Pelican Int'l, Inc. v. Hobie Cat Co.

655 F.Supp.3d 1002

PELICAN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. HOBIE CAT COMPANY; and Hobie Cat Company II, LLC, Defendants.

Case No.: 3:20-cv-02390-RSH-MSB

United States District Court, S.D. California

Signed February 10, 2023

Michael J. Lyons, Ahren C. Hsu-Hoffman, Austin Lawrence Zuck, Katerina Hora Jacobson, Corey Ray Houmand, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Plaintiff.

Todd G. Miller, Fish & Richardson Todd Miller, San Diego, CA, Bernard Charles Cryan, Kelly Nicole Williams, Fish & Richardson PC, San Diego, CA, John W. Thornburgh, Fish & Richardson — John Thornburgh, San Diego, CA, Oliver James Richards, Fish & Richardson — Oliver J. Richards, San Diego, CA, Corrin Nicole Drakulich, Fish & Richardson Corrin Drakulich, Atlanta, GA, Frank E. Scherkenbach, Fish & Richardson P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING & DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S DAUBERT MOTION; AND

[ECF No. 96]

(2) GRANTING & DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S DAUBERT MOTIONS.

[ECF Nos. 92, 95]

Robert S. Huie, United States District Judge

On April 13, 2022, Defendants Hobie Cat Company and Hobie Cat Company II, LLC (collectively "Hobie"), filed motions pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), to exclude testimony from two of Plaintiff Pelican International, Inc.'s ("Pelican") experts: (1) technical expert Dr. Maki, ECF No. 95; and (2) damages expert Ms. Dean, ECF No. 92. On April 13, 2022, Pelican also filed a Daubert motion to exclude testimony from Hobie's technical expert Dr. Sanders. ECF No. 96. On May 17, 2022, the Parties responded to the respective Daubert motions. ECF Nos. 111, 113. The Parties filed their respective replies soon thereafter. ECF Nos. 121, 128, 136. The Court held a hearing on the matter on February 9, 2023.

For the reasons below, the Court grants and denies in part Pelican's motion as to Dr. Sanders, grants and denies in part Hobie's motion as to Dr. Maki, and grants and denies in Part Hobie's motion as to Ms. Dean.

I. BACKGROUND

Pelican and Hobie are competing designers and manufacturers of watercraft products, such as kayaks. First Am. Compl. (Mar. 3, 2021), ECF No. 16 ¶ 8; Answer & Countercl. (Mar. 17, 2021), ECF No. 17 ¶ 9. Pelican is the owner by assignment of U.S. Patent No. 10,829,189 ("the '189 Patent"). U.S. Patent No. 10,829,189, at [73] (issued Nov. 10, 2020). In this case, Pelican accuses Hobie of infringing at least Independent Claim 14 of the '189 Patent by making, using, importing, selling, and/or offering for sale kayaks, including Hobie's Passport, Lynx, and Pro Angler 360 kayaks. See ECF No. 16 ¶ 13; ECF No. 62 at 18.

The '189 Patent is entitled "Interface for Mounting a Propulsion Mechanism to a Watercraft," and was issued on November 10, 2020. '189 Patent at [45], [54]. The invention described in the '189 Patent relates to an interface for mounting a propulsion mechanism to a watercraft with a rigid body, and to a watercraft comprising a rigid body and such an interface. Id. at col. 1 ll. 7-9, col. 2 ll. 14-18, col. 3 ll. 45-51.

Figure 31 of the '189 Patent (set forth below) depicts an exploded view of an exemplary kayak in accordance with the invention claimed in the '189 Patent.

Image materials not available for display.

FIG.31

Independent Claim 14 of the '189 Patent, the only independent claim asserted in this action,¹ recites:

14. A watercraft comprising:

rigid body having a deck portion, a hull portion and a well extending between the deck portion and the hull portion, an interface for mounting a propulsion mechanism to the body of the watercraft, the interface including:

a first portion including a first plate positionable adjacent to one of the hull portion and the deck portion of the watercraft, about the periphery of the well, and at least one channel extending from the first plate, the channel being positionable in the well, the channel being sized and shaped for receiving therein a portion of the propulsion mechanism and for mounting the propulsion mechanism to the interface; and

at least one fastening assembly for removably fastening the first portion to the body of the watercraft.

'189 Patent col. 18 ll. 64-67, col. 19 ll. 1-12.

On December 8, 2020, Pelican filed a complaint for patent infringement against Hobie, alleging infringement of the '189 Patent. See Compl. (Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No. 1. On March 3, 2021, Pelican filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 16. On March 17, 2022, Hobie filed an answer to the First Amended Complaint along with two counterclaims. ECF No. 17.

On March 26, 2021, the Court issued a scheduling order. ECF No. 20. On June 17, 2021, the Court issued an amended scheduling order. ECF No. 36. On November 17, 2021, the Court issued a second amended scheduling order. ECF No. 61. On February 1, 2022, the Court issued a claim construction order, construing disputed claim terms from the '189 Patent. ECF No. 77.

By the present Daubert motions: (1) Pelican moves to exclude certain opinions and testimony from Hobie's technical expert Dr. Sanders, ECF No. 96-1 at 1, 3-14; (2) Hobie moves to exclude certain opinions and testimony from Pelican's technical expert Dr. Maki, ECF No. 145 at 1-17; and (3) Hobie moves to preclude certain opinions and testimony from Pelican's damages expert Ms. Dean, ECF No. 144 at 1-22.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The law of the regional circuit governs a district court's decision to admit expert testimony under Daubert in a patent case. Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015). When considering expert testimony offered pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper" by "making a preliminary determination of whether the expert's testimony is reliable." Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002); see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible if:

(1) the witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (3) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (4) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (5) the expert has reliably applied the relevant principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch Inc., 26 F.4th 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702). "Under these rules, a district court may exclude evidence that is based upon unreliable principles or methods, legally insufficient facts and data, or where the reasoning or methodology is not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case." Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1295; see Pyramid Techs., Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 752 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he trial court must assure that the expert testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.").

"Ultimately, 'the test under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of his methodology.'" Elosu, 26 F.4th at 1024 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995)). "In evaluating proffered expert testimony, the trial court is 'a gatekeeper, not a fact finder.'" City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010)). "[T]he question of whether the expert is credible or the opinion is correct is generally a question for the fact finder, not the court." Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1296; see Elosu, 26 F.4th at 1024 ("Challenges that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, not a trial court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved for the jury." (quoting City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1044)). "[S]haky but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, not exclusion." Elosu, 26 F.4th at 1024 (quoting Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564); accord Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1296. "[W]here the methodology is reasonable and its data or evidence are sufficiently tied to the facts of the case, the gatekeeping role of the court is satisfied, and the inquiry on the correctness of the methodology and of the results produced thereunder belongs to the factfinder." Summit 6, 802 F.3d at 1296; see Pyramid, 752 F.3d at 814 ("[W]hen an expert meets the threshold established by Rule 702, the expert may testify and the fact finder decides how much weight to give that testimony." (quoting Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564-65)); Elosu, 26 F.4th at 1024 ("If the proposed testimony meets the thresholds of relevance and reliability, its proponent is 'entitled to have the jury decide upon [its] credibility, rather than the judge.'" (quoting United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2006))).

Whether to admit or exclude expert testimony lies within the trial court's discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); see United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1032 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We ... have stressed that the 'trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony'." (citation omitted)). Further, "[a] trial court not only has broad latitude in determining whether an expert's testimony is reliable, but also in deciding how to determine the testimony's reliability." Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. PELICAN'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN OPINIONS BY DR. SANDERS

A. Dr. Sanders's Opinions as to the "Guiding Assembly" Limitation

Pelican argues that the Court should exclude Dr. Sanders's invalidity and non-infringement opinions regarding the "guiding assembly" claim...