Patton v. Commonwealth

SAMUEL PATTON APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

No. 2020-CA-0526-MR

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

August 20, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 10-CR-00019

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: David L. Stewart LaGrange, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Thomas A. Van De Rostyne Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

BEFORE: DIXON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

OPINION

DIXON JUDGE:

Samuel Patton appeals the denial of his RCr^[1] 11.42 motion to vacate judgment of his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of his motion for an evidentiary hearing, entered by the Edmonson Circuit Court on February 7 2020. Applying the two-pronged performance and prejudice standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984), the trial court denied Patton's motion, finding that he failed to demonstrate either prong of Strickland's requirements of deficient assistance or that his case was prejudiced by trial counsel's actions. Following a careful review of the record, the briefs, and the law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to the occurrence of events described herein, Samuel Patton and Cheryl Coffey were friends. On a handful of occasions, Patton even spent the night at Coffey's house. Patton also spent time with Coffey's daughter, K.H., ^[2]both inside and outside of Coffey's presence. One evening in January 2010, K.H. rode with Patton to a liquor store in Bowling Green. After he made his purchase there, Patton gave K.H. some alcohol to drink. Later that month, on or about January 30, 2010, Patton spent the night at Coffey's house. Around midnight, Patton awakened K.H., led her to the kitchen, and raped her. Afterward, K.H. was scared and confused and did not immediately tell anyone what had transpired.

A few weeks later, on February 18, 2010, K.H. overheard her mother speaking on the telephone with a friend about child sexual abuse and began acting strangely. Coffey locked K.H. in her room and passed a note under the doorway inquiring as to whether K.H. had been sexually abused. Coffey was alarmed by K.H.'s written responses and took K.H. to the Sheriff's office to make a report. Deputy Sheriff Mike Vincent interviewed them and referred K.H. to the Child Advocacy Center (CAC) in Bowling Green for examination. Thereafter, Vincent also interviewed Patton.

On March 2, 2010, K.H. was examined by Dr. Jeffries Blackerby, ^[3] a pediatrician at the CAC, who observed a partially healed tear in K.H.'s hymen consistent with the allegations of sexual assault she relayed to him.

Shortly thereafter, Patton was indicted by the Edmonson County grand jury for rape in the first degree, ^[4] unlawful transaction with a minor (UTM) in the first degree, ^[5] UTM in the third degree (UTM III), ^[6] and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II).^[7] Patton was subsequently appointed legal representation.

Four years later, on March 20 and 21, 2014, Patton was tried by a jury. The Commonwealth called Vincent, Coffey, K.H., and Dr. Blackerby to testify. Patton called three witnesses - including his mother, Ruth Parker - and recalled Vincent. After closing arguments, the jury entered deliberations and quickly returned a guilty verdict of rape in the first degree and UTM III.

Before the sentencing phase of the trial commenced, the prosecution, defense counsel, and Patton reached a plea agreement. Following this agreement and the trial court's colloquy, Patton admitted - under oath and on the record - his guilt to first-degree rape and UTM III and entered his guilty plea in exchange for a prison sentence that was three years less than the minimum the jury could recommend at sentencing. The trial court asked Patton whether he needed additional time to consider his options, and he declined. During the colloquy, the trial court specifically informed Patton that his guilty plea would extinguish his right to appeal; Patton voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly acknowledged this. The trial court also asked Patton if he was satisfied with the performance of his counsel, to which Patton responded affirmatively.

Prior to final sentencing, Patton moved the trial court to withdraw his waiver of his right to appeal. The motion was denied, and Patton was sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement. Patton appealed this denial and other alleged evidentiary errors to our Court, which reversed the trial court's denial and addressed the evidentiary issues raised by Patton. This led the Commonwealth to seek - and subsequently be granted - discretionary review by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, ^[8] which ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Patton's conviction and sentencing. Id.

Following the Supreme Court's Opinion, Patton filed multiple motions - both with and without the assistance of counsel - including the one pursuant to RCr 11.42, as supplemented and amended, which was denied by the trial court and is now before us. The trial court denied this motion because Patton failed to demonstrate that the alleged errors of trial counsel prejudiced his case. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As previously observed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on Patton's direct appeal, when determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently trial courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006). "This inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive" and is reviewed for clear error. Id.

Concerning Patton's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, as established in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12 (Ky. 2002):

[t]he Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: [f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064]. To show prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.

(Emphasis added.) Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief may be granted. "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Herein, we need not determine whether Patton's counsel's performance was adequate on any or all of the issues raised because Patton fails to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsel's alleged deficient performance in representation of Patton.^[9]

To establish prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable probability exists that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. In short, one must demonstrate that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Fairness is measured in terms of reliability. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Harrington v Ritcher, 562 U.S. at 112, 131 S.Ct. at 792 (2011)).

Mere speculation as to how other counsel might have performed either better or differently without any indication of what favorable facts would have resulted is not sufficient. Conjecture that a different strategy might have proved beneficial is also not sufficient. Baze [v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2000)]; Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311 (1998). As noted by Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc): "The mere fact that other witnesses might have been available or that other testimony might have been elicited from those who testified is not a sufficient ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel."

Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). "No conclusion of prejudice . . . can be supported by mere speculation." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ky. 2000) (citations omitted).

In the context of an IAC claim pertaining to a defendant entering a guilty plea, Kentucky's highest court has opined:

A showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two components (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.

. . .

The trial court's inquiry into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the court to determine whether counsel's performance was below professional standards and caused the

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