People v. Atkins

1

2024 IL App (1st) 230252-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUINTIN ATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-23-0252

Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, First Division

June 17, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 21 CR 125 Honorable Thomas J. Byrne, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

COGHLAN JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Defendant's conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) is affirmed over his contentions that an armed robbery committed when he was 16 years old may not serve as a predicate felony for UUWF, that the trial court misapprehended the relevant sentencing range and that the trial court abused its discretion by not departing from sentencing guidelines.

¶ 2 In a blind plea, defendant Quintin Atkins pled guilty to one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). After merging the AUUW counts into the UUWF count, the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by relying on an offense that occurred when he was 16 years old to "convict" him both of UUWF and of "Class 2" AUUW. Defendant further contends that the trial court misapprehended the sentencing range when it determined there was a seven-year presumptive minimum for UUWF. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider that mitigating circumstances warranted imposing a sentence below seven years. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 Defendant's conviction arose from an incident that occurred on November 28, 2020, in Chicago. According to the stipulated factual basis for defendant's plea, on that date, officers responded to a call of shots fired. When they arrived on the scene, an individual pointed at defendant and said he had a firearm in his waistband. The officers approached defendant for a field interview. Defendant indicated that he had a gun and that he "took the gun off of his friend, who was just shot." The officers recovered a loaded handgun from defendant's waistband and placed him into custody.

¶ 4 Following arrest, defendant was charged by indictment with one count each of armed habitual criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) (count I), UUWF (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)) (count II), AUUW premised on not possessing a concealed carry license (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5) (West 2020)) (count III), and AUUW premised on not possessing a firearm owner's identification card (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(C) (West 2020)) (count IV). Two prior convictions-manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in case No. 13 CR 270401 and armed robbery in case No. 02 CR 1998201-were listed as the predicate offenses for AHC. The armed robbery conviction in case No. 02 CR 1998201 was listed as the single predicate offense for UUWF and, in both counts charging AUUW, as the basis for the State seeking to sentence defendant as a Class 2 offender.

¶ 5 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss count I, arguing that, because he was 16 years old when he committed armed robbery in 2002, that crime could not be used as a predicate offense for AHC. Following argument on the motion, the trial court dismissed count I. Counsel asked for a continuance so that defendant could consider an offer from the State.

¶ 6 At the next court date, defendant's attorney withdrew, and the trial court allowed defendant to proceed pro se. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the remaining counts of his indictment, arguing that, because he was a juvenile in 2002, the State could not use his 2002 armed robbery as a predicate offense for the charges of UUWF and AUUW. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that, although defendant was a juvenile in 2002, he was prosecuted as an adult.

¶ 7 After denying defendant's motion, the trial court informed defendant that he needed to answer the State's motion for discovery so as to put the State on notice if he had any affirmative defenses. Defendant responded, "Basically, on the elected matter, it is on camera. I am already pleading guilty to it. The gun is off a dead man's body. I had to defend myself." Defendant and the court then engaged in the following colloquy:

"THE COURT: Why are you setting this for trial if you are pleading guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: I am asking the State. I am ready to plead guilty on that charge right now.

THE COURT: As to counts two, three and four on 21 CR 00125, how do you plead to those counts?

THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Did you execute a jury waiver by any chance?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I understand they are supposed to do a presentence investigation report, Judge.

THE COURT: I will make sure we get a presentence investigation report done. They are going to come and interview you. You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Can I also offer this into evidence as adult criminal history that classifies me as a Class III for this case, the elected matter?

THE COURT: We will do that at sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you."

¶ 8 The trial court read the charges aloud. Among other things, the court stated that the charge of UUWF was "punishable by a penitentiary sentence from 3 to 14 years." Defendant indicated that he understood each charge and its possible penalties and was pleading guilty. However, he also stated, "Judge, I am pleading guilty, but I don't understand how [the State] is using a juvenile armed robbery to enhance." The trial court answered, "You can look at that. I am asking how do you plead." Defendant replied that he was pleading guilty. He also executed a jury waiver.

¶ 9 The trial court admonished defendant regarding the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The parties stipulated to the factual basis for the plea, as set forth above. The stipulation also included the following statement: "The defendant is a convicted felon *** under 02 CR 1998201." The trial court found that defendant's plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis existed for the plea. The court entered a finding of guilty on counts II, III, and IV, and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report.

¶ 10 The State asked the court to "briefly pass the case" so that it could discuss an offer with defendant concerning a separate case. When the matter was recalled, the State reported that defendant had rejected its offer on the separate case. The State further reported, "[Defendant] did inquire about the court's previous 402 offer on the case where he blind pled this morning. [Defendant] and I discussed an offer that involved both cases. However, he has since rejected that offer, so that offer is withdrawn."

¶ 11 After further discussion of the separate case, defendant queried as to how presentence custody credit would be applied. In the course of answering defendant's questions, the trial court told him that the State was offering, and "I would sentence you to," five years in prison "on those counts that you pled guilty to." The court would impose a three-year sentence on the separate case, for a total of eight years in prison. It repeated twice more that defendant would receive a five-year sentence in the instant case. When the court asked defendant what he would like to do, he answered, "Yeah, I will take it."

¶ 12 The trial court proceeded to give defendant guilty plea admonishments for the separate case. When the court asked him if he had signed a jury waiver, defendant responded by asking about presentence custody credit and requesting PSI reports for both cases. The following exchange ensued:

"THE DEFENDANT: Can you order a presentence investigation report?

THE COURT: If there is an agreement, you can waive it. If you want a presentence investigation report, what I will do then is have a hearing after reviewing the presentence investigation report. That is what we call a blind plea. Then it would be up to me what I think a fair sentence would be.

(Brief pause.)

THE DEFENDANT: How do I know I am getting my time credit?

THE COURT: I am going to think about this for just a minute and I have to decide if I am going to go along with this agreement. You didn't sign the jury waiver.

I think what I am going to do is set it for trial, State.

[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Okay.

THE COURT: If you don't mind.

[ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: That's fine, Judge.

THE COURT: I am going to strike the plea, and I am going to hold the elected case over for trial on January 31st."

¶ 13 The State indicated that it was withdrawing its offer. The court informed defendant that, after the PSI report was completed, the instant case would proceed to sentencing. The court stated, "I am not going along with any agreement. What I will do is after your jury trial [on the separate case], I will hear anything you have to say in mitigation on the case you pled guilty to, and if you win your other case, we won't address the sentencing. If you don't win the case, then I will sentence you on both."

¶ 14 When the case was called on January 31, 2023, the trial court summarized that defendant had entered a blind plea to counts II, III, and IV, and that there had been no agreement as to the sentence. After the parties acknowledged receipt of the PSI report, the State moved to amend it to include several prior convictions which had been unsealed. Other than one conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle in 2006, defendant's other prior convictions were all...