People v. Ambpjz

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AUSTIN JOSEPH AMBPJZ, Defendant and Appellant.

G060042

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

April 21, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No 18NF1250, Richard M. King, Judge.

Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

BEDSWORTH, J.

Appellant Austin Ambriz was convicted of murder for fatally stabbing Luke Lindsey during an altercation in Brea. On appeal, he contends the prosecutor violated Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batsori) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) by using her peremptory challenges to remove people of color from the jury panel. Appellant also raises a discovery issue related to Lindsey's school records. Finding no basis for reversal we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

One night in 2018, Lindsey and his girlfriend were hanging out and smoking marijuana at a friend's apartment. As the night wore on, Jason Burger joined them outside the apartment for a smoke. Then Burger called appellant and Robert Mejia, with whom he had been drinking early that evening, to come and pick him up.

When appellant and Mejia arrived at the complex, appellant and Lindsey got into a dispute and squared off against each other. But as soon as they begin to scuffle, appellant pulled a knife and stabbed Lindsey in the stomach. Lindsey, who had drugs and alcohol in his system, succumbed to his wounds later that night at the hospital. As it turned out, he and appellant had argued in the past, and according to one witness, appellant had previously stated he wanted to kill Lindsey.

At trial, however, appellant testified he acted in self-defense. He claimed he only pulled out his knife because Lindsey was beating him up, and he never actually stabbed Lindsey. Rather, Lindsey simply ran into the knife while he was holding it out in front of him. The jury did not see it that way. It convicted appellant of second degree murder with a deadly weapon, for which he was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison.

DISCUSSION

Batson/Wheeler Claim

During voir dire, appellant, who is Hispanic, challenged as discriminatory the prosecutor's decision to excuse certain Hispanics and African-Americans from the jury panel. Although the trial court eventually found there was a prima facie showing of discrimination with respect to the African-Americans, it ultimately accepted the prosecutor's proffered justifications for their removal and therefore it denied appellant's Batson/Wheeler motion. Appellant claims the court's ruling lacks substantial evidentiary support, but the record shows otherwise.

'""Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate's use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.'" [Citation.] '"Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.'" [Citation.] The law also recognizes '"a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination." [Citation.] "A three-step procedure applies at trial when a defendant alleges discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria. Second, if the trial court finds a prima facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge. Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution's offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] 'The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant]."" [Citation.]" (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759-760.)

Defense counsel first raised the issue of possible discrimination after the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror No. 219, an African-American woman, from the jury panel. Noting the prosecutor had previously excused a prospective juror of Hispanic ancestry, defense counsel claimed Prospective Juror No. 219's removal violated Batson/Wheeler because she was the second person of color who was excused by the People. However, the trial court did not believe there was prima facie evidence of discrimination because there were still African-Americans and Hispanics on the jury panel at that time. It thus denied defense counsel's motion to keep Prospective Juror No. 219 on the jury.

The court ruled similarly after the prosecutor removed another Hispanic from the jury panel. Although defense counsel argued "there seems to be a pattern of excluding minorities" by the prosecution, the court disagreed on the basis there were still about 20 panel members who had Hispanic-sounding surnames.

However, after the prosecutor excused another African-American woman from the panel, Prospective Juror No. 196, the court came to a different conclusion. Based on the fact there were far fewer African-Americans on the panel than Hispanics, the court found there was a prima facie showing the prosecutor was targeting African-Americans for removal. Therefore, the court asked the prosecutor to explain why she had excused Prospective Jurors No. 219 and 196.

The prosecutor said she believed Prospective Juror No. 219 would be distracted by other matters if she served on the jury. This belief, the prosecutor explained, was partly based on Prospective Juror No. 219's stated concerns about her ailing father, who was hospitalized in another time zone. Indeed, Prospective Juror No. 219 was very candid in her voir dire answers about how much this issue was weighing on her mind and how serving on the jury would potentially interfere with her ability to communicate with her father. She also indicated the clinic where she worked would have to shut down on the days she had jury duty if she could not find someone to cover for her. The prosecutor told the court this work-related issue also contributed to her belief that Prospective Juror No. 219 would not be a fully attentive juror.

The prosecutor's concerns regarding Prospective Juror No. 196 related to a different matter. When questioned during voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 196 had stated she had two nephews living with her who had been involved with the criminal justice system. One of them had previously served time for robbing a gas station, and the other was currently under house arrest for selling drugs. She also said the drug case was based on a "raid" that the police had carried out at her home. Given those circumstances, the prosecutor believed it would be very difficult for Prospective Juror No. 196 to be impartial if she served as a juror on this case.

In response, defense counsel argued that due to the bias against black men in policing and the courts, it would have an unfair impact on African-Americans if knowing someone who was involved in the criminal justice system was a disqualification for jury service. Defense counsel also pointed out that Prospective Jurors No. 219 and 196 both said they could judge the case fairly if they were selected to sit on the jury. However, the court found the prosecutor's stated justifications for removing them to be credible and legally valid. It also noted that, notwithstanding their removal, there was an African-American man in the jury box whom the prosecution had previously passed on.^[1] It thus denied defense counsel's request to keep Prospective Juror No. 196 on the jury.

When voir dire resumed, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror No. 168, who was the third African-American to be excused by the People. Asked to explain her reasons for doing so, the prosecutor said Prospective Juror No 168 appeared to have trouble with her hearing when she was questioned. The prosecutor felt this problem would only be exacerbated during trial if Prospective Juror No. 168 sat on the case because the jury was going to be spread out in the courtroom to guard against the spread of Covid-19. The trial court felt this was a valid concern. In fact, after reviewing the transcript of voir dire, the court agreed with the prosecutor that many of Prospective Juror No. 168's answers were odd and nonresponsive. It thus rejected defense counsel's claim that the prosecutor was targeting African-Americans for removal in violation of Batson/Wheeler.

On appeal, appellant broadly accuses the prosecutor of using her peremptory challenges to "strike persons of color called to the jury box." However, appellant does not contest the removal of any Hispanic prospective jurors in particular, nor does he contest the trial court's ruling there was not a prima facie showing of discrimination with respect to the removal of Hispanics from the jury panel. Instead, appellant's argument focuses on the prosecutor's justifications for removing Prospective Jurors No. 196, 219 and 168. According to appellant, the prosecutor's decision to remove these African-Americans from the panel was racially motivated, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise.

At the outset, we note the record shows the trial court was very conscientious of the concerns raised by defense counsel during voir dire. Throughout the jury selection...