Paylan v. Statton

376 So.3d 822

Christina PAYLAN, M.D., Appellant,

v.Joshua STATTON, Appellee.

No. 2D21-3904

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

December 27, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Doneene D. Loar, Judge.

Christina Paylan, M.D., pro se.

No appearance for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

Christina Paylan, M.D., appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her stalking injunction petition against her former boyfriend, Joshua Statton. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

Background

In September 2021, Dr. Paylan petitioned for a stalking injunction against Mr. Statton. She claimed that the two had a "casual dating relationship"¹ between 2012 and October 2019. After the relationship ended, Mr. Statton sent derogatory and profane emails to Dr. Paylan. Her petition included seven such emails, dated between March 16 and May 6, 2020. The final straw that prompted her petition was when Mr. Statton went to Dr. Paylan’s home in September 2021, and, in broad daylight, took a turtle lawn ornament, a Bed Bath & Beyond trinket, from her yard. Dr. Paylan’s security camera captured the footage. The trial court issued an ex parte temporary injunction.

After conducting a final hearing, where both parties proceeded pro se, the trial court dismissed the petition. The trial court reasoned that there was no "ongoing course, of conduct" involving "recent, repeated, malicious, willful harassment." The trial court found that Mr. Statton sent "some uncivil disgusting emails … two years ago" following a "disgusting breakup where a lot of really horrible things were said." However, "at best," the trial court explained, there was "potentially a petty [sic] theft of a turtle."

Dr. Paylan contends that she presented competent, substantial evidence to the trial court supporting issuance of a stalking injunction.

Discussion

[1, 2] "An order … denying an injunction following an evidentiary hearing is normally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ‘The trial court is afforded broad discretion in … denying … injunctions, and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, an appellate court must not disturb the trial court’s decision.’ " Shaw v. Tampa Elec. Co., 949 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting Jackson v. Echols, 937 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). As explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Florida courts may enjoin stalking under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2021). Such relief is appropriate when "[a] person … willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." § 784.048(2); accord Alter v. Paquette, 98 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("A person is guilty of stalking when he or she maliciously, willfully, and repeatedly harasses another person." (citing § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2011))). "[H]arass" is "a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a); see also Johnstone v. State, 298 So. 3d 660, 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) ("[S]talking requires the proof of a series of acts, willfully and maliciously directed at a specific person(s) and evidencing a continuity of purpose, which acts serve no legitimate purpose and cause substantial emotional distress to that person(s).").

[3] "In order to be entitled to a stalking injunction two separate instances of stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence." DiTanna v. Edwards, 323 So. 3d 194, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); see also Givens v. Holmes, 241 So. 3d 232, 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("Each incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction against stalking." (quoting Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014))). Dr. Paylan bore the burden of proof. See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("Turning to the facts of this case, it was incumbent on Ms. Copeland to prove stalking by competent, substantial evidence.").

Dr. Paylan’s stalking petition foundered on several bases.

I. A Course of Conduct is Lacking

[4, 5] The alleged stalking incidents Dr. Paylan relied on were remote and isolated. They do not constitute a "course of conduct" demonstrating "a continuity of purpose." See § 784.048(1)(b) (" ‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose."). "A course of conduct requires multiple acts that are separated by time or distance." Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

[6] Mr. Statton stopped sending offensive emails by May 2020. These incidents were stale. The turtle ornament theft occurred over a year later. See Wright v. Norris, 320 So. 3d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ("Norris’s testimony that Wright yelled at her in a Walmart a few years earlier simply was insufficient to support issuance of the [stalking] injunction."); Gill v. Gill, 50 So. 3d 772, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[A]n isolated incident of domestic violence that occurred years before a petition for injunction is filed will not usually support the issuance of an injunction in the absence of additional, current allegations."); Jones v. Jones, 32 So. 3d 772, 773–74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (concluding that a pushing incident that occurred three years before the injunction was filed was not sufficient to support the issuance of an injunction against domestic violence); Ahern v. Leon, 332 So. 3d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ("The last alleged ‘harassment’ occurred in mid-2018, eighteen months before Appellee filed the petition. Appellee admitted that, before December 2019, he did not feel it necessary to file a restraining order or contact the police because of any threat posed by Appellant. While that fact is not dispositive, the mere circumstance that Appellant was contracted to work at Appellee’s place of employment (eighteen months after her last contact with Appellant) is not a harassing ‘course of conduct’ under the statute."). We reject Dr. Paylan’s efforts to show a continuity of purpose.²

II. The Want of Incidents

[7] Dr. Paylan failed to establish two separate, but more recent, stalking incidents. Because the emails were too remote for the trial court’s consideration, the turtle ornament theft is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute stalking. See Stallings v. Bernard, 334 So. 3d 365, 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("Because the record does not demonstrate any basis for finding that Stallings engaged in a course of conduct involving two separate incidents of stalking that evidenced a continuity of purpose to harass Bernard, we reverse."); Roach v. Brower, 180 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (observing that in order to be entitled to an injunction for stalking, the petitioner must allege and prove two separate instances of stalking); Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144 ("[B]y its statutory definition, stalking requires proof of repeated acts." (quoting Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))); Chiu v. Adams, 327 So. 3d 889, 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (holding that petitioner failed to establish more than one instance of stalking following their breakup).

At the final hearing, Dr. Paylan presented additional evidence of a "parking lot incident." Specifically, her witness, Dr. Prakash Patel, testified that "three years ago," in January 2019, Mr. Statton texted him about seeing Drs. Patel and Paylan speaking in Dr. Paylan’s office parking lot. Apparently, Mr. Statton and Drs. Patel and Paylan were friends at one time.

[8] Dr. Paylan did not include this incident in her petition. Nonetheless, over Mr. Statton’s objection, the trial court admitted Dr. Patel’s testimony. See Stanlick v. Stanlick, 291 So. 3d 674, 674 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (concluding that the "trial court erred by allowing [former wife] to testify, over [former husband’s] objection, about alleged incidents that she did not include in her petition [for domestic violence]"). However, like the emails, this incident was too remote. Further, because Mr. Statton prevailed in the trial court, any testimony about the "parking lot incident" was harmless. Moreover, our record does not show that in orally pronouncing its ruling, the trial court considered or mentioned this unpleaded incident. See T.B. v. R.B., 186 So. 3d 544, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("When the trial court grants an injunction based on improperly admitted evidence, harmful error is clearly established.").

III. Dr. Paylan and the Reasonable Person Standard

[9, 10] Dr. Paylan failed to demonstrate that Mr. Statton’s conduct was sufficient to cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person. See Goudy v. Duquette, 112 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("In determining if an incident causes substantial emotional distress, courts use a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard." (quoting Slack v. Kling, 959 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))). Because "[t]he reasonable person standard is applied to a person in the position of the party … the standard is case specific." David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871, 876 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted).

Although we agree that Mr. Statton’s aged emails were offensive and his trespass and the theft of the turtle ornament is troubling,³ we cannot say that Mr. Statton’s behavior could cause "substantial emotional distress" to a reasonable person in Dr. Paylan’s position. See, e.g., Laquidara v. Houghtaling, 320 So. 3d 243, 244–45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (concluding that while a business owner yelling, screaming, and "hurling profanities" at a neighboring business owner over the use of an easement, with accompanying conduct designed to disrupt the business operations "was admittedly uncivil and offensive," it did not "r[i]se to a level that would have caused a reasonable person in the Houghtalings’ situation to suffer the substantial emotional distress necessary for an injunction"); Sinopoli...