Penobscot Nation v. Frey

3 F.4th 484

PENOBSCOT NATION ; United States, on its own behalf, and for the benefit of the Penobscot Nation, Plaintiffs, Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

v.Aaron M. FREY, Attorney General for the State of Maine; Judy A. Camuso, Commissioner for the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife; DAN SCOTT, Colonel for the Maine Warden Service; State of Maine ; Town of Howland ; True Textiles, Inc. ; Guilford-Sangerville Sanitary District; City of Brewer; Town of Millinocket; Kruger Energy (USA) INC.; Veazie Sewer District ; Town of Mattawamkeag; Covanta Maine LLC ; Lincoln Sanitary District; Town of East Millinocket ; Town of Lincoln; Verso Paper Corporation, Defendants, Appellees/Cross-Appellants,Expera Old Town; Town of Bucksport; Lincoln Paper and Tissue LLC; Great Northern Paper Company LLC, Defendants, Appellees, Town of Orono, Defendant.

Nos. 16-1424

16-1435

16-1474

16-1482

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

July 8, 2021

Pratik A. Shah, with whom Lide E. Paterno, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Kaighn Smith, Jr., David M. Kallin, and Drummond Woodsum were on brief, for appellant/cross-appellee Penobscot Nation.

Mary Gabrielle Sprague, Attorney, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric Grant, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellant/cross-appellee United States.

Kimberly Leehaug Patwardhan, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maine, with whom Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General for the State of Maine, and Christopher C. Taub, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Maine, were on brief, for state defendant appellees/cross-appellants.

Joshua D. Dunlap, with whom Matthew D. Manahan and Pierce Atwood LLP were on brief, for state intervenor appellees/cross-appellants.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Selya, Lynch, Thompson, and Barron, Circuit Judges.^*

Opinion En Banc

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

On August 20, 2012, the Penobscot Nation (the "Nation") brought suit against the State of Maine and various state officials (the "State Defendants"). The Nation stated in its original complaint, later amended, that when it entered into an agreement with Maine to settle its land claims in the state, "the Nation never intended to relinquish its ownership rights" to a 60-mile stretch of the Penobscot River (the "River") known as the Main Stem and that Congress intended "that the Nation's reservation encompass ownership rights within and attending" the Main Stem. The complaint sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the Nation had exclusive regulatory authority over the Main Stem; and (2) a declaratory judgment that the Nation had sustenance fishing rights in the Main Stem. The United States intervened in support of the Nation. Private interests, towns, and other political entities (the "State Intervenors") intervened in support of the State Defendants.

"Penobscot Indian Reservation" (the "Reservation") is defined in a pair of statutes -- the Maine Implementing Act ("MIA") and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act ("MICSA") -- collectively known as the Settlement Acts. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30; 25 U.S.C. § 1721 et seq. The district court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, issued declaratory relief saying that the Reservation does not include the waters of the Main Stem or the submerged lands of the riverbed underneath it but holding that the Nation has sustenance fishing rights in the Main Stem. See Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, 222-23 (D. Me. 2015). A divided panel of this court affirmed the district court's holding as to the definition of Reservation and vacated its holding as to the Nation's sustenance fishing rights. The Nation and the United States petitioned for rehearing en banc. We vacated the panel opinion and dissent and granted the petition. Penobscot Nation v. Frey, 954 F.3d 453, 453 (1st Cir. 2020).

In this en banc decision, we hold that the Reservation does not include the waters and submerged lands constituting the riverbed of the Main Stem. The plain text of the definition of Reservation in MIA and MICSA plainly and unambiguously includes certain islands in the Main Stem but not the Main Stem itself. We also hold that even if there were some arguable ambiguity as to the language at issue, the context, history, and clear legislative intent require rejection of the Nation's claim. As to the Nation's sustenance fishing claim, we do not accept the Nation's argument that its sustenance fishing rights alter the meaning of Reservation. We disagree that they have anything to do with the definition of Reservation. Such fishing rights do not alter or call into question the clear definition of Reservation. As to the Nation's claim that Maine has infringed those fishing rights, that claim is not ripe and the Nation lacks standing.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Penobscot River runs through the state of Maine. Its East and West Branches meet at the River's Main Stem, and the Main Stem stretches south for 60 miles. Within the Main Stem are a number of islands, including Indian Island, the Nation's headquarters.

Going back centuries, various iterations of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, along with a series of treaties and transactions between the Nation and Massachusetts¹ and the Nation and Maine, clouded title to certain land and natural resources in Maine. See id. § 1721(a)(1). In 1980, the United States, Maine, the Nation, and other Indian tribes in Maine reached an agreement which "represent[ed] a good faith effort ... to achieve a fair and just resolution of those claims which, in the absence of agreement, would be pursued through the courts for many years to the ultimate detriment of [Maine] and all its citizens, including the Indians." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6202 ; see 25 U.S.C. § 1721(7). To implement this agreement, Maine passed MIA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6201 et seq., and Congress passed MICSA, 25 U.S.C. § 1721 et seq.

MICSA defines "Penobscot Indian Reservation" as "those lands as defined in [MIA]." 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i). MIA defines the Reservation as:

[T]he islands in the Penobscot River reserved to the Penobscot Nation by agreement with the States of Massachusetts and Maine consisting solely of Indian Island, also known as Old Town Island, and all islands in that river northward thereof that existed on June 29, 1818, excepting any island transferred to a person or entity other than a member of the Penobscot Nation subsequent to June 29, 1818, and prior to the effective date of this Act.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 6203(8).²

MIA also addresses the Nation's sustenance fishing rights, saying:

Notwithstanding any rule or regulation promulgated by the [Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission] or any other law of the State, the members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation may take fish, within the boundaries of their respective Indian reservations, for their individual sustenance subject to the limitations of subsection 6.

Id. § 6207(4).³

On August 8, 2012, Maine's then-Attorney General, William Schneider, issued a legal opinion (the "Schneider Opinion") interpreting MIA and MICSA. This opinion said that the River is not part of the Nation's Reservation and that Maine has "exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over activities taking place on the River." The Schneider Opinion did not mention § 6207(4) of MIA or the Nation's sustenance fishing rights.

Twelve days later, on August 20, 2012, the Nation filed suit against the State Defendants. In its second amended complaint, it disputed the Schneider Opinion's interpretation of federal law. It sought a declaratory judgment that the Nation has exclusive regulatory authority over the Main Stem and that the Nation's members have the right to take fish for their individual sustenance from the Main Stem which Maine has infringed.

On February 15, 2013, the State Defendants answered the Nation's complaint and filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. They sought a declaratory judgment that "[t]he waters of the main stem of the Penobscot River are not within the Penobscot Nation reservation."

The State Intervenors -- a group of eighteen private parties, municipalities, and related entities that border the River and use it for discharges or other purposes -- moved to intervene in support of the State Defendants. The district court granted this motion on June 18, 2013. It also granted the United States’ motion to intervene in support of the Nation on February 4, 2014.

In 2015, the State Defendants, the Nation, and the United States moved for summary judgment. The State Intervenors filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. After holding oral argument on these motions, the district court declared that (1) "the Penobscot Indian Reservation as defined in [MIA and MICSA] includes the islands of the Main Stem, but not the waters of the Main Stem" and (2) "the sustenance fishing rights provided in [MIA] allows the Penobscot Nation to take fish for individual sustenance in the entirety of the Main Stem." Penobscot Nation, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 222-23.⁴ The parties cross-appealed.

On June 30, 2017, a divided panel affirmed the district court's declaratory judgment regarding the definition of "Penobscot Indian Reservation" under MIA and MICSA and vacated with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction its declaratory judgment regarding the Nation's sustenance fishing rights under MIA. Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 861 F.3d 324, 338 (1st Cir. 2017). The Nation and the United States petitioned for rehearing en banc. We granted these petitions on April 8, 2020, and vacated the panel opinion and dissent. Penobscot Nation, 954 F.3d at 453. We heard oral argument on September 22, 2020.

II. Analysis

We review grants of summary judgment de novo including when, as here, there were cross-motions for summary judgment before the district court. Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, 977 F.3d 93,...