People v. Baldner

2024 NY Slip Op 04495

The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Christopher Baldner, Respondent.

No. CR-23-0654

Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

September 19, 2024

Calendar Date: April 25, 2024

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York City (Matthew B Keller of counsel), for appellant.

Larkin Ingrassia LLP, Newburgh (John Ingrassia of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Aarons, Fisher, McShan and Mackey, JJ.

AARONS, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Ulster County (Bryan E. Rounds, J.), entered February 2, 2023, which, among other things, partially granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

On two separate occasions - once in September 2019 and once in December 2020 - defendant, an on-duty state trooper, engaged in high-speed chases with vehicles traveling on Interstate 87 (hereinafter the Thruway) in Ulster County. Both chases ended when defendant collided with the vehicles from behind, forcing them off the road. One of those vehicles flipped over and landed upside down, and a passenger inside the vehicle died. She was 11 years old.

The Attorney General commenced an investigation, culminating in an indictment charging defendant with one count of murder in the second degree (depraved indifference murder), one count of manslaughter in the second degree and six counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree. Defendant filed an omnibus motion contending, as relevant here, that the evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish that defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life as required by the crimes of depraved indifference murder and first-degree reckless endangerment. County Court agreed and dismissed the count of depraved indifference murder and reduced the counts of first-degree reckless endangerment to reckless endangerment in the second degree. The People appeal.

Depraved indifference is a culpable mental state that is "best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life - a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply does not care whether grievous harm results or not" (People v Williams, 206 A.D.3d 1282, 1284 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Huntington, 57 A.D.3d 1238, 1239 [3d Dept 2008]). "A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he [or she] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person" (Penal Law § 120.25). A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder if, by that same conduct, the person "causes the death of another person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]). Thus, depraved indifference is an essential element of both crimes that "has meaning independent of recklessness and the gravity of the risk created" (People v Maldonado, 24 N.Y.3d 48, 53 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Penal Law §§ 120.25; 125.25 [2]; People v Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348, 359 [2011]; People v Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294-295 [2006]; see also Penal Law § 15.05 [3]).

Depraved indifference requires a "highly fact-specific" inquiry (People v Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d 259, 276 [2013]), and, in assessing the legal sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury, "[o]ur task is limited to assessing whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes" (People v Reid, 185 A.D.3d 1163, 1165 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Critically, the "reviewing court must consider whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a petit jury" (People v Edwards, 36 N.Y.3d 946, 947 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord People v Hart, 221 A.D.3d 1192, 1193 [3d Dept 2023]). "In the context of grand jury proceedings, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Park, 163 A.D.3d 1060, 1061 [3d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPL 70.10 [1]).

The grand jury heard that, in September 2019, defendant "came out of the woods like the Dukes of Hazard" in his State Police vehicle, sirens activated, when he observed a minivan speeding at 80 miles per hour. Jonathan Muthu, the minivan's driver, testified that there were two passengers with him - a friend who had travelled with him from New York City to the Albany area earlier that morning and an acquaintance Muthu agreed to transport from Albany back to New York City. Muthu admitted that he fled the ensuing traffic stop because he had marihuana in the minivan, and accelerated to 70 to 80 miles per hour while "trying to go around cars." After Muthu failed to pull over again, defendant hit the rear of the minivan with his State Police vehicle while the minivan was traveling at "highway speed." The collision caused the minivan to spin 180 degrees, leave the roadway and hit the guardrail in the median. Defendant then crashed his State Police vehicle head-on into the front of the stationary minivan with Muthu and his two passengers still inside. The minivan was totaled, Muthu said, and the State Police vehicle appeared to sustain heavy damage too. Defendant then pointed his gun at Muthu and the two passengers and ordered them outside to lie on the ground, repeatedly asking whether they had weapons or drugs but never whether anyone was hurt.

Muthu also testified to defendant's statements to him after he was taken into custody. As recounted by Muthu, defendant said he was "lucky" that the "pit maneuver" succeeded in stopping the minivan, because otherwise defendant would have had tire spikes thrown onto the Thruway. Further, defendant told Muthu there is "only one way in and one way out" of the Thruway and wondered, "Where did you think you were going to go?"

By contrast, defendant's contemporaneous memorandum concerning the 2019 incident indicates the minivan had been traveling at 90 miles per hour before the attempted traffic stop, and then was "weaving in and out of traffic[,] slowing and speeding up to speeds over 100 mph." According to that memorandum and testimony from defendant's shift supervisor, defendant reported that the minivan initiated contact with the passenger side of defendant's State Police vehicle, causing the minivan to lose control and crash into the median guardrail. Defendant further reported that he positioned his State Police vehicle in front of the minivan after it hit the guardrail, and the minivan drove into the front end of defendant's vehicle attempting to flee again.

The evidence of the December 2020 incident follows a similar pattern. The grand jury heard from witnesses that, around 11:40 p.m., defendant was "see[ing] if he could get one last ticket" before meeting his partner when he stopped an SUV for speeding. The SUV pulled over, and, as told by Tristin Goods, who was driving the SUV, along with Goods' wife, who was seated in the front passenger seat, defendant began the traffic stop by angrily and profanely accusing Goods of traveling over 100 miles per hour. An argument between defendant and Goods ensued in front of Goods' wife and two children, who tried to calm him. Witnesses testified that, after defendant stepped away upon Goods' request to summon a supervisor, defendant returned and, without warning or provocation, pepper-sprayed the passenger cabin of the SUV, and Goods' wife and two children began screaming in pain. Goods, who had shielded his eyes from the spray, fled the traffic stop; in the commotion, defendant's pepper spray canister ended up inside the passenger cabin of the SUV.

Defendant radioed that the SUV was "taking off" with his pepper spray. According to the grand jury record, defendant pursued and caught up to the SUV and, without activating his siren, intentionally rammed the back of the SUV at 130 miles per hour. Defendant radioed dispatch, however, that the SUV had "just f***ing rammed me." The collision caused the SUV to fishtail, and pieces of it fell onto the road. The SUV continued on, so defendant intentionally rammed the back of the SUV again, this time at 100 miles per hour. Defendant radioed dispatch that the SUV "rammed me again."

The second collision caused Goods to lose control of the SUV, and the SUV flipped over, coming to a stop upside down in the grass next to the Thruway with Goods, his wife and two children inside. Defendant, seeing this, radioed that a car was overturned. ^[1] Testimony established that defendant drew his gun, instructed the occupants of the SUV to put their hands out of the windows and asked repeatedly whether they possessed weapons or drugs. Defendant did not inquire if anyone inside was injured in the crash and, when Goods' 11-year-old child could not be located, defendant did not assist him in looking for her. According to Goods, who had sustained arm, hand and head injuries, defendant "did not care." The child was later found pinned inside the wreck of the SUV, having already died from severe injuries sustained in the accident.

Meanwhile, as emergency responders engaged in recovery efforts, testimony and video evidence revealed that defendant searched for and found his pepper spray can. According to another trooper at the scene who asked defendant how he was doing, defendant said he felt "fine" except for the pepper spray that had blown back on him when it was discharged. Defendant reported to a State Police sergeant that both collisions were initiated by the SUV, including the second one, which caused the SUV to lose control and crash.

Although "the mens rea...