Payer v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC (In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig.)

635 F.Supp.3d 1061

IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Document Relates to: (1) End Payer Plaintiffs(2) Commercial Food Preparer Plaintiffs(3) W. Lee Flowers & Co., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, et al.,(4) Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, et al.,(5) Affiliated Foods, Inc., et al. v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 3:15-MD-02670-DMS-MDD

Case No. 3:16-cv-01226

Case No. 3:18-cv-02212

Case No. 3:15-cv-02787

United States District Court, S.D. California

Signed October 19, 2022

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CERTAIN STATE LAW CLAIMS

(ECF No. 1992)

Dana M. Sabraw, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Certain State Law Claims by Defendants StarKist Co., Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd., Bumble Bee Foods,¹ LLC, Tri-Union Seafoods LLC d/b/a Chicken of the Sea International ("COSI"), Thai Union Group PCL, Del Monte Corporation, Lion Capital (Americas), Inc., Lion Capital LLP, and Big Catch Cayman LP (collectively, "Defendants"). (Defs.' Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 1992.) End Payer Plaintiffs ("EPPs"), Commercial Food Preparers ("CFPs"), and Direct Action Plaintiffs ("DAPs") Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("AWG")² and W. Lee Flowers & Co. ("Flowers") (collectively referred herein as "Plaintiffs") jointly filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Pls.' Opp'n, ECF No. 2092). Defendants replied (Defs.' Reply, ECF No. 2203). The motion is decided on the briefs without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion.

I.BACKGROUND

The general background and history of this litigation are discussed extensively in prior orders and are only reiterated briefly. (See e.g., ECF No. 2654.) Numerous civil actions have been filed against COSI, Bumble Bee Foods LLC ("Bumble Bee"), StarKist Company ("StarKist"), and their executives, alleging conspiracy to fix and maintain supracompetitive pricing for packaged tuna in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. The first such action was filed on August 3, 2015. See Olean Wholesale Groc. Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, No. 15cv1714, 2015 WL 4622010 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2015). These actions were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") for pretrial proceedings before this Court. (See Transfer Order, ECF No. 1). The Court divided the plaintiffs into four tracks: (1) Direct Action Plaintiffs, who are direct purchasers proceeding individually; (2) Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, who are proceeding on behalf of a putative class; (3) Commercial Food Preparer Plaintiffs, who are indirect purchasers proceeding on behalf of a putative class; and (4) End Payer Plaintiffs, who are consumers proceeding on behalf of a putative class.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses. Summary judgment or adjudication of issues is appropriate if depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1). A fact is material when it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).³ A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

The party moving for summary judgment has "the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018). "If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production . . . the nonmoving party may defeat the motion for summary judgment without producing anything." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1103. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014). Rather, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Determining credibility and weighing evidence remain functions for a jury, not a judge on summary judgment. Id. As Defendants' instant motion raises pure questions of law it is suitable for determination on summary judgment.

III.DISCUSSION

A. South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA")

Defendants first argue South Carolina's consumer protection statute expressly bars class action claims and therefore EPP and CFP classes fail as a matter of law. (Defs.' Partial Summ. J. at 8-18, ECF No. 1992.) According to Defendants, both the plain text of the Rules Enabling Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010), dictate that Rule 23 cannot supply EPPs and CFPs with a cause of action that the South Carolina legislature expressly precluded. (Id.) While this Court previously considered whether SCUTPA's prohibition against "representative" claims precludes the pursuit of those claims under Rule 23, Defendants assert the Court did so prior to class certification and "in the context of limited briefing." (Id. at 8.) Defendants thus request that the Court reconsider.

1. The Legal Standard for Reconsideration

Judge Janis Sammartino explicitly considered and rejected Defendants' argument that South Carolina's class action bar is a substantive rather than a procedural rule in an Order dated March 14, 2017. In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1085-86 (S.D. Cal. 2017). The bar for seeking reconsideration of a prior order is high, which Defendants concede, and is not met here. (Defs.' Partial Summ. J. at 9, ECF No. 1992; Pls.' Resp. at 7, n.2, ECF No. 2203.)

First, because Defendants' request is brought well beyond the twenty-eight-day period for reconsideration set forth in the Local Rules, it is deemed untimely. Civil Local Rule 7.1.i.2.

Second, to reexamine an issue previously decided by the same court is contrary to the law of the case doctrine. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) ("the orderly administration of lengthy and complex litigation such as this requires the finality of orders be reasonably certain . . . [which] is served by the doctrine of law of the case, which counsels against reopening questions once resolved in ongoing litigation.") Defendants do not explicitly assert that any of the bases for seeking reconsideration apply here, namely that "1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; 2) an intervening change in the law has occurred; 3) the evidence on remand is substantially different; 4) other changed circumstances exist; or 5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result." U.S. v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, Defendants argue that the Court's prior Order did not adequately consider "whether, in the context of a fractured Supreme Court opinion, a concurrence and a dissent may validly constitute the Court's legal holding." (Defs' Partial Summ. J. at 9, ECF No. 1992.)

2. There Is No Change Warranting Reconsideration

Under the Erie line of authorities, courts exercising diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive laws, but federal procedural laws. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). However, lower courts have long struggled to classify state laws as substantive or procedural. In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court considered whether a New York state law that "prohibit[ed] class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages" also "preclud[ed] a federal district court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23." 559 U.S. at 396, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (plurality opinion). The plurality established a two-step framework to resolve this question: first, do the federal and the state rules conflict, and second, does the Federal Rule run afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) and "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Id. at 397, 130 S.Ct. 1431. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that Rule 23 was not displaced by the state law. Id. at 410, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (plurality opinion); id. at 416, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia wrote for a four-justice plurality that "it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule." Id. at 410, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Justice Stevens concurred that Rule 23 controlled but based on a finding that the New York law was procedural in nature and therefore applying Rule 23 did not "abridge, enlarge, or modify" any substantive right under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Id. at 416-17, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (Stevens,...