Peek v. Duanesburg Cent. Sch. Dist.

1

NICOLE M. PEEK, JEREMY J. MING & o/b/o Children, JOHN & JANE DOE- as same or similar in class, Plaintiffs

v.

DUANESBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and/or any aliases, and any unnamed employees/agents/school districts also responsible for same or similar cause of action, CELESTE JUNGE in all capacities, DR. JAMES NIEDERMEIER in all capacities, SCHENECTADY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Child Protective Service CPS, JOHN AND JANE DOE in all capacities, and any un-named corporation/entity/agency found liable, any other known/unknown accommodation and/or relevant parties. Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00388(AMN/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

November 29, 2023

APPEARANCES: NICOLE M. PEEK Plaintiff pro se JEREMY J. MING Plaintiff pro se GIRVIN & FERLAZZO, P.C. Attorneys for Defendants Duanesburg Central School District, Dr. James Niedermeier, and Celeste Junge GOLDBERG SEGALLA, LLP Attorneys for Defendant Schenectady County Department of Social Services

OF COUNSEL: PATRICK J. FITZGERALD, ESQ. DANIEL S. L. RUBIN, ESQ. JONATHAN M. BERNSTEIN, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Hon Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 2023, Plaintiffs Nicole M. Peek (“Plaintiff” or “Peek”), Jeremy Ming (“Plaintiff” or “Ming”), and “(BT, CM) (John and Jane Doe)”^[1] (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Duanesburg Central School District (“Duanesburg”), Duanesburg Superintendent of Schools Dr. James Niedermeier (“Superintendent Niedermeier”), and Celeste Junge, Secretary to the Superintendent at Duanesburg (“Junge”) (collectively the “School District Defendants”), and Defendant Schenectady County Department of Social Services (“DSS” or “Defendant”),^[2] alleging multiple statutory causes of action. See Dkt. No. 14.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. Nos. 23, 26 (the “Motions”).^[3] Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motions. Dkt. No. 35.^[4] For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motions are granted in their entirety, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.^[5]

II. BACKGROUND^[6]

The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of ruling on the Motions. See Div. 1181 Amalg. Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

Plaintiffs “at one point had [a] child enrolled in [Duanesburg] and decided to homeschool [the child] while building a family church with a private religious school [referred to as the “Valley of Baca”] held in Trust separate from home with its members.” Dkt. No. 14 at ¶ 1.^[7] Plaintiffs allege that they “informed [the] District or agents thereof since the beginning of [their] intentions and eventually had met [their] goals yet [the] district was still insistent on certain alleged ‘requirements' and made verbal threats to call Child [P]rotective [S]ervices and slander if [they] did not continue filling out arduous reports with minimal relevance to actual development.” Id. at ¶ 7.

On March 7, 2023, Junge started an email correspondence with Peek, asking Peek to “[p]lease advise the private school your son is attending so we can update our files.” Id. at 26. That same day, Peek replied that “[t]he Private Religious school [her son] is attending is called The Valley of Baca.” Id. at 27.^[8] On March 8, 2023, Junge responded, “Thank you for the information. We will update our file.” Id. at 28. On March 18, 2023, Peek said, “it's my understanding that we're entitled to some reimbursements under state law for the homeschooling period” and asked, “[w]ho should I send the invoice to?” Id. at 30. Plaintiffs allege that despite a request for reimbursement, they were not reimbursed for their homeschooling expenses. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiffs allege that they sent “all materials” to Superintendent Niedermeier,^[9] and the School District Defendants “made a [k]nowingly [f]alse [r]eport to . . . Social Services and [the] guidance office at” Duanesburg. Dkt. No. 35 at 2-3.^[10]

The Amended Complaint further alleges that the “Defendants['] [f]raudulent and prejudicial claims caused [two] separate vehicles of Schenectady County Sherriff's Department to go to one of Plaintiff[s'] place of business and knock on every occupied door therein in an attempt to locate Plaintiff(s).” Dkt. No. 14 at ¶ 15. Specifically, Plaintiff Ming alleges that on March 24, 2023, “two Schenectady [C]ounty sheriff['s] officers and two people that [Ming] imagined were some sort of social workers” knocked on his door and “proceeded to tell [Ming] that they received a report that [the] children are being neglected of an education and that [the children] are malnourished and a welfare check should be done on them.” Id. at 37. Ming asserts that he “allowed the social workers to see [the children] and [he] took pictures of all the stored food [as they requested] .. but [he] would not allow them entry.” Dkt. No. 35 at 3.

Peek emailed Junge regarding the School District calling the Office of Children and Family Services. Dkt. No. 35 at 9. On March 31, 2023, Superintendent Niedermeier responded by email to Peek stating, “[a]s a mandated reporter, it is my obligation to notify the Office of Children and Family Services when families do not follow through with home schooling requirements.” Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleadings, the court may consider documents that are “integral” to the pleadings even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleadings. See Mangiofico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, a pleading's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are “plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the . . . complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570.

“[I]n a pro se case . . . the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting, inter alia, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “‘make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants'” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Id. at 295 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' Pro Se Representation of Their Children

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot represent their children as pro se litigants. See Dkt. No. 23-1 at 11; Dkt. No. 26-1 at 9. In response, Plaintiffs argue that they “[s]omewhat [a]gree[] however to say a Parent, in no fact, may represent their children would be an erroneous conclu[sion] of law and well established general rules.” Dkt. No. 35 at 5. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, it is well-established in the Second Circuit that pro se parents cannot bring claims on behalf of their minor children. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“It is thus a well-established general rule in this Circuit that a parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an action pro se in federal court on behalf of his or her child.”) (citing Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2002) (“In this Circuit, a nonattorney parent is precluded from representing his or her child in federal court.”) (citation omitted); Ziegler on behalf of G.S. v. Multer, No. 1:18-CV-880 (GLS/DJS), 2018 WL 4610666, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018) (same).

Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they are brought on behalf of Plaintiffs' minor children, “BT” and “CM,” are granted.

B. DSS as a Proper Party

DSS argues that it is not a proper party in this action. Dkt. No 26-1 at 7-8. “Un...