People v. Bd. of Parole Hearings

83 Cal.App.5th 432

299 Cal.Rptr.3d 499

The PEOPLE, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, Defendant and Appellant;

Nathan Joshua Ramazzini, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

C093941

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed September 15, 2022

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anthony R. Hakl, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Nelson R. Richards and S. Clinton Woods, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.

USC Gould School of Law, Heidi L. Rummell and Michael J. Brennan; Buchalter and Steven G. Churchwell, Sacramento, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Human Rights Watch and Tracy J. Dressner, in support of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Brendan Michael Farrell, District Attorney (Colusa County) and Matthew R. Beauchamp, Chief Deputy District Attorney (Colusa County) for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Duarte, J.

In 1997, real party in interest and appellant Nathan Joshua Ramazzini was convicted of first degree murder with a special circumstance regarding a killing that occurred when Ramazzini was 16 years old. Pursuant to Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b), enacted by Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Ramazzini was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).¹ At the time Ramazzini was sentenced, courts interpreted section 190.5, subdivision (b) as establishing a presumption in favor of LWOP. ( People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791, disapproved by People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245 ( Gutierrez ).)

In 2012, the high court concluded that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution bars mandatory LWOP sentences for minors. ( Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407.) Our Supreme Court subsequently concluded that section 190.5, subdivision (b) confers discretion on the sentencing court to impose either a sentence of 25 years to life or LWOP, but the presumption in favor of LWOP as stated in Guinn was inconsistent with Miller . ( Gutierrez, supra , 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1386-1387, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.)

In response to Miller , the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 394), which provided that those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when they were 16 or 17 years old are now eligible for release on parole during their 25th year of incarceration. (Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.)

Pursuant to Senate Bill No. 394, Ramazzini became eligible for a parole hearing in July 2021. Upon learning of Ramazzini's parole eligibility, the Colusa County District Attorney's Office (Office), on behalf of the People of the State of California, petitioned for writ of mandate in the trial court, seeking to invalidate Senate Bill No. 394 on its face and as applied to Ramazzini and to enjoin the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) from enforcing its provisions. The Office asserted that Senate Bill No. 394 violated article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution, which restricts the Legislature's ability to amend an initiative statute without the approval of the voters except where the initiative statute permits amendment without the voters’ approval.

The trial court granted the Office's writ petition as applied to Ramazzini.

The Board appeals; it contends the Office lacked standing to petition for writ of mandate, and Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted because the Legislature may amend initiative statutes to address constitutional violations. Ramazzini also appeals; he joins the Board's contentions and separately contends that Senate Bill No. 394 was lawfully enacted because it does not amend Proposition 115's alternative sentencing scheme for 16- and 17-year-old defendants.

Disagreeing with the Board's argument regarding its standing to bring the writ petition, the Office argues that the Victims’ Bill of Rights ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 28 ) as well as various cases and statutes provide authority to bring the petition.² Accordingly, it argues principles of law and equity demand that its petition be permitted to proceed.

As we will explain, we agree with the Board that the Office lacks standing to petition for writ of mandate. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment invalidating Senate Bill No. 394 as applied to Ramazzini and direct the trial court to dismiss the action. Because the issue of standing is dispositive, we need not and do not address the other contentions raised on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Ramazzini's Conviction and Sentence

In 1997, 16-year-old Ramazzini murdered Erik Ingebretsen; Ramazzini was tried in adult court and convicted of first degree murder with a special circumstance. ( § 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The court sentenced Ramazzini to LWOP under Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, which was intended "to restore balance and fairness to [California's] criminal justice system." (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) text of Prop. 115, p. 33 (Prop. 115).) Proposition 115 added section 190.5, subdivision (b), which provides that the penalty for special-circumstance murder committed by 16- and 17-year-old offenders "shall be confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life." At the time Ramazzini was sentenced, courts interpreted that provision as establishing a presumption in favor of LWOP. ( People v. Guinn, supra , 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791.)

At Ramazzini's 1998 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor cited Guinn and argued that the presumption in favor of LWOP applied. The sentencing court recognized the presumption and sentenced Ramazzini to LWOP, explaining that potential mitigating factors did not allow it to exercise its discretion to impose a sentence of 25 years to life.

Subsequent Legal Developments

In a series of cases starting in 2005, the United States Supreme Court held that unduly harsh sentences imposed on minors violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 [8th Amend. bars capital punishment for juveniles]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 [8th Amend. bars LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses]; Miller v. Alabama, supra , 567 U.S. at p. 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455 [8th Amend. bars mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles].)

In 2012, the California Legislature passed a bill adding section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), which allowed certain juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1.) That same year, our Supreme Court held that sentencing a juvenile to 110 years in prison for a nonhomicide offense violated the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267-268, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 282 P.3d 291.)

In 2013, the Legislature added section 3051, which established a youth offender parole hearing procedure "for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was under 18 years of age at the time of his or her controlling offense." (Former § 3051, subd. (a)(1) ; Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) As originally enacted, juveniles sentenced to LWOP were not eligible for youth offender parole hearings. (Id. , subd. (h).)

Our Supreme Court subsequently observed that section 190.5, subdivision (b) confers discretion on the sentencing court to impose a sentence of either LWOP or 25 years to life on a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstances murder, but Guinn ’s presumption in favor of LWOP was inconsistent with the high court's decision in Miller . ( Gutierrez, supra , 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1386-1387, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.)

In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, at page 212, 136 S.Ct. 718, the high court concluded that Miller was a new substantive rule that applies retroactively. The court advised that a state may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them. ( Ibid. ) In Jones v. Mississippi (2021) ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1307, at page 1320, 209 L.Ed.2d 390, the high court held that Miller and Montgomery did not require any additional specific procedures.

Senate Bill No. 394

The Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) in September 2017, which was approved by the Governor and filed by the Secretary of State in October 2017. (Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.) The bill was intended to address the issue that offenders serving LWOP sentences committed before they turned 18 had no dedicated procedure to cure Miller violations and to "bring California into compliance with the constitutional requirements of Miller and Montgomery ." (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 21, 2017, p. 4.) The law added section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), which makes those sentenced to LWOP before they turned 18 years old eligible for parole during their 25th year of incarceration. (Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.)

Senate Bill No. 394 passed the Assembly with 44 "yes" votes, 30 "no" votes, and five non-votes in abstentia, a 55.6 percent majority, and the Senate with 28 "yes" votes, nine "no" votes, and three non-votes in abstentia, a 70 percent majority.

The Office's Lawsuit

In February 2018, the Ingebretsen family received a letter stating that, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 394, Ramazzini would be eligible for a youth offender parole hearing starting July 16, 2021. The family provided the letter to the Office, which filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 394. This court denied the petition without prejudice to refiling in superior court.

The Office then filed the petition in Colusa County Superior Court, naming...