People v. Bauman

2012 IL App (2d) 110544

981 N.E.2d 1149

367 Ill.Dec. 421

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Eric M. BAUMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2–11–0544.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Dec. 12, 2012.

Matthew J. Haiduk, Geneva, IL, for appellant.

Luis A. Bianchi, State's Atty., Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor's Office, Woodstock, IL, for the People.

OPINION

Justice BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[367 Ill.Dec. 422]¶ 1 After a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Eric M. Bauman, was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2010). He was sentenced to 10 months' supervision and assessed fines and fees. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss this action for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. See 725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2010). For the following reasons, we find that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On March 27, 2010, defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5 (West 2010)), possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4 (West 2010)), failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident (625 ILCS 5/11–601 (West 2010)), improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11–709 (West 2010)), and DUI (625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2010)). He secured bond and was released that day. One of the conditions of his bond was that he “appear to answer this charge in the Court having jurisdiction of the day certain set for hearing of this cause and thereafter as Ordered by the Court until discharged.”

¶ 4 On April 26, 2010, defendant filed a written document entitled “SPEEDY TRIAL DEMAND” and served a copy on the McHenry County State's Attorney's office. The written demand states, “[p]ursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103, the Defendant hereby demands a speedy trial as of the date of this order.” On April 27, 2010, defendant filed a notice of motion and a subpoena duces tecum. The subpoena was directed to the McHenry County sheriff's department. In the notice of motion the return date on the subpoena was listed as May 11, 2010.

¶ 5 On May 6, 2010, defendant appeared in court and notified the court that he had filed a speedy-trial demand. The case was continued to May 10, 2010, in another courtroom. On May 10, 2010, defendant again notified the court of his speedy-trial demand and answered ready for trial. The court then set a trial date of August 9, 2010.

¶ 6 On May 19, 2010, the State filed a notice of motion along with a subpoena duces tecum. The subpoena was directed to Marengo Rescue, a fire protection and emergency services agency in Marengo, Illinois. The notice of motion was also sent to defendant's attorney and stated that on June 18, 2010, the State would request status on the subpoena.

¶ 7 On June 17, 2010, the State filed another notice of motion to set a status date of July 9, 2010, on a subpoena it had sent to the Westchester Forensic Science Laboratory. That notice was served by fax on defendant's attorney. On June 18, 2010, defendant appeared in court with his attorney for return on the subpoena directed to Marengo Rescue.

¶ 8 On June 29, 2010, the State filed another notice of motion directed at Marengo Rescue. In that notice, the State sought a July 21, 2010, date for status on the subpoena. Defendant's attorney was also served a copy of the notice.

¶ 9 On July 9, 2010, the status date on the State's subpoena to the Westchester Forensic Science Laboratory, defense counsel appeared in court but defendant did not personally appear. Defense counsel notified the court that a jury trial date had been set for August 9, 2010, and that there was a speedy-trial demand on file. Counsel answered ready for trial and noted that the parties were in court for status on one of the State's subpoenas. In response, the State informed the court that defendant was not present and asked the court to find that defendant had waived the speedy-trial demand. The State also requested a warrant for defendant's arrest. Defense counsel argued that the parties were in court only because of a date set by the State, not the court. The court, relying on People v. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill.App.3d 451, 338 Ill.Dec. 372, 924 N.E.2d 578 (2010), responded that Illinois law indicates that it does not make a difference whether the State or the court sets the date, because either way the defendant must be present. Defense counsel respondedthat, applying such logic, the State could set five court dates a week that would require defendant's personal appearance or his speedy-trial demand would be waived. The court ruled that it was bound by Illinois law and held that defendant had waived his speedy-trial demand.

¶ 10 On August 6, 2010, the State filed a motion to continue the trial due to the unavailability of one of its witnesses. On August 9, 2010, the parties appeared in court on that motion. At that time, defense counsel again argued that defendant had filed a speedy-trial demand and was answering ready for trial. The court referred to its earlier ruling that defendant had waived his speedy-trial demand and that it was therefore no longer in effect. Over defense objection, the State's motion to continue was granted and the case was continued for trial to October 25, 2010.

¶ 11 The record does not reflect what, if anything, occurred on October 25, 2010. On November 24, 2010, the parties appeared in court. Defense counsel asked leave of court to file a motion to dismiss based upon a speedy-trial violation. The trial court granted counsel leave to file the motion, but again referenced Zakarauskas as dispositive of that issue.

¶ 12 On November 29, 2010, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The State responded, and the court heard arguments from both parties. On January 14, 2011, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, again relying on Zakarauskas.

¶ 13 On May 17, 2011, the State nol-prossed all the charges against defendant except the DUI charge. After a stipulated bench trial, defendant was found guilty of DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2010). He later filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative a New Trial.” That motion was denied. Defendant timely appeals.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, when he had a valid speedy-trial demand on file and he was not tried until after the 160–day speedy-trial time frame had run. Specifically, he argues: (1) he did not waive his valid speedy-trial demand where he caused no delay; and (2) even if he did not have to cause a delay to waive his right to a speedy trial, he did not fail to appear at a date “set by the court,” as required in the speedy-trial statute. See 725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2010).

¶ 16 In Illinois, a defendant has both a constitutional and a statutory right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 725 ILCS 5/103–5 (West 2010). The Illinois speedy-trial statute contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) implements the constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. Cordell, 223 Ill.2d 380, 385–86, 307 Ill.Dec. 669, 860 N.E.2d 323 (2006). The speedy-trial provisions of the Code are to be liberally construed in favor of a defendant because they were enacted to avoid infringements of the defendant's constitutional speedy-trial right. People v. Kohler, 2012 IL App (2d) 100513, ¶ 23, 360 Ill.Dec. 379, 968 N.E.2d 1132. Section 103–5(b) of the Code was amended in 2000 by Public Act 91–123 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000). That section provides, in pertinent part:

“(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried * * * within 160 days from the date [the] defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant * * *. The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2010).

¶ 17 Section 103–5(f) of the Code relates to delays caused by a defendant, and provides, in pertinent part:

“(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b) or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended.” 725 ILCS 5/103–5(f) (West 2010).

¶ 18 Prior to the 2000 amendment of section 103–5(b), a delay occasioned by a defendant's failure to appear in court only suspended the 160–day speedy-trial term. See People v. Dotson, 173 Ill.App.3d 541, 545, 123 Ill.Dec. 243, 527 N.E.2d 881 (1988) (the defendant's failure to appear at a scheduled court hearing temporarily tolled the speedy-trial term).

¶ 19 Generally, the trial court's ruling on a speedy-trial challenge shall be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Buford, 374 Ill.App.3d 369, 372, 312 Ill.Dec. 551, 870 N.E.2d 995 (2007). However, an issue on appeal that involves a question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill.App.3d at 453, 338 Ill.Dec. 372, 924 N.E.2d 578. “ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.’ ” Id. (quoting Cordell, 223 Ill.2d at 389, 307 Ill.Dec. 669, 860 N.E.2d 323). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent, and that language will be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Cordell, 223 Ill.2d at 389, 307 Ill.Dec. 669, 860 N.E.2d 323. However, “[a] statute capable of two interpretations should be given that which is reasonable and which will not produce absurd, unjust, unreasonable or inconvenient results that the legislature could...