People v. Benjamin

2020 VI Super 34

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Plaintiff, v. MALACHI BENJAMIN and OMAR B. JOSEPH, Defendants.

CASE NO. SX-15-CR-376

CASE NO. SX-15-CR-377

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST.CROIX

March 10, 2020

FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

Appearances:

ERIC S. CHANCELLOR, ESQ.

DAMON WATSON-WILLIS, ESQ.¹

Assistant Attorney General

Virgin Islands Department of Justice

Kingshill, VI 00850

For People of the Virgin Islands

AMELIA B. JOSEPH, ESQ.

Office of the Territorial Public Defender

Kingshill, VI 00850

For Malachi Benjamin

MICHAEL A. JOSEPH, ESQ.

Christiansted, VI 00820

For Omar A. Joseph

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MOLLOY, Judge.

¶1 BEFORE THE COURT are motions filed by the Defendants, Malachi Benjamin ("Benjamin") and Omar B. Joseph ("Joseph"), to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the FourthAmendment. The People of the Virgin Islands (the "People") oppose. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On the evening of December 16, 2015, officers of the Virgin Islands Police Department ("VIPD") were engaged in a crime-reduction initiative in Frederiksted, St. Croix. Between 6:00 p.m. and 8:25 p.m. that night, VIPD Officers Rolando Huertas ("Huertas"), Orlando Benitez Jr. ("Benitez"), and Nyeim France were on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle in the area of Hospital Street. The vehicle's windows were rolled down. As they approached 39B Hospital Street ("the house"), Huertas smelled a strong odor of marijuana. Huertas has fifteen years of experience and extensive training in identifying illegal drugs. The marijuana odor intensified as the officers drove toward the front of the house. The road is "right in front of the residence." (Hr'g Tr. 46:14-15 (Sept. 6, 2016).) While still in the vehicle on the public road, Huertas observed a light cloud of smoke rising up from the front of the house. Two people were seated in "a little porch" in front of the house, and one was standing just outside. Id. at 11:11-12. The persons on the porch were later identified as Joseph and Benjamin.²

¶3 The porch is relatively small with an irregular "wooden type . . . fence" made of uneven slats with three- to four-inch gaps directly above the curb. (See Pls.' Ex.1; Defs' Joint Ex. 1.) The officers stopped the vehicle directly in front of the residence. From the vehicle, Huertas could see two large cement blocks on the porch. Items on the porch were also clearly visible from up to fifteen feet away. The officers did not notice any porch lights or streetlamps. But the area was illuminated by the headlights of the unmarked police vehicle.

¶4 While still in the vehicle, Huertas identified himself as a police officer and asked Benjamin and Joseph what they were doing. Benjamin said, "just chilling." Id. at 16:10. Huertas then saw Benjamin make a quick movement with his hand. He shined his flashlight directly at Benjamin and Joseph and saw "what appeared to be a firearm sticking out from a holster inside of th[e] cinder block." Id. at 28:23-25. The gun was later identified as a Silver Taurus .38 Special Revolver with five live rounds in the cylinder. For safety reasons, Huertas called out a police code for "gun" to avoid reaction because shootings had been reported in the area the night before.

¶5 Huertas exited the vehicle and ordered Joseph and Benjamin to put their hands in the air andkeep them visible. Huertas then walked toward the porch and stopped near a silver scooter leaning against the street-side of the porch entrance. Standing near the entrance to the porch, Huertas ordered Joseph to walk toward him. While Huertas was securing Joseph, Benitez noticed a second firearm, later identified as a Colt 22 LR revolver, which was inside the cinderblock Benjamin had been sitting on. The Colt revolver had five live rounds in the chamber. After alerting officers to the presence of another firearm, Benitez detained Benjamin per police procedure to secure an area to prevent anyone from accessing the weapons.

¶6 Joseph and Benjamin were asked about the firearms. Both said they had the guns for protection. See id. at 34:9-11 ("Mr. Joseph said that's for protection. Mr. Benjamin said we need protection."). Huertas asked them if they had licenses for the firearms. They said no. Huertas then advised them of their rights. After the guns were secured, Joseph and Benjamin were placed in handcuffs and transferred to the police station. A vial later identified as marijuana was discovered in the bushes to the north side of the porch—the same direction of Benjamin's quick hand movement. At the police station, Officer Karen Stout, Custodian of Firearms Records, confirmed that neither individual was licensed to carry a firearm in the Virgin Islands and, further, that the .38 Special Revolver had been reported stolen. Huertas then arrested Joseph and Benjamin. The People later charged Joseph and Benjamin with unauthorized possession of a firearm in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a); unauthorized possession of ammunition in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2256(a); and failure to report firearms obtained or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of 23 V.I.C. § 470(a). Both Defendants later moved to suppress the firearms.³

II. LEGAL STANARD

¶7 The Fourth Amendment generally protects individuals from 'governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant' . . . ."⁴ Simmonds v. People, 53 V.I. 549, 555-56 (2010) (quoting United Statesv. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984)). And "[i]t is beyond debate that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes. Id. at 555. Warrantless searches and seizures are "'per se unreasonable absent one of a few well-delineated exceptions.'" People v. Berkley, 70 V.I. 655, 665 (Super. Ct. 2019) (ellipses and brackets omitted) (quoting Browne v. People, 56 V.I. 207, 217 (2012)). One exception is law enforcement's interest in "'effectuating a search and seizure [which can] outweigh[] privacy interests.'" Id. (ellipses and citation omitted). However, once a defendant claims he was searched without a warrant, the prosecution must show that the search was reasonable. Accord United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[O]nce the defendant has established a basis for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was reasonable." (citing United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1993)).

¶8 Here, the officers seized the firearms without a warrant. Thus, the People have the burden to show that the police officers' actions "'were reasonable.'" Berkley, 70 V.I. at 665 (quoting People v. Prentice, 64 V.I. 79, 89 (Super. Ct. 2016)). "'Reasonableness is an objective inquiry measured by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search and the nature of the search itself.'" People v. Pemberton, 2019 VI Super 118, ¶ 7 (quoting Prentice, 64 V.I. at 89). "If the People fail to satisfy this burden, the Court must suppress the evidence and exclude it from trial under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine." Id. (quoting Castillo v. People, 59 V.I. 240, 255-56 (2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

¶9 The Defendants raise two arguments for suppressing the firearms.⁵ First, they argue that the officers lacked sufficiently-particularized, objective evidence of criminal activity. Second, they argue that, because of the heightened expectation of privacy surrounding the home, the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The People counter officers trained in identifying marijuana, who observe objective evidence of marijuana use in an area known for criminal activity, supplies reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory stop. The People also argue, in the alternative, that reasonable suspicion is not required when citizens use contraband in plain view. Each is addressed in turn.

A. Reasonable Suspicion to Justify an Investigatory Stop

¶10 Because the firearms were seized without a warrant, "the People must show that the investigative stop and all subsequent events fit under an exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at ¶ 9. An "'investigative stop'" is one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (remaining citation omitted)). "Brief investigative stops are . . . valid when based on particularized objective facts, 'in light of the officer's experience,' an officer has a reasonable suspicion that 'criminal activity is afoot.'" Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting Blyden v. People, 53 V.I. 637, 648 (2010)). For the stop to be justified, "the officer must 'articulate something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Id. (quoting People v. Cannergeiter, 65 V.I. 114, 122 (Super Ct. 2016)). "A 'Terry' stop . . . usually entails a vehicular stop, but [can also] encompass[] any attempt by a law enforcement officer to literally stop an individual to question the person." People v. Blake, 65 V.I. 13, 16 (Super. Ct. 2012). Thus, a Terry stop usually occurs in a public place or roadway. "But if an officer restrains an individual's liberty, 'by means of physical force or show of authority,' Fourth Amendment protections attach." Pemberton, 2019 VI Super 118 at ¶ 18 n.3 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).

¶11 "The concept of reasonable suspicion has not been 'reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Id. at ¶ 19 (quoting Cannergeiter, 65 V.I. at 131). And determining whether suspicion is reasonable "'is often . . . imprecise . . . .'" Id. (citation omitted). But considerable deference is given to the officer's determination, and reasonable suspicion "'is a less demanding test than probable cause.'" Id. (citation omitted). The officer still must articulate particularized objective facts, however, that in his experience support his belief "'that criminal activity is afoot.'" Id. at ¶ 55 (citation omitted). And "'[w]hen reviewing for reasonable suspicion, courts consider facts of individual significance in the totality of...