Pead v. Ephraim City

473 P.3d 175

Darren PEAD, Appellee,

v.EPHRAIM CITY, Appellant.

No. 20190416-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed August 6, 2020

Nathan R. Skeen, Maralyn M. English, and Nathanael J. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant

Erik Strindberg, Salt Lake City, Kass Harstad, and Cameron Platt, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Jill M. Pohlman authored this Opinion, in which Judges Kate Appleby and Ryan M. Harris concurred.

Opinion

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Ephraim City appeals the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss Darren Pead's complaint against it for violations of Utah's Whistleblower Act. The City argues that Pead's complaint is time-barred and that, in concluding otherwise, the district court erroneously calculated the applicable sixty-day period for the City to respond to Pead's notice of claim. On this basis, the City asks that we reverse and remand the case with instructions to dismiss Pead's claim with prejudice. We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 Between October 2015 and June 28, 2017,² Pead was employed as a police officer for the City. In early June, Pead and other officers reported to the City illegal misconduct in the police department involving incomplete reports and uninvestigated crimes. Following an investigation by Utah County, Pead resigned effective June 28. In his notice of resignation, Pead explained that he had no choice but to resign given the illegal conduct and retaliation against him.

¶3 On October 25, Pead filed a written notice of claim with the City pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the GIA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-7-401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2017), claiming that he had been wrongfully terminated in violation of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act—also known as the Whistleblower Act (the WBA), see id. § 67-21-4 (2016); see also id. § 63G-7-301(2)(f) (Supp. 2017) (providing that immunity from suit is waived for "actual damages" suits "under Title 67, Chapter 21," of the WBA).³ Pead then filed suit in federal district court on December 26, claiming violations of the WBA and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. As of December 26, 181 days had elapsed since Pead's resignation in June.

¶4 The federal court dismissed Pead's First Amendment claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim. Pead then filed the present action in state district court, again alleging violations of the WBA.

¶5 The City moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the district court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction because Pead had not timely complied with the intersecting filing requirements of the GIA and the WBA. See generally Thorpe v. Washington City , 2010 UT App 297, ¶¶ 18–21, 243 P.3d 500 (construing the GIA and the WBA to require an employee "to file a notice of claim and a civil action—i.e., a district court complaint—within 180 days" of the adverse employment action (cleaned up)).

¶6 As applied to Pead, the City explained that under the GIA, it had sixty days from the filing of Pead's notice of claim to approve or deny it and that Pead could not file a legal action until after the City responded or the sixty days elapsed. Pead filed his notice of claim on October 25, and the sixtieth day fell on December 24. Noting that December 24 was a Sunday, and Monday, December 25 was a legal holiday, the City invoked a statutory rule of construction to argue that December 24 and December 25 were excluded from the time period calculation and that the time for it to respond to the notice of claim did not elapse until Tuesday, December 26. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7 (LexisNexis 2016) (excluding weekends and legal holidays from the last day of any time period provided by law to "perform an act"). As a result, the City contended that, under the GIA, the earliest Pead could have filed his WBA action would have been December 27. Thus, his December 26 complaint was filed prematurely under the GIA, and a filing on December 27 (182 days from the date of his resignation) would have been too late under the WBA's 180-day statute of limitations.

¶7 In response, Pead argued that the GIA's sixty-day period for responding to the notice of claim could not be extended under computation of time rules because the claim was deemed denied by operation of law on the sixtieth day—in this case, December 24. Pead also asserted that he timely filed his complaint within the 180-day limitations period under the WBA, arguing that rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied to extend the last day for filing his complaint from December 25—a legal holiday and the 180th day after his resignation—to December 26, the date he filed his original complaint in federal court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a) (explaining how to compute time periods specified in court rules, court orders, and statutes that do not specify a method for computing time).

¶8 The district court denied the City's motion. Noting that the timeliness of Pead's complaint was "determined by the intersection" of the GIA and the WBA, the court first concluded that the complaint was timely filed under the 180-day limitations period of the WBA. The court applied rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to determine that, although the "terminal date" from Pead's resignation was December 25, rule 6 operated to extend the filing period to December 26. The court then determined that the sixty-day notice of claim period under the GIA ended on December 24. Rejecting the City's argument for time computation under Utah Code section 68-3-7, the court relied on Utah caselaw to support its conclusion that the "60-day cutoff [under the GIA] ends at precisely 60 days, even when it occurs on a weekend." On this basis, the court determined that the sixty-day period ended on December 24, sixty days from the date the notice of claim was filed on October 25. As a result, the court concluded that Pead satisfied both statutes by filing his complaint on December 26.

¶9 Pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the City petitioned for interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss, and we granted the petition.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 The City challenges the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss. Specifically, the City argues that the district court "erroneously concluded that the statutory notice of claim period terminated after 60 days, despite the final day landing on a weekend." Second, and relatedly, the City argues that the court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because Pead failed to "file his notice of claim with sufficient time under the [GIA] to allow him to comply with the 180-day statute of limitations under the [WBA]." "A trial court's decision to dismiss a case based on governmental immunity is a determination of law that we afford no deference." Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr. , 2001 UT 34, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 958. Likewise, the City's challenge requires that we interpret the relevant statutes, and we "review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Grimm v. DxNA LLC , 2018 UT App 115, ¶ 14, 427 P.3d 571 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶11 The City argues that the district court erred by concluding that the sixty-day notice of claim response period under the GIA ended on December 24 and, by extension, that Pead's complaint was timely filed under the WBA's 180-day limitations period. We agree.

¶12 This case involves the intersection of timelines in the GIA and the WBA. The GIA generally immunizes "each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental entity ... from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-201(1) (LexisNexis 2016). But the GIA waives that immunity in certain cases, including from suits against a governmental entity for actual damages "under Title 67, Chapter 21," of the WBA. See id. § 63G-7-301(2)(f) (Supp. 2017); see also McGraw v. University of Utah , 2019 UT App 144, ¶ 10, 449 P.3d 943 ("[T]he GIA expressly waives immunity from suits alleging retaliation under the WBA." (cleaned up)). The WBA, in turn, prohibits an employer from taking adverse actions against an employee for the employee's "good faith" communications regarding, among other things, "a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state [or] a political subdivision of this state" or, "as it relates to a state government employer," "gross mismanagement," "abuse of authority," or "unethical conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2016). See generally Thorpe v. Washington City , 2010 UT App 297, ¶¶ 11–12, 243 P.3d 500 (describing the overall operation of both the GIA and the WBA).

¶13 Our courts have "consistently and uniformly held that suit may not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the [GIA] are strictly followed," in that "any conditions placed on [a statutory right of action] must be followed precisely." Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr. , 2001 UT 34, ¶ 23, 24 P.3d 958 ; accord McGraw , 2019 UT App 144, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 943 ; see also Wheeler v. McPherson , 2002 UT 16, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 632 ("Applying this rule of strict compliance, we have repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from the exactness required by the [GIA]."). Indeed, "[c]ompliance with the [GIA] is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities." Wheeler , 2002 UT 16, ¶ 9, 40 P.3d 632.

¶14 One of the GIA requirements that must be "strictly followed" is filing the notice of claim and allowing the governmental entity sixty days to respond before filing a complaint in court. See Hall , 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 21–26, 24 P.3d 958 ; accord McGraw , 2019 UT App 144, ¶¶ 12, 18, 24–27, 449 P.3d 943 ; Thorpe , 2010 UT App 297, ¶ 12, ...