People v. Bayne

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEXANDRIA MARIE BAYNE, Defendant and Appellant.

D077553

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

August 27, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No SCD270076, Robert F. O'Neill, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

McCONNELL, P. J.

I INTRODUCTION

Alexandria Marie Bayne drank numerous alcoholic beverages, drove her vehicle while she had a blood alcohol content (BAC) four times the legal driving limit, and crashed head-on into another vehicle, killing the driver of the vehicle. She was found guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, driving with a BAC of 0.08 or more and causing bodily injury, and driving the wrong way on a divided highway.

The defendant appeals her judgment of conviction. She claims the trial court erred: (1) by excluding evidence she was sexually assaulted as a child, which allegedly caused her to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and precluded her from appreciating the risks associated with her actions; (2) by denying her motion to continue the sentencing hearing; (3) by miscalculating the court operations assessment (Pen. Code ^[1] § 1465.8) and the conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) she owes as part of her sentence; and (4) by imposing a $10, 000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)), a stayed $10, 000 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), and the previously-mentioned court operations and conviction assessments without considering her ability to pay them.

We agree the trial court miscalculated the court operations and conviction assessments the defendant owes as part of her sentence. Therefore, we modify the judgment as follows: the court operations assessment is reduced from $200 to $120, and the conviction assessment is reduced from $150 to $90. We reject the defendant's remaining arguments and affirm the judgment as modified.

II BACKGROUND

A The Crash

The tragic events giving rise to these proceedings occurred on December 17, 2016. That day, the defendant drank several alcoholic beverages at various locations, including a restaurant, a bar, and two friends' homes. She drove her vehicle to and from these locations. At several points during the day, the defendant's minor children were with her in the vehicle while she drove.

Near the end of her day of drinking, the defendant drove to a friend's house where she socialized and continued drinking. At about 11:30 p.m., the defendant called her boyfriend and asked him to meet up with her at a bar. The boyfriend noticed the defendant was slurring her speech warned her not to drive, and offered to pick her up. She declined his offer.

About fifteen minutes later, the defendant left her friend's house and drove her vehicle to a nearby intersection of two major roadways. Two “Do Not Enter” signs were posted warning drivers on one of the roadways not to turn onto an offramp for the other roadway. Despite these signs, the defendant turned her vehicle onto the offramp and began driving the wrong way down the divided roadway. A driver on the roadway repeatedly flashed her headlights and honked her horn to get the defendant's attention. The defendant ignored these warnings, nearly crashed into the vehicle of the person trying to get her attention, and then, while traveling at a speed of 60 miles per hour, crashed head-on into a vehicle that was traveling in the opposite direction at a speed of 57 miles per hour. Sarita Shakya, the driver of the other vehicle, died at the scene of the accident.

The defendant was taken to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries. Blood draws were performed approximately four hours after the accident and showed the defendant had a BAC of 0.27 percent, plus or minus 0.01. A retrograde analysis showed the defendant had a BAC of between 0.27 percent and 0.35 at the time of the accident. A law enforcement criminalist opined the defendant had somewhere between 10 and 13 drinks circulating in her system at the time of the crash.

B The First Trial

The defendant was charged by amended information with one count of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2); four counts of child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 3-6); one count of driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 7) one count of driving with a BAC of 0.08 or more and causing bodily injury (id., subd. (b); count 8); and one count of driving the wrong way on a divided highway (id., § 21651, subd. (b); count 9). The information alleged the defendant suffered two prior convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). It also alleged enhancements associated with the charged offenses.

A central disputed issue at trial was whether the defendant harbored the implied malice necessary to be found guilty of second degree murder-i.e., whether she knew her conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard for human life. The defense sought to disprove implied malice with evidence the defendant suffered from PTSD, which prevented her from appreciating the degree to which she was impaired the night of the accident. The defense posited the defendant's PTSD was related to sexual assaults perpetrated against her when she was a child, including sexual assaults committed by her brother, a neighbor, and members of her father's motorcycle gang. According to the defense, the defendant's PTSD was triggered when she received a text message from her brother approximately six months before the drunk driving accident. The text message at issue contained a photograph of her brother's genitals.

The defense filed a motion to admit testimony from two experts-psychologist Dr. Raymond Murphy and psychiatrist Dr. Clark Smith. Dr. Murphy interviewed the defendant and administered assessments on her, including the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory, the Personality Assessment Inventory, the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, and the Davidson Trauma Scale. Based on his examination and the assessments he administered, Dr. Murphy diagnosed the defendant with major depressive disorder, PTSD, and alcohol use disorder. Dr. Smith interviewed the defendant as well, reviewed Dr. Murphy's psychological evaluation, and diagnosed the defendant with major depressive disorder, PTSD, and alcohol dependence.

In response to the defense's motion, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude or limit the scope of the defense's psychiatric evidence. The prosecution conceded the defense experts could testify they relied on the defendant's interview statements when forming their opinions. However, it argued the experts could not relay those statements to the jury because they were inadmissible hearsay. The prosecution also argued that any evidence pertaining to the details of the childhood sexual assaults-including testimony from the defendant-should be excluded because it was irrelevant and “would only be provided to elicit sympathy from the jury.” At the hearing on the parties' motions, the prosecution reiterated its claim that any evidence of the childhood sexual assaults was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

The trial court ruled the defense experts could testify concerning their diagnoses of the defendant and the general matter upon which they relied in forming their opinions. However, the court ruled the defense experts could not relay to the jury the out-of-court statements upon which they relied. The court found the defense experts also could not testify whether the defendant harbored implied malice because that was an “ultimate” issue for the jury to decide. Further, on relevance and undue prejudice grounds, the court excluded evidence pertaining to the details of the sexual assaults perpetrated against the defendant when she was a child.

In accordance with these rulings, the defense elicited testimony from the defendant that she experienced certain unspecified trauma as a child, had depression, and received a triggering text message from her brother. The defendant also testified she had approximately eight drinks on the day of the accident. She testified she drove that evening, even after a day of drinking, because she did not feel impaired.

The defense elicited testimony from its experts that they diagnosed the defendant with depression, PTSD, and alcohol use disorder. They testified about the general matter upon which they relied in making their diagnoses. Further, they testified PTSD can impair one's judgment and organized thinking abilities. However, the defense experts were not permitted to testify about whether the defendant harbored implied malice, and no witnesses were permitted to testify about the details of the sexual assaults the defendant experienced as a child.

At the close of trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the second degree murder charge. Eleven jurors voted to find the defendant guilty of murder and one juror voted to find her not guilty of murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury driving with a BAC of 0.08 or...