People v. Arias

320 Cal.Rptr.3d 814

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.David G. ARIAS, Defendant and Appellant.

A164789

Court of Appeal, First District. DIVISION ONE.

Filed May 10, 2024

Trial Court: Superior Court of Alameda, Trial Judge: Hon. Allan Hymer (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 19-CR-010020)

Law Office of Matthew Siroka, Matthew A. Siroka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Lourdes Rosado, President and General Counsel, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Gregg

E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Humes, P.J.

Defendant David Arias was tried for two counts of sexual abuse committed against J. Doe, a child under 14 years old. During the trial, the defense brought a Batson/Wheeler ¹ motion challenging the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory strike against a prospective juror who was a Black woman. After the trial court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, the prosecutor gave three reasons for the strike. The court then denied the motion without any discussion, stating only that it did not "think the challenge was based on racial animus or bias." The jury convicted Arias of both charges, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

We conclude that the trial court’s cursory denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was improper, because the prosecutor’s reasons for the strike do not withstand scrutiny. The first reason was that the juror would "empathize" more with defense experts than with a prosecution expert because her educational background was similar to that of the defense experts. The record belies this justification, however, because the prosecution expert’s educational background was essentially the same as the defense experts’. The second reason was that the juror had concerns about implicit bias and unfairness in the criminal justice system. Although a recent statute expressly renders such a reason presumptively invalid, the statute does not apply to this case because the jury was selected before its effective date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (e), (i).) But even though this reason was facially race-neutral under then-governing law, it was nevertheless troubling, and it did not independently justify the strike under the totality of the circumstances. Finally, the last reason was that the juror was "pretty opinionated" and might therefore be reluctant to deliberate. This concern was unlikely to have actually motivated the strike, however, because it was not applied to other potential jurors. Applying the governing Batson/Wheeler framework, we conclude that the record lacks sufficient evidence on which the trial court could have reasonably relied to accept the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror without further probing and explanation. Because the error was structural, we reverse.²

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Arias began dating Doe’s mother and moved in with her, Doe, and Doe’s younger brother when Doe was about four years old. The couple eventually had a son together. They did not marry, but Doe called Arias her dad.

In April 2019, when Doe was 11 years old and in sixth grade, she reported to a school counselor that Arias had sexually abused her. At trial, Doe described various sexual acts occurring during that school year, including an incident in the bathroom when Arias forced her to touch his penis and an incident in her bedroom when Arias licked her vagina while holding her legs. Arias testified in his own defense and flatly denied ever touching Doe sexually.

Arias was originally charged in July 2019, and he was tried in mid-2021. The operative information alleged two felony counts, forcible lewd acts upon a child under 14 years old and aggravated sexual assault (oral copulation) of a child under 14 years old.³

Jury selection began in May 2021. During the process, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against A.W., a Black woman. The trial court found that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, but it accepted the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenge without any assessment, and it then denied the motion. The seated jury had one Black member, a woman.

The jury convicted Arias of both charges. In March 2022, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life for aggravated sexual assault and imposed and stayed a term of 8 years to life for forcible lewd acts.

II. Discussion

A. The Batson/Wheeler Framework

[1, 2] " ‘ "Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race." ’ [Citation.] ‘ "Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution." ’ " (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 759-760, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 503 P.3d 668 (Holmes).) The " ‘[e]xclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error’ " and requires reversal. (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 292, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 95, 452 P.3d 609; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769 (Silva).)

[3, 4] A trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s Batson/Wheeler claim proceeds in three steps. " ‘ "First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on impermissible criteria. Second, if the trial court finds a prima facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge. Third, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution’s offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].’ " ’ " (Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 760, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 503 P.3d 668.)

[5–8] Generally, we review a trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion " ‘ " ‘with great restraint,’ " ’ " considering "only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions." (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946 (Lenix).) " ‘We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ " (Id. at pp. 613–614, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946.) "But when the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, inher- ently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient." (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) In that situation, "the court’s failure to probe, or to explain, may eliminate the basis for [appellate court] deference." (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1078, 274 Cal. Rptr.3d 655, 480 P.3d 49.)

Here, the trial court found that the defense made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the prosecutor offered her reasons for striking A.W., and the court accepted those reasons without comment and denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. As a result, the issues on appeal are whether the prosecutor’s reasons were facially neutral at the second stage of the analysis and whether the court erred by uncritically crediting them at the third stage of the analysis.

B. Additional Facts

A.W. was in her thirties and had a bachelor’s degree in business, a master’s degree in counseling, and a Ph.D. in "higher education and organizational change." She worked at a major healthcare company where she "design[ed] and execute[d] learning experience[s] for new [and] existing employees." In response to a question on the juror questionnaire asking for the jurors’ "feelings about the criminal justice system," she wrote, "It is a system that has its benefits, such as providing a process that facilitates a decision whether or not someone is innocent or guilty of a crime. However, there are improvements that need to be made to ensure that individual[s] are not falsely convicted of a crime that they did not commit[ ]."

A.W. was questioned on the second day of voir dire. The prosecutor began by asking A.W. whether there was anything from the previous day’s questioning "that stood out to [her] as new or different or anything [she] thought might be troubling that stuck in [her] mind." A.W. replied, "Not so much troubling. I think this process is fairly new. One thing that I did hear over and over again was the one[-]person testimony and that being sufficient or not, as well as the Me To[o] movement [that] came up quite a bit. The position that I take is I’m coming in with a fresh, new lens, so I’m coming in with an open mind. I don’t have an opinion either way. One thing I will say is that everyone has unconscious bias and I think that’s something that I would want to put out there in the beginning. And it’s hard to say check your bias at the door especially if you don’t know what that is."

The prosecutor acknowledged that A.W. had "a good point" and other jurors had already raised "the idea of maybe having unconscious biases or implicit biases." The prosecutor said, "[W]e are asking you right now, are you biased that you might not know," and specifically asked whether A.W. "[felt] one way or the other[,] whether it has to do with … the Me Too movement or other feelings about the...