Case Law Patrick v. State

Patrick v. State

Document Cited Authorities (11) Cited in (21) Related

Neil L. Weisman, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In February 2004, Jason Patrick pleaded guilty to Murder; Battery, as a Class B felony; and Criminal Confinement, as a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court identified mitigating and aggravating circumstances and sentenced Patrick to the maximum term of ninety-three years. Patrick now appeals and raises a single dispositive issue for review: whether his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment under Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied.

We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On July 7, 2002, nineteen-year-old Patrick had ten-year-old Evan Parker "come into the house that [Patrick] sometimes stayed at, 2516 W. Linden Street in South Bend." Appellant's App. at 709. Patrick then forced Parker into the basement of the house. At the time, Patrick was angry with Parker "from another instance." Id. Patrick used his fist to hit Parker in the head and face, which caused Parker bruising, contusions, and extreme pain and resulted in serious bodily injury. Patrick also used a knife to stab Parker at least twice, knowing that the manner in which he used the knife was likely to cause death. Patrick then left Parker confined in the basement. Parker was conscious when police officers discovered him, but he later died as a result of his injuries.

On July 10, 2002, the State charged Patrick with murder; battery, as a Class B felony; criminal confinement, as a Class B felony; and battery, as a Class C felony. In November 2002, the State filed a death penalty request. In July 2003, Patrick moved to dismiss the death penalty request on grounds that he is mentally retarded. Following a three-day hearing, the trial court found Patrick to be mentally retarded and dismissed the State's request for the death penalty.

In February 2004, Patrick entered into a guilty plea in which he agreed to plead guilty to murder, Class B felony battery, and Class C felony confinement. The agreement left sentencing to the trial court. During a guilty plea hearing, the trial court established a factual basis for all three offenses, accepted the plea agreement, and scheduled a sentencing hearing for the following month.

The parties appeared for sentencing on March 15, 2004. At that hearing, Parker's mother and aunt both testified and asked that the trial court impose the maximum sentence. Dr. Joseph Prahlow, a forensic pathologist, testified regarding Parker's injuries and cause of death. Dr. Prahlow stated that Parker died as a result of two stab wounds, but he also explained that Parker had sustained "many very superficial or shallow cutting wounds on many parts of his body." Id. at 757. Specifically, Dr. Prahlow stated that "[t]here [was a] cluster of seven superficial puncture wounds or stab wounds on [Parker's] left cheek area." Id. at 758. According to Dr. Prahlow, the superficial wounds suggested "some type of taunting or torture-like activity." Id. at 760.

Dr. Gregory Hale, a licensed psychologist, testified that he administered a Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory ("MMPI-II") test on Patrick, which showed that Patrick had a "fairly pathological or mal-adjusted profile." Id. at 768. He explained that Patrick's profile was not frequently seen, especially in persons his age. He stated that his profile "reflects things like anger, hostility, dislike for authority figures, unhappiness related to family experiences, suspiciousness, distrust, inability to really form good meaningful relationships, very easily hurt, suspects other people are going to hurt him, even before they do." Id. Dr. Hale also stated that it would be difficult to treat Patrick because he "is not somebody who bonds very well with people, and the moment as if he feels the relationship is not going in his way, he becomes angry and will push away." Id. at 771.

Patrick presented one witness at the hearing, Manette Zeitler, who is a mitigation specialist. Zeitler testified that Patrick grew up in South Village, Illinois, and that his parents kept him and his six siblings locked in the house, either in their rooms or in the basement. The children did not attend school, had no medical records, and abused alcohol and marijuana with their parents. Patrick and his siblings were verbally, physically, and sexually abused in their home. Zeitler submitted to the trial court an eleven-page report containing her findings, which included information she had received from Patrick's siblings. In addition to Zeitler's testimony, Patrick's counsel read a letter Patrick had written to the court in which he expressed remorse for what he had done.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court announced its sentence from the bench. In particular, the court first explained that because of its prior determination that Patrick is mentally retarded, the court was precluded under Indiana law from either imposing the death penalty or sentencing Patrick to life in prison without parole. The court explained that the "range of sentence in this case is ... anywhere from forty-five to ninety-three years." Id. at 811. Next, the trial court stated in relevant part:

The law requires that I consider in reaching any sentencing decision those criteria for sentencing that [are] set forth in [Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(a)]. The law in that statute also says that I may consider as aggravating factors those circumstances in sub-section B, and those circumstances in sub-section C, as mitigating factors.
Dealing with the first list, I have and am, considering the risk that Mr. Patrick will or may commit another crime;
I am and will, consider the nature and circumstances of this crime;
I am and will, consider Mr. Patrick's prior criminal record, character, condition;
Number four, the victim of the crime was less than 12 years of age is a factor that has to be considered[;] it is a factor that is an element in two of the offenses, however.
* * *
The seventh factor in that statute, any oral or written statement made by the victim of the crime, I have also considered that.
Aside from that, I have thought about and reviewed and will consider the testimony which was adduced at the mental retardation hearing on December 16, 17 and 18. I believe that is an important component to consider.
I have also considered Dr. Courtney's report, Dr. Figueroa's report and Dr. Hale's report, as were prepared in late January of this year as [they relate] to the competency issue.
I've considered the video taped statements that were introduced during the course of the hearing on mental retardation, specifically those statements that were made by the defendant, himself.
And I have ... it goes without saying, but I'll say it anyway, I've considered all of the testimony that I've heard today, the photographs, Ms. Zeitler's report, [eleven-page] report, and the information contained in the pre-sentence report itself.
I do realize in dealing with the mitigating factors, that there are mitigating factors that need to be recognized and addressed and talked about.
The Court did, based upon the testimony at the mental retardation hearing, find that under Indiana [l]aw the defendant is a mentally retarded person, and I've already dealt with that. And that is a factor which I believe has to be considered as a mitigating factor.
I have looked at and thought about ... what type of a family life Mr. Patrick had, and how that led him to be where he is today.
* * *
I do find that that was his upbringing, the experience he had in his home, his lack of education, and the sort of things that have been testified to from day one in this case through today, are matters which I must also consider in mitigation.
As it relates to the acceptance of responsibility, I'm aware of the law in this state, that essentially requires a court to consider as a matter of mitigation, that a plea was entered....
* * *
In this case, I do note that even though that is the goal of that mitigating factor, that it took [one and one-half years] to resolve this case, that the plea was not to everything that was originally charged in the case. And that the victim's family has expressed, particularly Ms. Parker, her wish that life without parole or the death penalty would be imposed, which seems to me to mean that the victim's [family's] preference from day one would have bee[n] to prosecute the case fully to the maximum extent allowed.
I think that those things weigh a little bit in mitigating of the mitigation of the plea, but I do take the plea into consideration in doing this.
I have also considered both in mitigation and in aggravation, the psychological difficulties that Mr. Patrick may, and in fact[,] does face.
* * *
I also do note Mr. Patrick's relative young age, that is 19 at the time that this offense occurred, and 21 at the date of sentencing, today.
* * *
And there are I guess on the other side aggravating factors that I must consider, and I do consider.
It is true that Mr. Patrick does not have much of a criminal history, and that the criminal history that he has is certainly insignificant as it relates to these offenses. But I suppose almost any criminal history is insignificant [compared] to these types of offenses. But it is nonetheless something which I must consider.
The defendant does have a prior conviction, I'm assuming it's of a misdemeanor type [or] nature, it's called retail theft, I guess, in Cook County. We would probably call it conversion in this state.
But nonetheless there was a conviction noted in the pre-sentence report which occurred on April 24,
...
5 cases
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2008
Kendall v. State
"...State, 819 N.E.2d 119 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, opinion vacated by Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.2005);20 Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, opinion affirmed in part, vacated in part by Patrick v. State, 827 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.2005);21 Mitchell v. ..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2005
Edwards v. State
"...sentence based on aggravating circumstances, other than criminal history, that relied upon judicial "fact-finding." See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Ryle v. State, 819 N.E.2d 119 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Milligan v. State, 8..."
Document | Indiana Supreme Court – 2005
Williams v. State
"...court relied primarily on invalid aggravators, but also relied upon an "insignificant" criminal history. See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, aff'd in part, vacated in part by 827 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.2005). Therefore, we conclude that under these fa..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2005
Riehle v. State
"...next decide whether the remaining circumstance or circumstances are sufficient to support the sentence imposed. See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). As we explained in Means v. State, 807 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. Even one valid aggravating circumstan..."
Document | Minnesota Court of Appeals – 2005
State v. Senske
"...in other jurisdictions have declined to extend Blakely to consecutive sentencing based on judicial findings. See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ind.App.2004) (citing Cowens v. State, 817 N.E.2d 255 (Ind.App.2004); cf. People v. Murray, 5 Misc.3d 636, 785 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (N.Y.Sup.2..."

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5 cases
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2008
Kendall v. State
"...State, 819 N.E.2d 119 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, opinion vacated by Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.2005);20 Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, opinion affirmed in part, vacated in part by Patrick v. State, 827 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.2005);21 Mitchell v. ..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2005
Edwards v. State
"...sentence based on aggravating circumstances, other than criminal history, that relied upon judicial "fact-finding." See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Ryle v. State, 819 N.E.2d 119 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Milligan v. State, 8..."
Document | Indiana Supreme Court – 2005
Williams v. State
"...court relied primarily on invalid aggravators, but also relied upon an "insignificant" criminal history. See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. granted, aff'd in part, vacated in part by 827 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.2005). Therefore, we conclude that under these fa..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2005
Riehle v. State
"...next decide whether the remaining circumstance or circumstances are sufficient to support the sentence imposed. See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). As we explained in Means v. State, 807 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. Even one valid aggravating circumstan..."
Document | Minnesota Court of Appeals – 2005
State v. Senske
"...in other jurisdictions have declined to extend Blakely to consecutive sentencing based on judicial findings. See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ind.App.2004) (citing Cowens v. State, 817 N.E.2d 255 (Ind.App.2004); cf. People v. Murray, 5 Misc.3d 636, 785 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (N.Y.Sup.2..."

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