Patock v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior

873 F.Supp.2d 251

James M. PATOCK, Sr., Plaintiff,

v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1910 (CKK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 6, 2012.

James M. Patock, Sr., Fairfax, VA, pro se.

Rhonda C. Fields, Michael J. Lanzdorf, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sues several District of Columbia and United States defendants for alleged constitutional violations and various common law torts. The suit arises out of plaintiff's arrest and convictionfollowing a search of his trailer on the National Mall in the District that uncovered firearms. See generally Patock v. Fox News Television Channel, 1:11–cv–974, 2012 WL 695892, at *1–2 (E.D.Va. Mar. 1, 2012). In addition to naming the Department of Interior (“DOI”) and its component United States Park Police, plaintiff sues at the federal level the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and its component Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). At the local level, plaintiff sues the District of Columbia, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Department of Health, Department of Corrections Director Thomas P. Hoey, District of Columbia Jail Warden Simon Wainwright (hereafter “District of Columbia defendants”), the Council of the District of Columbia, and Virginia German Shepherd Rescue, Inc. (“VGSRI”). See Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 7] (Caption).

Pending are the District of Columbia defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Dkt. # 15], which plaintiff has not opposed, and the federal defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which plaintiff has opposed. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and taking judicial notice of civil proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the Court will grant both motions to dismiss. In addition, the Court will dismiss the complaint against the D.C. Council and VGSRI, neither of which has appeared in the case, under the screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

BACKGROUND

This civil action is based on the same events underlying plaintiff's earlier-filed action in the Eastern District of Virginia. Since the factual record is more developed in the Eastern District, this Court hereby adopts the Eastern District's background statement set forth in its recently issued Memorandum Opinion. Patock, 2012 WL 695892 at *1–2. Notably, plaintiff pleaded guilty on December 20, 2010, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, “to Attempted Carrying of A Pistol Without a License and Possession of an Unregistered Firearm, in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22–4504(a), 7–2502.01.” Id. at *2. He was sentenced on January 14, 2011, to a 180–day suspended sentence and one-year probation. Id. See also Patock v. District of Columbia, Crim. No. 2010 CF2 020876 (D.C.Super.Ct.Docket).

Proceedings in the Eastern District of Virginia

Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in the Eastern District on September 12, 2011, against DOI and 13 other defendants. Patock, 2012 WL 695892 at *2. The Eastern District categorized plaintiff's claims against DOI as (1) an FTCA claim based on alleged defamation by the Park Police and unlawful conversion of plaintiff's German Shepherd and (2) a constitutional claim based on “DOI's [alleged] refusal to return [plaintiff's] dog and the weapons seized during his arrest.” Id. In his “prayer for relief [plaintiff] request[ed] [the] return of his dog, but not his firearms, and $20 million in damages.” Id.

On March 1, 2012, the Eastern District granted DOI's motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiff's claims against DOI with prejudice. Id. at *7. That court found, inter alia, (1) that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA claim because plaintiff had failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, (2) that plaintiff had no available remedy against DOI for constitutional violations, and (3) that DOI could not redress plaintiff's claim for the return of his German Shepherd because “it followed D.C. law and legally transferred Patock's dog to the Humane Society” and, thus, lacked custody or control over it. Id. at *4–6. The Eastern District further determined that since plaintiff's firearms “were confiscated in the course of his arrest in the District of Columbia,” it was not the proper venue for litigating plaintiff's claim for the return of his firearms. Id. at *6.

The Proceedings in this Court

In rambling allegations supporting the instant complaint filed here on November 1, 2011, 2011 WL 5241653, plaintiff generalizes the alleged wrongs “by the named defendants” as “[o]fficial and police malfeasance, and misconduct, police brutality, gross negligence ... issuing false statements, withholding evidence, destroying evidence, violation of the United States Freedom of Information Act, negligently refusing to provide retractions of statements and information found to be incorrect and fraud are also included.” Am. Compl. at 2 ¶ 1. Plaintiff claims specifically that his constitutional rights were violated in the following ways:

• His “second amendment rights were violated by the courts' refusal to follow the law as specified in DC code 4504.01.” Id. ¶ 2. He alleges that since he lived in his trailer for more than two years, “the courts ignored the exemption that allowed me to have weapons for self-defense in my home.” Id.

• The United States Park Police violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment when it “confiscated [his] legal weapons ... and ... refused to return them.” Id. ¶ 4.

• His “sixth amendment rights were violated when the judge allowed a statement allegedly made by James McFarland into evidence during a hearing on November 5, 2010 without having the person present in the courtroom for cross-examination.” Id. at 3 ¶ 5.

• His “eighth amendment rights ... were violated when [he] was kept in confinement [in the District of Columbia] where [he] was subject to constant physical and verbal abuse from both other inmates and ... many of the guards. One guard Sargeant even loudly stated in my hearing that white prisoners would be treated differently and far worse than blacks and Hispanics.” Id. ¶ 6.

In his prayer for relief, plaintiff requests “the immediate return of my pet German Shepherd ... and my other property, including my firearms,” and $20 million in monetary damages. Id. at 7.

DISCUSSION

The District of Columbia Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Since plaintiff has not opposed the District of Columbia defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court, pursuant to the Order of January 19, 2012, will grant those defendants' motion as conceded. See Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C.Cir.1997) (affirming district court's reliance on the absence of a response as a basis for treating a motion as conceded and granting the motion); accord Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294–95 (D.C.Cir.2004); see also Slovinec v. Amer. Univ., 520 F.Supp.2d 107, 111 (D.D.C.2007) (“Local Civil Rule 7(b) requires that a party opposing a motion serve and file an opposition at the time directed by the Court; if he fails to do so, the court may treat the motion as conceded.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Crummey v. Social Sec. Admin., 794 F.Supp.2d 46, 62 (D.D.C.2011) (although pro se parties “are entitled to a certain amount of solicitude in the conduct of litigation [,] ... that such solicitude is not limitless and [they] are not relieved of their obligation to comply with the applicable rules.”) (citing Slovinec, 520 F.Supp.2d at 111).

The Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

In their motion filed on February 6, 2012, the federal defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against the Park Police on several grounds but also for being duplicative of his claims pending in the Eastern District of Virginia. In light of the Eastern District's ruling on March 1, 2012, this Court finds that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the claims against DOI and the Park Police. See Rosendahl v. Nixon, 360 Fed.Appx. 167, 168 (D.C.Cir.2010) (finding that courts “may raise the res judicata preclusion defense sua sponte ”) (citing Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412–13, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000); Brown v. D.C., 514 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (D.C.Cir.2008)); Tinsley v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv's, Inc., No. 99–7031, 1999 WL 506720 (D.C.Cir. June 2, 1999) (per curiam) (stating that a “district court may apply res judicata upon taking judicial notice of [a] [party's] previous case”) (citing Gullo v. Veterans Cooperative Housing Ass'n, 269 F.2d 517 (D.C.Cir.1959) (per curiam)); see also Fenwick v. U.S., 691 F.Supp.2d 108, 116 (D.D.C.2010) (observing that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel “are so integral to the administration of the courts that a court may invoke [them] sua sponte.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

“Under [the doctrine of] collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Novak v. World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.Cir.1983) (internal quotations omitted). In order for collateral estoppel to bar a claim, “(1), the same issue now being raised must have been contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case; (2), the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in that prior case; and (3), preclusion in the second case must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first determination.” Martin v. Dep't of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 454 (D.C.Cir.2007). A prior adjudication of the court's subject matter jurisdiction...