Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health Sys.

230 A.3d 1190

Brianna PASQUINI

v.FAIRMOUNT BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM & UHS of Fairmount, Inc., Appellants

No. 2017 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 4, 2020

Filed March 25, 2020

Reargument Denied May 19, 2020

Andrew C.S. Efaw, Denver, for appellant.

Mark Patrick Merlini Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.

Joshua Ryan Van Naarden, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

Fairmount Behavioral Health System & UHS of Fairmount, Inc. (Appellants) appeal from the Order entered on May 14, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting Brianna Pasquini's (Appellee) Motion to Strike Objections to Requests for Admission and requiring Appellants to admit or deny whether they knew a non-party patient was a registered sex offender in January of 2016. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant procedural history herein as follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2017, [Appellee] filed the instant litigation alleging a personal injury action arising out of the preventable rape and sexual assault suffered by Appellee while she was receiving inpatient addiction treatment at [Appellants’] facility. Appellee alleges in January, 2016, she was raped and assaulted by Montezz Hewlett, a fellow patient at the facility who, at the time, had a documented history of violent sexual crimes- including a rape conviction- and was a registered sex offender. Appellee alleges that Appellants knew or should have known of Hewlett's history and sex offender status, yet they allowed him unfettered and unmonitored access to Appellee, resulting in her rape and sexual assault.

While conducting discovery, Appellee served a request for admissions stating: "It is admitted that Defendant, Fairmount Behavioral Health System, knew that Mr. Hewlett was a convicted sex offender in January 2016." Mr. Hewlett's status as a sex offender is publicly available information via the internet due to the requirements of Pennsylvania's Registration of Sexual Offenders Act ("Megan's Law"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10, et seq. Appellants objected, claiming that the information sought was "privileged" because Hewlett was a patient at their facility. Appellee moved to strike this objection, noting the request sought Appellants’ knowledge of publicly available information.

Following briefing and oral argument before this [c]ourt, Appellee's motion to strike Appellants’ objection was granted, requiring Appellants to respond to the request for admission. Appellants, in response, filed a motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, certification to appeal the May 14, 2019 Order. Appellants also filed two motions seeking to stay the case. Appellants argued that responding to the request would require disclosing privileged information about Hewlett, therefore, the Order should be vacated. This [c]ourt denied all of Appellants’ motions.

On June 12, 2019, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming the May 14 order is collateral under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) because it violates the confidentiality provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7101, et seq. and the psychiatrist -patient privilege. Subsequently the Superior Court denied Appellee's Motion to Quash.^[1]

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/26/19, at 1-2.

On July 8, 2019, Appellants filed their Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal which is a four-page narrative. Therein, Appellants contend they cannot readily discern the basis for the trial court's decision, and therefore, they "generally challenge" the court's finding that they must respond to Appellee's request for admission at issue. Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 7/8/19, at 2. Appellants further state that "this statement of errors includes every subsidiary issue [Appellants] raised in [their] Response to Appellee's Motion to Strike and in [their] Motion for Reconsideration submitted following the entry of the May 14, 2019, Order." Id .² On September 26, 2019, the trial court filed is Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

In their brief, Appellants present the following Statement of the Questions Involved:

1. Does a request for admission asking a mental health treatment provider to reveal information learned from a patient during treatment violate the Pennsylvania psychotherapist-patient privilege, 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (West 2019) ?

2. Does a request for admission asking a party to reveal the contents of privileged medical records violate the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7111 (West 2019)?

Brief of Appellants at 3.

It is axiomatic that "[a]n appeal lies only from a final order, unless permitted by rule or statute." Stewart v. Foxworth , 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa.Super. 2013). As previously noted, this Court's September 6, 2019, Per Curiam Order, denied Appellee's motion to quash the instant appeal without prejudice to her right to raise again the issue before the merits panel. Although Appellee has not done so, "since we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order." Gunn v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut , 971 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we begin by addressing whether we possess jurisdiction to review the trial court's order.

In order to be appealable, an order must be a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341 - 42 ; an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a) - (b), Pa.R.A.P. 311 - 12 ; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.³ When considering the appealability of a discovery order concerning one's mental health records and a report pertaining thereto, this Court recently stated:

"The courts of Pennsylvania have uniformly held that, if an appellant asserts that the trial court has ordered him [or her] to produce materials that are privileged, then Rule 313 applies." Farrell v. Regola , 150 A.3d 87, 95 (Pa.Super. 2016), citing Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian , 119 A.3d 1012, 1016 n. 1 (Pa.Super. 2015) ("When a party is ordered to produce materials purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 313...."), Ben v. Schwartz , 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 549 (1999) (holding that when a trial court refuses to apply a claimed privilege, the decision is appealable as a collateral order, and Commonwealth v. Harris , 612 Pa. 576, 32 A.3d 243, 248 (2011) ) (distinguishing federal law and reaffirming Pennsylvania law that "orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313"). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this order is appealable as a collateral order.

Commonwealth v. Segarra appeal of: Complainant Witness, D.G., a minor , 228 A.3d 943, 948–50 (Pa.Super. Feb. 10, 2020).

Applying the above analysis to the case at bar, we reach the same conclusion. We are able to examine the issues of privilege raised by Appellants without analyzing the underlying issues in the case, i.e . Appellants’ alleged negligence, gross negligence, carelessness and recklessness. In addition, Appellants allege the requested material is subject to various privileges and that the potential revelation of this sensitive mental health information implicates the "importance" prong of the collateral order doctrine, as such privacy rights are deeply rooted in public policy. Finally, our failure to review the propriety of the trial court's discovery order at this juncture would result in Appellants’ claim of privilege being irreparably lost, as they could be forced to disclose sensitive information in conformance with the trial court's discovery order, and such compliance could not be undone in a subsequent appeal. See T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc. , 950 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2008).

Having determined that the requirements of the collateral order doctrine have been met and that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we now proceed to examine the issues Appellants have raised. "In reviewing the propriety of a discovery order, we determine whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and, to the extent that we are faced with questions of law, our scope of review is plenary." Id .

Appellants contend the trial court's May 14, 2019, Order requires them "to disclose [their] knowledge of information obtained from a non-party patient in furtherance of providing mental health treatment to him." Brief for Appellants at 8. Appellants urge this Court to reverse based on either the "psychotherapist-patient privilege," 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944⁴ or the "Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act" (MHPA), 50 P.S. § 7111.⁵ Id . In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that:

"evidentiary privileges are not favored." Commonwealth v. Stewart , 547 Pa. 277, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (observing "[e]xceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."). Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege "only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth." Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation , 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) ).

BouSamra v. Excela Health , 210 A.3d 967, 975 (Pa. 2019).

Herein, during discovery in her underlying action, Appellee sought to determine whether or not Appellants knew of Mr. Hewlett's sexually violent past at the time he allegedly attacked Appellee on January 21, 2016. Appellee served upon Appellants a request for admission, and Appellants responded as follows:

Q. It is admitted that Defendant, Fairmount Behavioral Health System, knew that Mr. Hewlett was a convicted sex offender in January 2016.

ANSWER :

...