Pathfinder Realty, Inc. v. Taylor

1

2024-Ohio-4708

PATHFINDER REALTY, INC. Appellee v. MONCIERRA TAYLOR AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS Appellant

C. A. No. 30126

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery

September 27, 2024

Civil Appeal from Municipal Court Trial Court Case No. 23 CVG 1191

Laurence A. Lasky, Attorney for Appellant

Steven C. Katchman, Attorney for Appellee

OPINION

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Moncierra Taylor appeals from an order of the Dayton Municipal Court, which granted restitution of premises to Pathfinder Realty, Inc. ("Pathfinder") after overruling Taylor's objections to a magistrate's decision. Because Taylor has vacated the premises, no meaningful relief can be granted, and this appeal is dismissed as moot.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 2, 2023, Pathfinder, a property management company acting as the agent for the owner of premises located on Kumler Avenue in Dayton, filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Taylor, who resided at the property. According to the complaint, Pathfinder had taken over management of the premises at issue and had not been "furnished with a written lease." The complaint alleged that Taylor had not complied with the terms and conditions of the lease, namely the payment of rent, that Pathfinder had provided the required statutory notice to Taylor to vacate the premises, and that Taylor had not vacated the premises. Pathfinder demanded restitution of the premises. A copy of the February 25, 2023 "Notice to Leave the Premises" was attached to the complaint listing nonpayment of rent as the grounds and an amount due of $600.

{¶ 3} A hearing on the complaint occurred on April 3, 2023 before a magistrate. Jason Cuff testified that he was employed by Pathfinder to provide property maintenance services and to serve as a "courier" of three-day notices. Cuff stated that Pathfinder was the agent for the owner of the Kumler Avenue premises and that Taylor resided there "month-to-month," with rent of $885 per month due on the first of the month. He identified the three-day notice to vacate that he had taped to the front door of the premises. Cuff acknowledged that Taylor had made "efforts to pay, but nothing has actually come through to date."

{¶ 4} Taylor, who appeared pro se, stated that she had been living on the premises for eight years. She testified that, originally, Sylvester Ballard was her landlord and she "did a rent-to-own with him"; she gave him about $8,000 or $9,000 when she moved in. She testified that Ballard "went under [her] nose and sold it to [Pathfinder]." She apparently believed that she had had a "rent-to-own" agreement with Ballard; she stated that she had documentation of the agreement, but she had not brought it to the hearing. She had contacted her lawyer, but that person had been unable to attend the hearing. According to Taylor, she went to Pathfinder the Friday before the Monday hearing with $1,400 but was told that Pathfinder's lawyer was not there and "to ask him in court Monday." Taylor stated that she had $1,500 at the hearing.

{¶ 5} The magistrate advised Pathfinder's attorney that she was inclined to allow Taylor an opportunity to locate her documentation and appear with representation, noting that Taylor appeared to be willing to continue to pay rent. Pathfinder's attorney asserted that this (the hearing) was the first time it had been brought to his attention that there might be a land installment contract that Taylor had entered with a prior owner "that was then pedaled to" Pathfinder; he asserted that Pathfinder did not have such a document. Counsel also indicated that Taylor had been reaching out to Pathfinder but hadn't followed through with making payments, and that if she did make payments, Pathfinder would accept the money. The magistrate continued the matter for one week to allow Taylor to bring her rent current and locate a copy of her contract.

{¶ 6} A second hearing occurred on April 10, 2023, before a different magistrate. Pathfinder's attorney advised the magistrate that he had confirmed the existence of the land installment contract and had spoken to Taylor's attorney. Counsel had apparently agreed to extend the matter for 60 days and requested a 60-day extension. The magistrate granted the extension.

{¶ 7} A third hearing occurred on June 5, 2023, before the second magistrate. At that hearing, Taylor's attorney represented that there had been a land contract for the amount of $54,000 that "was never recorded officially." According to counsel, Taylor, who remained in the premises, had paid almost $20,000 on the contract, and the prior owner was "not acknowledging that." Taylor's counsel suggested that Taylor and Pathfinder needed to reach some kind of agreement about the payment of rent, in escrow or otherwise, while Taylor pursued an action against Ballard. Pathfinder's attorney stated that the land contract had clearly been in existence more than five years and that Pathfinder had received no payments "for a number of months."

{¶ 8} The court indicated that the "ultimate question" was whether an eviction was permissible or whether there had to be a foreclosure. Counsel for Taylor stated that Pathfinder had refused to accept her payments and had asked instead for her to terminate the land contract and sign a lease agreement with Pathfinder. Counsel for Pathfinder stated that, if Taylor could bring the rent current, she could continue to make her payments while pursuing the matter with the prior owner separately. The magistrate indicated that she would research the issue of an unrecorded land contract, and the matter was continued again for a week.

{¶ 9} On June 12, 2023, the hearing resumed before the second magistrate. Taylor appeared without counsel, and the magistrate noted she had granted counsel's motion to withdraw. Counsel for Pathfinder argued that, to be valid, a land installment contract must be recorded, which Taylor's agreement was not, so the contract should be "treated as a regular lease agreement" with an arrearage for nonpayment of rent. Pathfinder asked to proceed with the eviction against Taylor, and Taylor requested a continuance. The court agreed to continue the hearing, conditioned on Taylor's placing $1,200 in escrow with the clerk. After a pause in the proceedings, Taylor produced a receipt from the clerk's office reflecting a deposit of $1,200.

{¶ 10} On June 13, 2023, Taylor filed a pro se request for a copy of the land installment contract that Pathfinder's attorney had presented in court the previous day. On June 23, 2023, Taylor filed a request for a continuance, which the court denied.

{¶ 11} On June 26, 2023, the eviction hearing commenced before a third magistrate. Pathfinder asserted that a three-day notice had been served on Taylor and that there was the land installment contract that had never been recorded and of which Pathfinder had not known. Pathfinder requested that its arrangement with Taylor be treated as "just a simple lease agreement" and asserted that there had been a nonpayment of rent. According to Pathfinder, the only real issue was whether Pathfinder could proceed with the eviction, because the land installment contract had never been recorded, or had to proceed with a foreclosure to get the relief it requested.

{¶ 12} Taylor, who was again without counsel, advised the magistrate that she had gone to Pathfinder that same morning, at which time she had been told that she owed $2,600 and that, in order to stay in her home, she would have to sign to terminate the land contract. She stated that she had $2,600 and had provided $1,200 the week before, but she declined to terminate the land contract without the advice of a lawyer. The magistrate advised Taylor that Ohio is a "first record state, which means documents concerning ownership of residential and commercial property have to be evidenced by recordation. So, if there is not status of recordation, essentially that would not count in the chain of title of succession."

{¶ 13} Pathfinder indicated that it wanted Taylor to execute a new lease agreement because the land contract was in default. Counsel asserted that a balloon payment had been due two years after the land contract was executed and it had never been made.

{¶ 14} After further discussion, the magistrate indicated that, if no new lease agreement were signed, the matter would proceed as an eviction. The magistrate found that Taylor had "an unrecorded land contract," which meant that she was "essentially . . . a tenant without a lease agreement." The magistrate advised Taylor that she did not have any "equity rights" in the property and that, without a lease agreement, she "would be looked at as a holdover."

{¶ 15} Pathfinder told the magistrate that it wanted restitution of the premises in the absence of payment of rent due. The magistrate went into recess to allow Taylor to consider signing the new lease agreement with Pathfinder. Thereafter, when Taylor declined to enter into a new lease agreement, the magistrate granted restitution of the premises to Pathfinder and ordered that the funds in escrow be released to Pathfinder. A magistrate's decision was issued the same day as the hearing, and the municipal court adopted the decision the next day, June 27, 2023.

{¶ 16} On June 28, a new attorney appeared in the municipal court on Taylor's behalf and filed notice that he would be filing a compulsory counterclaim against Pathfinder and a third-party complaint against Ballard; counsel also requested an emergency stay of execution of the court's restitution order. Specifically, counsel asserted that, in 2015, Taylor had agreed to pay $54,000 for the property, which was now worth considerably more, and that the proper remedy for Pathfinder to reclaim...