People v. Adams

227 N.E.3d 64

2023 IL App (2d) 220061

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Stephen M. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-22-0061

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Filed June 29, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County. No. 18-CF-391, Honorable Robert P. Pilmer, Judge, Presiding.

Gal Pissetzky, of Pissetzky Law, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Eric C. Weis, State’s Attorney, of York-ville (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Adam J. Rodriguez, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Stephen M. Adams, appeals from his conviction of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1998)).¹ Defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) and section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2018)), (2) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and (4) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the victim’s rebuttal testimony. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROND

¶ 3 On January 8, 2019, defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Count I provided that, on or between June 1 and September 1, 1998, defendant committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1998)) in that he committed an act of sexual conduct with A.S., who was at least 13 but under 17 years of age, by knowingly touching or fondling her vagina for the purpose of defendant’s sexual gratification or arousal. Count II alleged the same except that the sexual act alleged was that defendant knowingly touched and fondled A.S.’s breasts. Both acts were alleged to have occurred outside defendant’s house on Chesterfield Lane in Aurora while A.S.’s parents were inside the house.

¶ 4 A. Motion in Limine

¶ 5 On February 6, 2020, the State filed a motion in limine to introduce three sets of other-crimes evidence at trial. The State sought to introduce the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant’s motive, intent, lack of an innocent frame of mind, and propensity to engage in sexual behavior with teenage girls.

¶ 6 The first set of other-crimes evidence involved A.S. and defendant, and the acts occurred at defendant’s Chesterfield Lane home in Aurora on the same day as the charged offenses. In the course of the charged conduct, which included fondling A.S.’s breasts and buttocks, defendant allegedly also invited A.S. to touch his erect penis and told her it was because "it like[d] [her]." The State explained that the reason this conduct was not charged in the indictment as attempt was that an attempt charge was beyond the applicable limitations period.

¶ 7 The second set of other-crimes evidence also involved A.S. and occurred at her family’s house and swimming pool in St. Charles (swimming pool evidence). The State alleged that before the charged incident, when A.S. was approximately 14 years old, defendant started becoming overly friendly with the children at gatherings with his family and A.S.’s family. The State alleged that this led to defendant touching and fondling A.S. at her family’s home in St. Charles. The State alleged that "[t]his activity continued at the St. Charles residence and included defendant touching and fondling A.S. on her breasts and vagina while he swam with children in the A.S. family swimming pool." This conduct was the subject of separate pending charges in Kane County. The State argued that the evidence showed that defendant "committed the same type of behavior against A.S. in the months leading up to the [charged conduct]" and argued that the evidence was admissible for propensity purposes under section 115-7.3 of the Code because defendant’s alleged conduct was "essentially a continuing narrative of a single course of action" that "lasted for a year or two and [took] place in different locations" and "involve[d] the same victim and same type of behavior by *** defendant."

¶ 8 The third set of other-crimes evidence concerned another victim, E.O., and took place in May 2016 in Will County (plea evidence).² E.O. was a foreign exchange student from Sweden whom defendant was hosting at his home in Plainfield. In the State’s motion in limine, it alleged that, while E.O. was living in defendant’s home, defendant "would get uncomfortably close to E.O., touch her on her arms and belly, and kiss her neck." Defendant was alleged to have "frequently told E.O. that she looked pretty, but never did this when his wife was around." On a single occasion, defendant allegedly touched E.O.’s stomach with his hand, and E.O. told him "not to touch her ‘fat,’" to which defendant "responded by lifting her shirt and stating he liked it because he liked women who were not skinny." The State’s motion further alleged that defendant tried to kiss E.O., fondled her breasts and buttocks, told her that "they should have crazy fun," and then pressed his body against hers. E.O. could feel what she described as his "man parts" through his sweatpants. E.O. left defendant’s house that same month.

¶ 9 Defendant’s conduct against E.O. led to a three-count indictment in Will County (case No. 16-CF-2153), charging defendant with, inter alia, aggravated criminal sexual abuse. On September 22, 2017, defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of attempted criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(a)(1) (West 2016)) of E.O.

¶ 10 On February 12, 2020, defendant responded to the State’s motion in limine. As to the swimming pool evidence, defendant argued that it involved pending charges, that the probative value of that other-crimes evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact because he was presumed innocent, and that he could not rebut the allegations without forgoing his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Regarding the plea evi- dence, defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible for the purpose of propensity because the conduct against E.O. occurred 18 years after the offenses alleged in the indictment. He asserted that the prejudicial impact of the plea evidence outweighed whatever minimal relevance the evidence had. Defendant did not respond to the State’s first set of other-crimes evidence, which allegedly occurred during the course of the charged conduct.

¶ 11 On February 18, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion in limine. The State began the hearing by clarifying that its motion "can really be argued in three categories rather than two. One is kind of a subcategory." The State explained that there were "two parts of the A.S. story" that it sought to admit: the evidence where defendant asked her to touch his penis on the same day as the charged conduct in the instant case and the swimming pool evidence. It described the former evidence as "probably the easiest of the issues."

¶ 12 The State then explained the swimming pool evidence in more detail, first noting that A.S. and her family were members of the same church as defendant. A.S.’s family would host church gatherings at their home in St. Charles, and they had a swimming pool on their property. The State alleged that defendant would swim in the pool and would "seem to gravitate toward the children in the pool." At first, A.S. thought that the contact from defendant in the pool was accidental, but the contact turned into "essentially groping of her body parts." Defendant also told A.S. that she was pretty and special and that he liked her. The State argued that this incident was related to the subject matter of defendant’s current indictment and had occurred in relatively close proximity, having taken place about one year prior.

¶ 13 In addition to the other-crimes swimming pool evidence, the State described a separate incident involving A.S., where defendant had A.S. over to his house to babysit his children and drove her home later that night.³ A.S. was under the impression that defendant and his wife would be out of town for a couple of days, and she planned to stay overnight, but they returned early. A.S. was in pajamas when defendant returned home that night, and in the presence of A.S. and his wife, defendant made a comment about the sex lives of rock stars. Later, while driving A.S. home, defendant tried to fondle her and invited her to touch his penis.

¶ 14 Turning to the plea evidence, the State noted that defendant’s conduct against E.O. occurred when she was close in age (16 years old) to the age A.S. was when the charged offense occurred (15 years old). Consistent with its written motion, the State described the particular incident that led to E.O. removing herself from defendant’s household, including that defendant had told E.O. she was pretty, kissed her on the neck, fondled her breasts and buttocks, told her they should have "crazy fun," and pressed his body against E.O., causing her to feel defendant’s "man parts" rubbing against her through his sweatpants. The State related that it had contacted E.O. and that she was willing to travel from Sweden to testify to defendant’s conduct. The State argued that, although the gap between defendant’s alleged conduct against A.S. and E.O. was 18 years, the similarity between the incidents supported allowing introduction of the plea evidence.

¶ 15 The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, explaining as follows. First, defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, which was a qualifying offense under section 115-7.3(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.8(a) (West 2018)). The court continued:

"With respect to weighing the probative value of the evidence against any undue prejudice to [defendant], [section 115-7.3 of the Code] points out and the Court may consider, one, proximity

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