People v. 2006 Saturn Ion (In re 2006 Saturn Ion)

In re FORFEITURE OF 2006 SATURN ION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 2006 SATURN ION, Defendant, and STEPHANIE WILSON, Claimant-Appellee.

No. 357183

Court of Appeals of Michigan

March 24, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-014106-CF

Before: O'Brien, P.J., and Shapiro and Boonstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this forfeiture action, plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting claimant's motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

On June 24, 2021, claimant received a call from Malcolm Smith requesting a ride. According to claimant, she drove her 2006 Saturn Ion to Detroit, Michigan, parked in front of a gas station on Lumley Street, and Smith came up from behind and got into the vehicle. Claimant testified that, afterwards she drove a short distance and was pulled over moments later by Sergeant Chivas Rivers of the Wayne County Sheriff's Office, who had been surveilling a house on Lumley for narcotics activity.

Rivers' account of the stop differed from claimant's. According to Rivers, claimant and Smith drove up to and parked in front of the house on Lumley that Rivers was surveilling for narcotics activity, and while they were parked, an unknown black male approached the passenger side of claimant's vehicle and "reached his arm into the window in what appeared to be a hand to hand drug transaction." After claimant pulled away from the house, Rivers stopped the vehicle and interviewed claimant and Smith. According to Rivers, Smith said that he was there to purchase $10 worth of heroin, and claimant confirmed "that she was transporting Mr. Smith down there to purchase narcotics from the Lumley address . . . ." Claimant, for her part denied making these statements. After interviewing claimant and Smith, Rivers found five empty syringes under the passenger seat, but no drugs. Nevertheless, the vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, on October 23, 2019, forfeiture proceedings were initiated by plaintiff under MCL 333.7521 et seq.

Following discovery, claimant moved for summary disposition on three grounds. Claimant asserted that she was entitled to summary disposition under (1) MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on plaintiff's failure to promptly file its complaint for forfeiture, (2) MCR 2.116(C)(8) based on plaintiff's failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and (3) MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was no material factual dispute and claimant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At the hearing on claimant's motion, the trial court questioned counsel from each party about the facts surrounding the seizure of the vehicle. The court acknowledged that Rivers appeared to witness a "hand-to-hand transaction," but noted that "people can come and go and go up to a car and hand a lot of things over," and the car was stopped only "a couple minutes later" and "no drugs" were found. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted claimant's motion for summary disposition without specifying under which subrule it was ruling.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, a motion to stay, and an ex parte motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied these motions and directed plaintiff to release claimant's vehicle immediately. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Hoffner v Lactoe, 492 Mich. 450, 459; 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court considers "all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." McLain v Lansing Fire Dep't, 309 Mich.App. 335, 340; 869 N.W.2d 645 (2015). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint" and "[a]ll well-plead allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant." Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). For review of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers "affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Sanders v Perfecting Church, 303 Mich.App. 1, 4; 840 N.W.2d 401 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich. 419, 425; 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008).

To the extent that this appeal asks this Court to review the interpretation of a statute, "[t]his Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo." Herald Co, Inc v Eastern Mich. Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 470; 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006).

III. VEHICLE FORFEITURE

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In response, claimant argues that the trial court not only granted her motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), but also under subrules (C)(7) and (C)(8), and she argues that plaintiff's failure to brief arguments related to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) constitutes an abandonment of these issues. We disagree with plaintiff's assertion that the trial court granted her motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (C)(8). Although claimant argued that she was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), the trial court appears to only have decided the case on MCR 2.116(C)(10) grounds. For claimant's contentions related to MCR 2.116(C)(7), the trial court made no mention of those arguments during the motion hearing or in its order following the hearing, therefore the record lacks any finding that plaintiff failed to promptly file its complaint for forfeiture, as claimant argued. As for claimant's arguments related to MCR 2.116(C)(8), it appears that the trial court did not grant summary disposition under that subrule because the court considered evidence outside the pleadings during the hearing on claimant's motion. See Steward v Panek, 251 Mich.App. 546, 554-555; 652 N.W.2d 232 (2002) (explaining that a motion will not be considered to have been decided under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings). Consequently, by only contesting the trial court's order on MCR 2.116(C)(10) grounds, plaintiff disputed the basis for the trial court's ruling, and plaintiff was not otherwise required to argue on appeal that summary disposition was not warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (C)(8) in order to obtain appellate relief.

Turning to the remaining dispute on appeal, plaintiff alleges that claimant's vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). That subsection provides in relevant part that "a conveyance, including an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of [a controlled substance]," is subject to forfeiture. MCL 333.7521(1)(d). In other words, under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a "vehicle which, if used to facilitate any prohibited transaction concerning illicit drugs, is subject to forfeiture." People v One 1979 Honda Auto, Vin No 284S2150186, 139 Mich.App. 651, 655; 362 N.W.2d 860 (1984). See also In re Forfeiture of One 1985 Mercedes Benz, 174 Mich.App. 203, 205; 435 N.W.2d 426 (1988).

"While generally forfeitures are not favored in the law, since § 7521 is embodied in article 7 of the Public Health Code, it must be liberally interpreted in order to promote the health, safety, and welfare of Michigan citizens." In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, 183 Mich.App. 182, 184; 454 N.W.2d 201 (1990).

The trial court reasoned that, despite Rivers seeing what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, "people can come and go and go up to a car and hand a lot of things over," and ultimately "no drugs" were found when the car was stopped "a couple minutes later." That is, the trial court seemed to conclude that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to establish a question of fact about whether claimant's vehicle was used to transport drugs as part of a prohibited drug transaction that would subject the vehicle to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, we believe that this conclusion is untenable. Rivers testified that while surveilling a "known drug house," he saw claimant park her car outside the home, and watched as someone from the home approached the vehicle and "reached his arm into the window in what appeared to be a hand to hand drug transaction." Claimant then drove off. According to Rivers, when he stopped the vehicle shortly thereafter, both Smith and claimant admitted that they went to the house to purchase heroin. On the basis of this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that claimant used her vehicle to drive to a "drug house" intending to purchase heroin, her passenger purchased some heroin, and then claimant drove off with the heroin in the vehicle.^[1] If proven, these facts would establish that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d).^[2]

Claimant argues that even under these facts, MCL 333.7521(1)(d) cannot support forfeiture because the evidence only supports that claimant's vehicle was used to...