People ex rel. A.C.

517 P.3d 1228

IN RE: the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

IN the INTEREST OF: A.C., juvenile.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SA73

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 4, 2022

Attorneys for A.C.: Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Amanda Bleiler, Deputy State Public Defender, Greeley, Colorado

Attorneys for Weld County District Court: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Stefanie Mann, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

No appearance on behalf of Petitioner.

En Banc

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE SAMOUR joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, joined by JUSTICE HART, specially concurred.

JUSTICE SAMOUR specially concurred.

JUSTICE HOOD, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, dissented.

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 We accepted original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to consider whether the Juvenile Justice Code authorizes a magistrate to order a juvenile—who has been found incompetent to proceed—to undergo a "reassessment evaluation" as part of the restoration review or restoration hearing procedures outlined in sections 19-2.5-704 to - 706, C.R.S. (2022), to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency.

¶2 A.C., the juvenile, argues that such an evaluation is prohibited by our holding in People in Interest of B.B.A.M., 2019 CO 103, ¶ 34, 453 P.3d 1161, 1168. In B.B.A.M., we held that section 19-2.5-703(1), C.R.S. (2022),¹ did not authorize a juvenile court to order a "second competency evaluation" to help the court determine if a juvenile had been restored to competency. We stated that the juvenile court "should have held a restoration hearing or a restoration review instead." B.B.A.M. , ¶ 34, 453 P.3d at 1168. The parties in B.B.A.M. did not brief—thus we did not have the opportunity to consider—what authority the General Assembly intended to confer on juvenile courts in sections 19-2.5-704 to - 706, which govern the restoration hearing and review processes. That argument is squarely presented in this case, and we now hold that a juvenile court has the authority pursuant to section 19-2.5-706(2), C.R.S. (2022), to order a reassessment evaluation after determining that a juvenile remains incompetent and that this type of evaluation is distinct from the second competency evaluation at issue in B.B.A.M. Accordingly, we discharge the rule to show cause and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 The People filed a petition in delinquency against A.C. A.C.'s counsel moved for a competency evaluation, noting that A.C. had trouble paying attention and was on an individualized education plan at school due to his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). The magistrate granted the motion and ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services ("CDHS") to perform a competency evaluation pursuant to the court's authority under section 19-2.5-703(1). John Edwards, Ph.D., performed the competency evaluation. His diagnostic impression was that A.C. had ADHD. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Edwards concluded that A.C. did not have the ability to (1) factually and rationally understand the proceedings or (2) assist in the defense. See § 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. (2022) (defining "incompetent to proceed"). Dr. Edwards noted that A.C. "did not appear to be able to retain" or apply legal concepts, opining that A.C. would not likely "be able to effectively assist his attorney in his defense due to his lack of formal exposure to the legal system and the effects of his demonstrated psychiatric disorder manifesting in attention and concentration difficulties." Ultimately, Dr. Edwards concluded that A.C. was incompetent to proceed but that the "prognosis for restoring [A.C.] to competency ... [was] fair to good." The magistrate found A.C. incompetent to proceed, stayed the proceedings, and ordered CDHS to provide restoration services.

¶4 Almost six months later, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether A.C. had been restored to competency. Dr. Edwards and A.C.'s restoration services provider testified at the hearing, but neither opined as to whether A.C. had been "restored to competency." Dr. Edwards noted that he was unable to form an opinion as to A.C.'s current state because he had not seen A.C. since the initial evaluation based on his belief that B.B.A.M. prevented him from performing a reassessment evaluation. Afterward, the magistrate issued a written order finding that it had "limited information as to whether" A.C. was competent to proceed and ordered A.C. to participate in a reassessment evaluation. A.C. objected, arguing that a reassessment evaluation was equivalent to a second competency evaluation of the type prohibited by our decision in B.B.A.M. The magistrate denied A.C.'s objection, stating that a reassessment evaluation, which "appear[s] to be contemplated" by section 19-2.5-705(1), C.R.S. (2022), "is distinct from a second competency evaluation and permitted under" B.B.A.M. A.C. then petitioned the Weld County District Court to review the magistrate's order. After reviewing the record and the briefing, the district court adopted the magistrate's order.

¶5 A.C. then filed a petition for a rule to show cause, which we granted.

II. Original Jurisdiction

¶6 Under C.A.R. 21(a)(1), this court has discretion to exercise its original jurisdiction in extraordinary circumstances "when no other adequate remedy" is available. We consider whether a party will suffer irreparable harm without our intervention: that is, harm that cannot be remedied through the ordinary appellate process. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo. 2004) (electing to exercise original jurisdiction when the harm caused by an "improper order" could not "be remedied on appeal"). We also consider whether the petition raises an issue "of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." B.B.A.M., ¶ 16, 453 P.3d at 1166 (quoting Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001) ). A.C. argues, and we agree, that both considerations justify our exercise of original jurisdiction here.

¶7 First, absent our intervention, A.C. will suffer irreparable harm, and, thus, he has no adequate alternative remedy. The juvenile court ordered A.C. to participate in a reassessment evaluation over his objection. We have recognized that a party suffers irreparable harm when a court forces the party to undergo a competency evaluation without statutory authority to do so. B.B.A.M., ¶ 19, 453 P.3d at 1166.

¶8 Second, this is "an issue of first impression that is of significant public importance." Id. at ¶ 20, 453 P.3d at 1166. We have not yet considered whether sections 19-2.5-704 to - 706 empower a juvenile court to order a juvenile—who remains incompetent to proceed—to undergo a subsequent reassessment evaluation to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency. Our decision today will have far-reaching consequences for many juveniles in Colorado whose competency to proceed is in question. Accordingly, we elect to exercise our original jurisdiction to provide guidance to juvenile courts and clarify the statutory scheme.

III. Analysis

¶9 We begin by reviewing the applicable standard of review, the principles of statutory interpretation, and the statutes governing juvenile competency determinations. We then review our decision in B.B.A.M. and consider whether it is dispositive of the issue before us. We conclude that it is not. To be sure, section 19-2.5-703, which concerns a juvenile court's initial determination regarding competency, does not empower a juvenile court to order a second competency evaluation. However, sections 19-2.5-704 and - 705 do. These sections concern the juvenile court's responsibility to monitor and evaluate a juvenile's progress. And in conjunction with section 19-2.5-706(2), these provisions authorize a juvenile court to order a reassessment evaluation after the court determines a juvenile remains incompetent. Finally, we apply the rule to the facts of this case and hold that the district court did not err by adopting the magistrate's order requiring A.C. to undergo a reassessment evaluation. Accordingly, we discharge the rule to show cause and remand for further proceedings.

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶10 Whether the juvenile court had authority to order a reassessment evaluation is a matter of statutory interpretation. This inquiry is a question of law, which we review de novo. B.B.A.M., ¶ 23, 453 P.3d at 1166-67. When we interpret a statute, our primary goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent, which we do by giving "words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings" and reading the statutory "scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts," McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 37-38, 442 P.3d 379, 389. Further, we cannot read the statute in a manner that would "lead to illogical or absurd results." Id. at ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. If the statute is unambiguous—that is, not open to multiple interpretations—then our work is done. Id.

B. Reassessment Evaluations

¶11 The district court argues that it properly adopted the magistrate's order because (1) section 19-2.5-705(1) contemplates that juvenile courts will receive evaluations concerning juveniles' restoration to competency, (2) the competency evaluations under section 19-2.5-703(1) that we addressed in B.B.A.M. are distinct from the reassessment evaluation that the magistrate ordered here, and (3) section 19-2.5-706(2) permits a juvenile court to "enter any new order necessary to facilitate the juvenile's achievement of or restoration to competency." We agree in part.

¶12 We begin our consideration of these issues with a review of the specific statutes governing juvenile competency proceedings. Whenever the question of a juvenile's...