Peacock v. Debley

1

DAVID L. PEACOCK v. WILLIAM C. DEBLEY, ET AL

No. 410-2023

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

April 22, 2024

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 487297V

Graeff, Berger, Albright, JJ. ^[*]

OPINION

Berger, J.

This case is before us on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entering summary judgment in favor of defendants Montgomery Deputy Sheriff William C Debley, Montgomery County, and the State of Maryland. The lawsuit arose from a motor vehicle accident involving Deputy Debley and appellant David Peacock.

On appeal, Peacock presents three questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows:

I. Whether the circuit court erred in ruling that the time for filing the action was not extended by the Supreme Court of Maryland's COVID Tolling Orders.

II. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that there was no genuine dispute of fact as to whether Deputy Debley was "State personnel" under the Maryland Tort Claims Act and therefore entitled to immunity.

III. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that Md. Code (2006, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 5-524 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP") did not authorize direct recovery against the County for Peacock's claim of respondeat superior liability.

For the reasons explained herein, we shall affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The facts underlying this appeal are not disputed by the parties. On the morning of October 29, 2018, Deputy Debley was operating a motor vehicle southbound on Woodfield Road towards Welsh Road when Debley struck the rear of a vehicle operated by Peacock. At the time of the accident, Deputy Debley was traveling to the Sheriff's Office and was operating his assigned Sheriff's Office vehicle, but he had not yet begun his shift.

On January 23, 2019, Peacock, via counsel, filed notices of claims with Montgomery County pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act and with the Maryland State Treasurer pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). Within one week, the County acknowledged receipt of Peacock's claim. The County advised Peacock that "a review of your letter also purports to be a notice of claim against the Sheriff's Department and/or the State of Maryland." The County further advised that "[t]o the extent your claim is against either of these entities, neither the County Executive, County Attorney, nor Montgomery County is the proper party to receive statutory notice for the State of Maryland, nor are they otherwise authorized by the State of Maryland to accept notice."

The State acknowledged Peacock's claim via a letter dated April 20, 2021 from the Maryland State Treasurer's office. The State Treasurer advised that a "preliminary review" of the claim had led to the "determin[ation] that the claim alleges conduct by a sheriff or deputy sheriff engaged in an activity that does not involve service of process, transportation of prisoners, courthouse security, or personnel matters" and that "[w]here a claim involves activities . . . other than those State functions, a county government may obtain insurance coverage and defense of claims that fall under the Maryland Tort Claims Act." The State Treasurer further advised that the claim had been referred "to the Montgomery County government for appropriate handling" and the State Treasurer was "administratively[] closing this matter."

In September 2021, Peacock filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Montgomery County and Debley alleging one count of negligence against each defendant. The County and Debley both moved to dismiss the complaint. The County argued that Debley was not acting as an agent of the County at the time of the accident, and, therefore, the County was not a proper defendant. Debley argued that he was entitled to statutory immunity and dismissal under the MTCA because he was "State personnel" at the time of the accident. On January 28, 2022, Peacock filed an amended complaint which added the State as a party. Because an amended complaint had been filed, the circuit court denied the motions to dismiss the original complaint as moot. The State subsequently moved to dismiss, arguing that Peacock's claim was time-barred because he failed to sue the State within three years of the accident as required by the MTCA. Peacock filed an opposition, and the circuit court denied the State's motion.

Following discovery, the State, the County, and Debley filed motions for summary judgment. The State argued, inter alia, that Peacock's claim was barred by the MTCA because it was filed more than three years after the accident.^[1] The State asserted that by failing to sue the State within three years, Peacock had failed to satisfy a condition precedent to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity. Debley argued that he was entitled to immunity under the MTCA, and the County argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because it was not Debley's employer. In his opposition, Peacock argued that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether Debley was a State or County employee at the time of the accident and that the Supreme Court's COVID Tolling Orders extended the filing deadline for his claim against the State.^[2] Peacock further argued that he was entitled to recover against the County pursuant to CJP § 5-524 because the County was the owner of the vehicle.

Following a hearing on April 10, 2023, the circuit court granted the motions and entered judgment in favor of the County, the State, and Debley. The circuit court determined that there was no factual dispute regarding Debley's status as "State personnel" at the time of the accident, that Peacock was not entitled to recover against the County pursuant to CJP § 5-524, that the MTCA's filing deadline was not extended by the COVID Tolling Orders, and that Debley was entitled to immunity under the MTCA. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The entry of summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-501, which provides:

The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Md. Rule 2-501(f). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only when there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could base a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738-39 (1993).

The Supreme Court has described the standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing summary judgment determinations as follows:

On review of an order granting summary judgment, our analysis "begins with the determination [of] whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists; only in the absence of such a dispute will we review questions of law." D'Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574, 36 A.3d 941, 955 (2012) (quoting Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 546, 7 A.3d 536, 544 (2010)); O'Connor v. Balt. Cnty., 382 Md. 102, 110, 854 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2004). If no genuine dispute of material fact exists, this Court determines "whether the Circuit Court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 571, 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008) (citations omitted).

Thus, "[t]he standard of review of a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is de novo, that is, whether the trial court's legal conclusions were legally correct." D'Aoust, 424 Md. at 574, 36 A.3d at 955.

Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 24-25 (2013).

DISCUSSION

I.

The first issue we shall address on appeal is Peacock's assertion that the circuit court erred in ruling that the time for filing the action against the State was not extended by the COVID Tolling Orders. As we shall explain, we agree with the State that the MTCA's three-year filing requirement is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that was not extended by the COVID Tolling Orders.

A. The Judiciary's Response to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

The Supreme Court issued several administrative orders addressing suspension of deadlines as a result of the COVID-19 public health emergency, which we shall refer to collectively as the COVID Tolling Orders. The COVID Tolling Orders were issued "as part of the State's response to the COVID-19 emergency that began in early 2020." Murphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 478 Md. 333, 350 (2022). The COVID Tolling Orders were "issued against the backdrop of the pandemic and various measures taken by the Governor and Legislature in response to that emergency." Id. The Supreme Court summarized the government response to the COVID-19 emergency, including actions undertaken by "[e]ach branch of State government . . . to limit access to public buildings and reduce interactions among government personnel and members of the public." Id. at 353. On March 12, 2020, former Chief Judge^[3] Mary Ellen Barbera issued administrative orders suspending jury trials and non-essential matters, and on March 13, 2020, the Chief Judge issued an additional administrative order closing courthouses to the public for all but certain emergency matters. Id. at 356.

On March 13, 2020, the Rules Committee approved rules relating to the emergency authority of the Chief Judge, and the Supreme Court adopted the proposed rules, which, inter alia, delegated authority to the Chief Judge to extend court deadlines. Id. at 357. On April 3, 2020, the Chief Judge issued the first administrative order tolling deadlines, which ordered that:

all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters required to be filed in a Maryland state court including

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