Peay v. Sager

STRATTON PEAY, Plaintiff v. CO SAGER, et al, Defendants

No. 1:16-cv-130

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

February 1, 2022

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 208] MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Berry, Bertolini, Cowan, Ennis Gustafson, Horton, Kunig, Miller, Oberlander, Michael Overmyer, Rittenhouse, Sager, Sheasly, Simon, Smail, and Kim Smith [ECF No. 208] be granted.

II. Report

A. Procedural Background

Although this case has an extensive procedural history, it need not be recounted here. For present purposes, Plaintiff Stratton Peay filed his Third Amended Complaint - the currently operative pleading - on April 24, 2018. ECF No. 83. In his pleading, Peay, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), contends that prison officials at his previous place of confinement, SCI-Forest, violated his civil rights by engaging in a conspiracy to unlawfully confine and harass him and by subjecting him to unlawful retaliation for filing a previous lawsuit. Id. Peay also claims that prison officials displayed deliberate indifference to a serious injury to his "left mastoid bone." Id. Peay has named a host of individuals as Defendants in this action, each of whom is a correctional officer, unit manager, psychologist, corrections counselor, or other correctional personnel affiliated with SCI-Forest.^[1]ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 4-16. Peay primarily seeks monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 208]. In support of their Motion, Defendants have filed a brief [ECF Nos. 209], a Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 210], and an Appendix of Exhibits [ECF No. 211]. Peay filed a Response to Defendants' Motion [ECF No. 213], accompanied by several exhibits and a sworn declaration [ECF No. 214], but he did not file a Responsive Concise Statement. This matter is ripe for disposition.^[2]

B. Factual Background

1. Local Rule 56.1 Violation

Before addressing the factual background underlying this action, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to properly respond to Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 210], as required by Local Rule 56.C.1. This rule requires non-moving parties to a motion for summary judgment to file a responsive concise statement in which they must: respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant's concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant's concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR 56.C.1. Courts located in the Western District of Pennsylvania require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tice, 2018 WL 5724125, at *2 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 5722316 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018); First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services, Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018); Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Authority, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017).

A non-moving party "faces severe consequences for not properly responding to a moving party's concise statement." Hughes, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1. Any alleged material facts "set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts . . . which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party." LCvR 56.E. While courts provide some leniency to pro se litigants when applying procedural rules, the Court '"is under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal chores for the [pro se litigant] that counsel would normally carry out.'" Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)). Nor may pro se litigants ignore procedural rules that apply to parties assisted by counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (explaining that "we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel").

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff has failed to respond to any statement of material fact in Defendants' Concise Statement, it will be deemed admitted. LCvR 56.E. However, the Court will consider any facts properly alleged in Plaintiffs pro se responses that specifically contradict Defendants' statement of facts, to the extent that they are supported by the record. Boyd v. Citizens Bank of Pa, Inc., 2014 WL 2154902, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2014) (stating that "[t]o the extent Plaintiffs statement of 'fact' specifically controverts Defendant's, the Court will consider these facts in determining whether summary judgment should be granted").

2. Factual allegations

In his Third Amended Complaint, Peay alleges that an individual known as Detective Leon Lubiejewski framed him for murder over twenty years ago, resulting in his current incarceration. ECF No. 83 at 2-3. Although Lubiejewski is not a defendant in this action, most of Peay's claims stem from his belief that Defendants engaged in a widespread conspiracy to cover up Lubiejewski's misconduct and keep Peay wrongfully imprisoned for the murder of Tiene Williams.

To that end, Peay first alleges that Defendants Sager, Berry, Smail, Rittenhouse, Overmeyer, Horton, Oberlander, Kunig, Miller, and Ennis directed two other inmates to assault him on February 23, 2015, causing him to sustain a broken rib and injuries to the left mastoid bone in his skull. Id. at 4-5. Peay contends that this attack was "designed by these Defendants to have [Peay] illegally 'emergency transferred'" into protective custody so that "investigators (Innocence Projects, etc) couldn't discover that [Peay]" was innocent of Williams' murder. Id. Peay remained in protective custody from February 23, 2015, to August 12, 2015. Id.

Peay next alleges that Defendants Horton, Overlander, Ennis, and Overmeyer conspired to "illegally deny [him] a job and [General Labor Pool] pay" as part of a scheme to "overwhelm [him] into ceasing to make complaints regarding Det. Lubiejewski's malfeasance." Id. at 5.

They also allegedly directed other inmates to spit on Peay and throw urine on him while he was in protective custody, presumably for the same reason. Id.

Peay further alleges that, at some unidentified time, Defendants Bertolini, Gustafson, Kunig, and Miller "illegally housed Plaintiff 'alone' [z-code status]" because they wanted "easy access to 'poison' Plaintiff, 'torture' Plaintiff, cause Plaintiff'depression,' [and] 'force' Plaintiff into altercations . . . with staff and inmates, etc." Id. at 6. Defendants Simon, Cowan, and Sheasley allegedly conspired to illegally misdiagnose Peay as schizophrenic to cover up the malfeasance of their co-Defendants. Id. at 6-7.

Peay also asserts a medical indifference claim, suggesting that Defendants Smith, Overmeyer, and Oberlander intentionally overlooked the injury to his left mastoid bone and improperly denied him "an MRI or CT-Scan for his mastoid bone injury." Id. at 8. Peay suggests that this is part of a "scam to use 'force (physical, etc.) to make themselves appear correct." Id.

Finally, Peay suggests that each of the instances of misconduct described above amounted to unlawful retaliation in response to his prior civil rights litigation and his attempts to expose Defendants' "case fixing scam" and "Det. Lubiejewski's malfeasance." Id. at 9.

C. Standards of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his...