Peltier v. State

859 N.W.2d 381

Stacy PELTIER, Petitioner and Appellant

v.STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee.

No. 20140178.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Feb. 12, 2015.

Erin M. Conroy, Bottineau, ND, for petitioner and appellant; submitted on brief.

Stephenie L. Davis, State's Attorney, Cavalier, ND for respondent and appellee; submitted on brief.

Opinion

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Stacy Peltier appeals from a district court order denying his post-conviction relief petition. Because Peltier failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that withdrawing Peltier's pleas was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice, we affirm the district court's order.

I

[¶ 2] In May 1993, under a plea agreement, Peltier pled guilty to eighteen burglary counts stemming from burglaries in eight North Dakota counties. The trial court accepted his pleas and sentenced him to five years for each count with the time to run concurrently. He did not file a direct appeal on that criminal case, and after serving his sentence, he was released in November 1996. He has since been convicted of federal crimes, he is currently incarcerated, and he claims his federal sentence was enhanced due to his prior state convictions.

[¶ 3] In January 2013, seeking to mitigate the federal sentencing enhancements, Peltier filed a post-conviction relief petition, arguing his state conviction was obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, his rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 were violated, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court failed to properly combine his cases causing him to be prejudiced. The district court summarily denied his petition.

II

[¶ 4] On appeal, Peltier argues the district court erred in denying his post-conviction relief petition and erred in finding the State established the affirmative defense of laches.

[¶ 5] “This Court reviews an appeal from a summary dismissal of post-conviction relief as it would review an appeal from summary judgment.” Overlie v. State, 2011 ND 191, ¶ 6, 804 N.W.2d 50. A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction relief petition if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

[¶ 6] Under current law, a post-conviction relief application “must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final.” N.D.C.C. § 29–32.1–01(2). This provision was added to N.D.C.C. ch. 29–32.1 and became effective on August 1, 2013. 2013 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 248. Because Peltier's application was filed January 2013, the prior version of the chapter applies and this provision does not bar his application.

III

[¶ 7] Peltier argues the district court erred in denying his petition because the trial court violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 by failing to establish a sufficient factual basis for his guilty pleas and failing to find they were entered voluntarily. He contends the judgment must be reversed because his pleas were constitutionally invalid, and the pleas must be vacated.

[¶ 8] “When a defendant applies for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, the application is treated as one made under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d).” Mackey v. State, 2012 ND 159, ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d 539. This Court has stated:

When a court has accepted a plea and imposed sentence, the defendant cannot withdraw the plea unless withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The decision whether a manifest injustice exists ... lies within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion.

Id. A court abuses its discretion by not allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when the court erred by failing to establish a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Id.

A

[¶ 9] Peltier argues the district court erred in denying his petition because the trial court violated Rule 11 by not establishing a sufficient factual basis for his pleas. He argues the trial court did little more than ask if he “entered the establishments and ‘did these things,’ ” the requisite state of mind was never established, and the record is lacking in details, specifications, and evidence of the crimes.

[¶ 10] At the time of his sentencing, N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(e) (1993) stated, “Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment of dispositional order upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy if that there is a factual basis for the plea.” The ideal way to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea is for the court to ask the defendant to state in his own words what he did that he believes constitutes the crime to which he is pleading guilty, but that is not the only method. Mackey, 2012 ND 159, ¶ 12, 819 N.W.2d 539. The court may question the defendant, the prosecution or defense counsel, inquire into the presentence report, or conclude a factual basis exists from anything appearing on the record. Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.

[¶ 11] In Mackey, this Court concluded, after reviewing the record, there was sufficient reason for the trial court to have established a valid factual basis for the plea. 2012 ND 159, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d 539. The record, including the criminal information, testimony at the sentencing hearing, and the transcript from the hearing, established a sufficient factual basis. Id. None of the typical means for establishing a factual basis were utilized; however, this Court determined the trial court did not err by failing to use such processes. Id. at ¶ 16.

[¶ 12] Although it is not required to directly question a defendant regarding the factual basis for his guilty plea, the trial court in this case did directly address Peltier regarding the factual basis for his pleas. See Mackey, 2012 ND 159, ¶ 9, 819 N.W.2d 539 (noting trial court did not err by not directly questioning defendant regarding the factual basis for his guilty plea). The trial court also mentioned its notes and prior hearings, acknowledging its familiarity with the case. Like in Mackey, the trial court reviewed and considered the entire record. We conclude the trial court established a sufficient factual basis for Peltier's pleas, and the district court did not err in determining Peltier had failed to meet his burden of establishing an issue of material fact for this claim.

B

[¶ 13] Peltier argues the district court erred in denying his petition because the trial court failed to ensure his pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

[¶ 14] “A guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be valid.”State v. Blurton, 2009 ND 144, ¶ 10, 770 N.W.2d 231. A defendant who pleads guilty upon counsel's advice “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.” Damron v. State, 2003 ND 102, ¶ 9, 663 N.W.2d 650.

[¶ 15] At the time of Peltier's sentencing, N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c) (1993)¹ stated, in pertinent part: “The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally ... in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.”

[¶ 16] The trial court did not specifically address Peltier personally regarding the voluntariness of his pleas, but the transcript reflects it reaffirmed it had previously advised him of his rights at a prior hearing and asked whether Peltier wanted to waive a reading of those advisements:

THE COURT: You pleaded not guilty to a Pembina County matter and at that time I explained to you your rights as a criminal defendant. Did I not do that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And is it necessary to explain his rights on each of those cases, Mr. Trenbeath? Or will you waive any further indication from the Court as to what his rights are?

MR. TRENBEATH: Your Honor, I believe my client will agree with me when I say we will waive reading any advisement of rights. Is that correct, Stacy?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[¶ 17] “The trial court advisement required by Rule 11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P. is mandatory.” Davenport v. State, 2000 ND 218, ¶ 8, 620 N.W.2d 164. Although Rule 11(b) does not require the trial court to follow a “ritualistic, predetermined formality, the court must substantially comply” with the rule's procedural requirements to ensure a voluntary guilty plea is entered. Id. However, “[a]t a change of plea hearing, a trial court is not required to readvise a defendant of each of his rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b), if the court determines the defendant previously was properly advised of those rights and recalls the advice.” Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 15, 608 N.W.2d 292; see also State v. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d 183, 185 (N.D.1994).

[¶ 18] Here, the trial court reaffirmed it had previously explained Peltier's rights as a criminal defendant at a previous hearing. Although we do not have the transcript from that previous hearing, Peltier affirmed on the record the trial court had, in fact, done so. In addition, the trial court inquired whether Peltier wanted to waive a reading of those advisements which Peltier agreed to. The district court did not acknowledge the significance of that colloquy, but simply stated “it does not appear that the trial court fully complied” with Rule 11. Ultimately, the district court determined withdrawing Peltier's pleas was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

[¶ 19] While a manifest injustice may result from a sentencing court's procedural errors, determining whether such an injustice exists for the purpose of withdrawing a guilty plea lies within the court's discretion, and it will not be reversed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Abdi, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 10, 608 N.W.2d 292. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the court's legal discretion is not exercised in the interests of justice.” Id. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that withdrawing...