People v. Baudoin

85 Cal.App.5th 1184

301 Cal.Rptr.3d 864

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Terry Christopher BAUDOIN, Defendant and Appellant.

B317130

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Filed December 6, 2022

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WEINGART, J.

Defendant Terry Christopher Baudoin appeals a restitution order imposed in connection with his conviction for battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution to the victim, L.W.,¹ including for various expenses she incurred in relocating away from her home where the assault took place. Penal Code ² section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I) ( section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) ) requires a trial court to include "[e]xpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the defendant" in a direct restitution award, but only if the expenses have been "verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim." Defendant argues the restitution order here violates section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) because there was no verification by law enforcement or a mental health treatment provider supporting the necessity of L.W.’s relocation costs. We agree, and reverse and remand for further proceedings, including affording the People an opportunity to provide the required verification.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Assault on L.W.³

On March 6, 2019, L.W. had an argument with her husband at his workplace. Defendant, who was a good friend of L.W.’s husband, was present during the argument.

After the argument, L.W. returned to the home she shared with her husband and her two children, who were four and six years old. Arriving home, the doorbell rang. When she opened the door, defendant's sister, Tiana Baudoin (Tiana),⁴ rushed at L.W. and began beating her about the face and head. Repeatedly struck, L.W. fell to the floor. Defendant, who was present with his sister, directed Tiana to let L.W. stand up, but Tiana continued beating her. Defendant then joined in. He "sucker punched" L.W. in the face. She fell on her back and lost consciousness.

As a result of the beating, L.W. was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she remained for approximately 24 hours. She suffered fractures to both eye sockets, and required approximately 14 stitches under one of her eyes.

B. Defendant Pleads Nolo Contendere and Is Sentenced to Prison

By an amended information, defendant was charged with battery with serious bodily injury ( § 243, subd. (d) ), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( § 245, subd. (a)(4) ), and first degree burglary ( § 459 ). Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to battery with serious bodily injury and admitted inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.⁵ He also admitted a probation violation from a prior case. The court sentenced defendant to an upper term of four years in state prison to be served concurrently with the term for violating probation. The court dismissed the remaining counts, and put the matter over for a further hearing regarding victim restitution.

C. Restitution Overview

Before we discuss the restitution related proceedings in the trial court, an overview of certain restitution provisions applicable to this case is helpful.

"In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as The Victims’ Bill of Rights.... [Citations.] Proposition 8 established the right of crime victims to receive restitution directly ‘from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer.’ ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The initiative added article I, section 28, subdivision (b) to the California Constitution ...." ( People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623 ( Giordano ).)

Under this constitutional provision, "[r]estitution shall be ordered ... in every case ... in which a crime victim suffers a loss." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) " California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (b), which is not self-executing, directed the Legislature to adopt implementing legislation. [Citations.]" ( Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 652, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623.)

The Legislature enacted section 1202.4 to "implement[ ] the broad mandate of California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (b)." ( Giordano , supra , 42 Cal.4th at pp. 656, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623.) Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." ( § 1202.4, subd. (f).) It further provides that "[t]he court shall order full restitution." (Ibid. )

Subdivision (f)(1) of section 1202.4 provides that a "defendant has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution." ( § 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) "The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt." ( People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 878.)

Subdivision (f)(3) of section 1202.4 provides, in relevant part, that the restitution order "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following ...." ( § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) What follows are 12 subdivisions, (f)(3)(A) through (f)(3)(L), which address specific types of expenses. Among these subdivisions is (f)(3)(I), which addresses "[e]xpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the defendant." Section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) requires that "[e]xpenses incurred pursuant to this section shall be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim."

D. The Restitution Hearings and Resulting Order

On November 9, 2021, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(1) to consider restitution payable to L.W. by both defendant and Tiana.

L.W. testified at the hearing as follows. After the assault, she was taken to the hospital by ambulance, and she later received a bill in the amount of $1,642, which was still unpaid. After she was released from the hospital, she did not return to her home because defendant and Tiana knew where she lived, and she was afraid of them assaulting her again or something else happening to her. L.W. further testified, "My husband—when the incident happened, I called him and told him what happened. He never answered. He never said come home. He never said—he never checked on me and the kids at all. It's as if he knew that it happened, and he never reached out to say, ‘Okay. Come back home. It's okay. You know, it was a mistake.’ He never reached out. So basically, I got beat up by his friends and put out my house with my two young kids." Defendant and Tiana were gang-affiliated and members of the gang would gather at the residence where L.W. lived with her husband.

Faced with this situation, L.W. took her two children to the one-bedroom apartment of her father, where she was able to stay for a night. After that, she moved from place to place, including different motels and friends’ residences, because she was not able to afford a more permanent residence. L.W. stayed in motels for about six to eight months, and she provided receipts totaling $8,055.56; she was missing some receipts, so the actual expense was higher. L.W. shared the motel rooms with a relative and each paid half of the expenses. In February 2020, L.W. was able to get into an apartment for $1,800 per month in rent; L.W. also shared the apartment with the same relative, and they each paid half of the rent. When L.W. had lived with her husband, she had paid no rent, and she was not on the lease. L.W. and her relative also had to pay a total of $3,600 for a security deposit and last month's rent; the relative paid the "majority of it" but L.W. agreed to pay her back.

At the conclusion of L.W.’s testimony, the prosecutor argued that L.W. should receive $1,642 for the ambulance charge, $9,000 for L.W.’s share of the hotel expenses (calculated at $50 per day for 180 days), and $900 for L.W.’s share of the security deposit, for a total of $11,542. Defense counsel pointed out that L.W. admitted she had assumed, near the end of her period of staying in motels, that she would be returning home, and counsel argued that this admission showed L.W. did not fear returning home and was not entitled to restitution of relocation expenses under section 1202.4(f)(3)(I).

Defense counsel also argued there was no verification from law enforcement that it was necessary for L.W. to move, and that such evidence was required by section 1202.4(f)(3)(I). In making this argument, counsel cited People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ( Mearns ), which counsel contended held that a verification by law enforcement was required to award relocation expenses under section 1202.4(f)(3)(I). The prosecutor responded the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to award relocation expenses, and no verification by law enforcement was required.

The trial court held a second hearing regarding restitution on November 22, 2021. The court found defendant was...