ("Following adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for a violation of [the enumerated offense provisions], the sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld [.]") (emphasis supplied). Thus, the trial court was authorized to correct the void sentence it previously imposed, including by resentencing Parrott on that count. See Rooney , 287 Ga. at 2, 690 S.E.2d 804. See also Dennis v. State , 300 Ga. 457, 459, 796 S.E.2d 275 (2017) (because the defendant's original sentence for a particular offense was void, "the trial court was free to resentence him" for that offense).

Moreover, the mere fact that Parrott's new sentence was more severe than the original sentence also does not violate double jeopardy protections. We have stated that, in the multiple-punishment context, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's "legitimate ‘expectation of finality in his [original] sentence.’ " Stephens v. State , 289 Ga. 758, 764, 716 S.E.2d 154 (2011) (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco , 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) ). See also Wilford v. State , 278 Ga. 718, 719-720, 606 S.E.2d 252 (2004). But a convicted defendant, like Parrott, "has neither a vested right to nor a reasonable expectation of finality as to a pronounced sentence which is null and void." Hulett v. State , 296 Ga. 49, 54, 766 S.E.2d 1 (2014) (quoting Bryant v. State , 229 Ga. App. 534, 535, 494 S.E.2d 353 (1997) (rejecting double jeopardy claim where the trial court vacated the defendant's original sentence as void and imposed a new, longer sentence in compliance with the sentencing statute)); Strickland v. State , 301 Ga. App. 272, 274, 687 S.E.2d 221 (2009) (defendant had no reasonable expectation in the finality of a prison-only sentence because the applicable statute imposed a mandatory fine in addition to imprisonment). Cf. Wilford , 278 Ga. at 720, 606 S.E.2d 252 (holding that no double jeopardy violation occurred where the defendant was resentenced to a longer term after the trial court determined that his original sentence was improperly imposed under the First Offender Act).³

Although Parrott concedes that his probation sentence for felony fleeing was void, he contends that the trial court was not authorized to resentence him because a $5,000 fine by itself, without imprisonment, is a legal sentence for felony fleeing. See OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5). He thus argues that the trial court was required under Georgia law to vacate only the void portion of the sentence (i.e., probation) and leave the valid portion (the fine) as the sole remaining sentence. In other words, Parrott argues that the trial court was required to do nothing more and nothing less than excise the void portion of the sentence. This approach, however, is not compelled by our precedent.

Generally speaking, Georgia law gives trial judges great discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory parameters. See Tuggle v. State , 305 Ga. 624, 628, 825 S.E.2d 221 (2019) ("Generally speaking, trial courts have the discretion to impose sentence within the parameters prescribed by a statute and if the sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellate courts will not review it.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Rooney , 287 Ga. at 3, 690 S.E.2d 804 ("The discretionary assessment of punishment within legislatively prescribed boundaries has long been ingrained and accepted in American jurisprudence.") (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. Riggs , 301 Ga. 63, 68-70, 799 S.E.2d 770 (2017) (stating that, although the applicable sentencing statute did not expressly authorize a partially concurrent and partially consecutive sentence, "[w]e find within the law no limitation on this broad [sentencing] discretion" precluding such a "hybrid" sentence, and "in construing other statutes related to sentencing, we have found that a trial court's discretion is limited only by an express legislative act").⁴

We acknowledge that this Court's handling of sentences that could be characterized as partially void may appear to be inconsistent. For example, in several of our cases where part of a sentence—such as a parole...