People of State v. Slaughter

489 Mich. 302

803 N.W.2d 171

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Mark SLAUGHTER, Defendant–Appellee.

Docket No. 141009.Calendar No. 8.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 20, 2011.Decided July 1, 2011.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Jessica R. Cooper, Prosecuting Attorney, John S. Pallas, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas R. Grden and Rae Ann Ruddy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for the people.Randall P. Upshaw, Lathrup Village for defendant.Ron Schafer, Kym L. Worthy, and Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion

YOUNG, C.J.

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained before a residence can be entered applies to a first-response firefighter answering a 911 call and, if so, whether the firefighter's entry into defendant's residence was reasonable in the instant case. We conclude that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters no less than to police officers when they are responding to emergency situations that threaten life or property. We also conclude that the firefighter's actions in this case were reasonable, thus satisfying the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Mark Slaughter, resided in a townhouse in Royal Oak, Michigan. ¹ In May 2007, defendant's neighbor, Kathleen Tunner, saw water running down her basement wall and over her electrical box. She also heard water flowing behind that wall, which adjoined defendant's townhouse. ² Tunner attempted to locate defendant by knocking on his door, but he was not home. She then called her townhouse management company in a further attempt to locate defendant. After this attempt failed, Tunner dialed 911. The city of Royal Oak dispatched several firefighters to the townhouse, including Lieutenant Michael Schunck. After consulting with Tunner about her emergency call, Schunck entered defendant's residence. When he went to the basement to shut off defendant's water and to assess whether any additional measures needed to be taken to prevent a fire, Schunck observed, in plain view, grow lights and several dozen plants that appeared to be marijuana. He then reported what he saw to the Royal Oak police.

The Royal Oak Police Department dispatched an officer to secure defendant's townhouse while another officer procured a search warrant. After entering defendant's townhouse, officers seized 48 marijuana plants, grow lights, a watering system, defendant's state identification card, books on marijuana horticulture, packaging material, and other drug paraphernalia.

Defendant was charged with manufacturing with the intent to deliver more than 20 but fewer than 200 marijuana plants.³ The district court bound defendant over as charged, notwithstanding defendant's claims that the firefighter's entry into the townhouse violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that he did not exercise dominion and control over the seized marijuana plants.

Although defendant did not appeal the bindover decision, he subsequently filed a pretrial motion to suppress in the circuit court. After hearing testimony and oral argument, the court granted the motion in a written opinion and order. The circuit court concluded that Lieutenant Schunck “did not attempt to hear or see for himself what was causing the problem [that led Tunner to dial 911], nor did he attempt to verify the existence of running water in the wall prior to entering the defendant's home.” The circuit court also observed that Schunck had indicated that “he would have entered the apartment even if he had shut off the water and/or electrical from the outside” because “he has to investigate the [911] calls to the fullest extent possible....”

The circuit court applied this Court's decision in People v. Tyler⁴ and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Camara v. Muni. Court of City & Co. of San Francisco⁵ in concluding that firefighters are required to procure a warrant before entering a building “to prevent a fire from occurring....” Furthermore, it relied on the fact that this Court's decision in People v. Davis,⁶ which articulated the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, did not contain “anything related to the investigation of a possible fire hazard.” Accordingly, the court ruled that the firefighters could not avail themselves of the community caretaking exception.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling in a split, unpublished decision, albeit on alternative grounds.⁷ First, the majority determined, contrary to the circuit court's decision, that the community caretaking exception can apply to searches performed by first-response firefighters to abate a possible fire hazard. However, the majority explained that “the record permits the conclusion that the firefighters were simply too quick to enter into defendant's unit and failed to investigate the complaint” before entering defendant's residence.⁸ Thus, the majority concluded that “there are too many outstanding questions to conclude whether the firefighters acted reasonably” and, therefore, that the circuit court had properly granted the motion to suppress.⁹

The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that first-response firefighters can avail themselves of the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The dissenting judge, however, concluded that the firefighters had acted reasonably in the instant case, indicating that “[t]he firefighters were faced with a possible emergency situation and they needed to make quick judgments about what to do in order to avoid a potential fire.” ¹⁰

This Court granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal and ordered the parties to brief whether

(1) the actions of firefighters may fall under the “community caretaker” exception to probable cause requirements; (2) the “emergency aid” aspect of the community caretaker exception applies in this case; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the firefighters were first obligated to attempt to remedy the condition for which a neighbor called by using means that did not involve entry into the defendant's home.¹¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court's factual findings at a suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error, but the application of the underlying law—the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution—is reviewed de novo.¹²

III. ANALYSIS

A. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees every person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and provides, in its entirety:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.¹³

Similarly, article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution provides, in relevant part:

The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

This Court has ruled that the Michigan Constitution “is to be construed to provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment, absent ‘compelling reason’ to impose a different interpretation.” ¹⁴

Although the entry into defendant's residence was warrantless, “[u]nder the common law and agreeably to the Constitution search may in many cases be legally made without a warrant. The Constitution does not forbid search, as some parties contend, but it does forbid unreasonable search.” ¹⁵ While many warrantless searches are unreasonable pursuant to the warrant requirement,¹⁶ the United States Supreme Court has articulated several instances in which warrantless searches are reasonable. These include searches of automobiles,¹⁷ searches incident to contemporaneous lawful arrests, ¹⁸ inventory searches conducted according to established procedure, ¹⁹ searches conducted during exigent circumstances,²⁰ and searches the police undertake as part of their “community caretaking” function.²¹

The instant case involves only the last circumstance listed—searches undertaken as part of a community caretaking function—and requires this Court to determine the scope of that community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Because it is uncontested that the initial search of defendant's residence was warrantless, we must determine whether the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applies.

B. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in Cady v. Dombrowski, which involved the constitutionality of the search of the trunk of an out-of-town police officer's automobile.²² The police officer was hospitalized after a serious automobile accident, and local police officers arriving on the scene of the accident directed that the injured officer's vehicle be towed to a private garage. Because the private garage was unsecured, local police sought to locate and safeguard the injured officer's service revolver. After failing to find the revolver on the officer's person or in the glove compartment of the vehicle, officers searched the vehicle's trunk and discovered the...