People v. Boyd

322 Cal.Rptr.3d 687

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Tarrell Ivory BOYD, Defendant and Appellant.

E081005

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

Filed June 27, 2024

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elaine M. Kiefer, Judge. Vacated; treated as petition for writ of habeas corpus and granted. (Super.Ct.No. SWF008183)

John L. Staley, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B. Hazard, and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

RAPHAEL J.

Nearly 17 years into his 27-year prison sentence, defendant and appellant Tarrell Ivory Boyd moved for a new sentencing hearing on the ground that his custody and conduct credits had been miscalculated at his sentencing. The People agreed, and the trial court granted the motion, awarding Boyd seven more days of credits. Boyd appeals, contending that the original error warranted a full resentencing to consider the effect of ameliorative sentencing laws passed since his original sentencing hearing.

On our own motion, we invited the parties to address jurisdiction. We hold that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider Boyd’s freestanding motion given that his sentence has long been made final. In order to establish jurisdiction for a postjudgment claim that credits were improperly calculated at sentencing, an inmate must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We therefore vacate the trial court's order, which was void from the start. However, given the circumstances, we treat Boyd’s purported appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, grant the petition, and modify the sentence to reflect the undisputed credits. We reject Boyd’s claim that he is entitled to a full resentencing.¹

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, a jury convicted Boyd on four felonies: assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), shooting at an inhabited building or vehicle (§ 246), possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)). A personal firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) were also found true, and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on all counts. In all, the trial court sentenced Boyd to 27 years in prison with 610 days of custody credits (§ 2900.5) and 91 days of conduct credits (§§ 2933.1, subd. (c), 4019).

In 2023, Boyd moved for a recalculation of his credits and a new sentencing hearing. He contended that his credits should have started accruing from the date of his arrest on a different case, not the date the complaint was filed and he made his first appearance in the current case, which was several days later. At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed that Boyd should have received 616 days of custody credits and 92 days of conduct credits. The judge ordered a new abstract of judgment to reflect the corrected credits.

II. ANALYSIS

Boyd’s main argument on appeal is that the trial court’s imposition of an unauthorized sentence in 2006 entitled him to a full resentencing in 2023. The sentence was allegedly unauthorized because it included 610 rather than 616 days of custody credits and 91 rather than 92 days of conduct credits. Boyd does not contend that the trial court erred in recalculating these credits.

Before addressing the merits of Boyd’s argument, however, we must consider whether we have appellate jurisdiction. In People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 (King), the Court of Appeal held that, when a case is final, the mere fact that a sentence is unauthorized does not confer jurisdiction on a trial court to vacate that sentence or on a reviewing court to entertain an appeal based on a claim the sentence was unauthorized. (Id. at pp. 633, 641, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 731; see also People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 239, 226 P.3d 348 [" 'In most cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing pending to which a motion may attach’ "].) On our own motion, we invited the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing jurisdiction. Below, we address three grounds for jurisdiction raised by the parties as well as our own research: a trial court’s inherent power to correct clerical errors, the unauthorized sentence doctrine, and Code of Civil Procedure section 187. We conclude that none formed a valid basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction here.

We thus hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Boyd’s motion. The order is therefore void, and we vacate it under our inherent authority to set aside void orders. That done, in the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our discretion to treat Boyd’s purported appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is the proper method for raising such belated claims of credit miscalculation. We reject Boyd’s argument that he is entitled to a full resentencing, but we grant the petition and modify the judgment to reflect the credits both parties agree Boyd is entitled to.²

A. Inherent Power to Correct Clerical Errors

[1–3] "It is not open to question that a court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.] The power exists independently of statute and may be exercised in criminal as well as in civil cases. [Citation.] The power is unaffected by the pendency of an appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citation.] The court may correct such errors on its own motion or upon the application of the parties." (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729 (Candelario).)

[4] "Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is ‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered.’ " (Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729.) If the error is in rendering judgment, then it is judicial error. (See People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 345, fn. 11, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 842 P.2d 100 (Karaman).)

[5, 6] Here, in orally pronouncing its sentence in 2006, the trial court sentenced Boyd to 27 years in prison with 701 days of credits. "In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence." (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 344, fn. 9, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 842 P.2d 100.) What the trial court ordered was properly recorded in judicial records. The trial court’s misstatement of the number of days of credits was therefore a judicial error, not a clerical one, as it was one made in rendering the judgment. The "true fact[ ]" (Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729) is that Boyd was sentenced to a term with insufficient credits. That a computational error underlay the judicial error does not make that error a clerical one. (See Estate of Eckstrom (1960) 54 Cal.2d 540, 544, 7 Cal.Rptr. 124, 354 P.2d 652 [corrections of clerical errors " ‘may not make the judgment express anything not embraced in the court’s decision, even though the proposed amendment contains matters which ought to have been so pronounced’ "]; In re Daoud (1976) 16 Cal.3d 879, 882, 129 Cal.Rptr. 673, 549 P.2d 145 ["Since there is no claim that the … order was incorrectly recorded, any error must be judicial"].)

Some statements from our Supreme Court could be read to suggest that whether an error is clerical or judicial turns on whether the error itself involved judicial discretion, not whether the error was one in recording a judicial pronouncement (clerical) as opposed to pronouncing it (judicial). In re Wimbs (1966) 65 Cal.2d 490, 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70 stated that a sentencing court’s purported correction of a judgment ordering concurrent sentences rather than consecutive ones "was not of merely clerical error or inadvertence but an attempt, in excess of the court’s power, to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion." (Id. at p. 498, 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70.) Karaman stated: "It is clear that both the initial judgment rendered by the court and the subsequent modification were the result of the exercise of judicial discretion, and that any error the court sought to remedy thus was judicial rather than clerical in nature." (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 345, fn. 11, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 842 P.2d 100.) And Candelario stated that "[a]n amendment that substantially modifies the original judgment or materially alters the rights of the parties, may not be made by the court under its authority to correct clerical error … unless the record clearly demonstrates that the error was not the result of the exercise of judicial discretion." (Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729.)

[7, 8] Nevertheless, in Candelario, the Court stated clearly that the difference between judicial and clerical error is " ‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered.’ " (Candelaria, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729.) That persuades us that whether discretion was exercised in pronouncing sentence does not distinguish clerical error from judicial error. Consistent with this, in In re Wimbs, Karaman, and Candelaria, each alleged error was in pronouncing the sentence and was held to be judicial, not clerical. (In re Wimbs, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 498, 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70; Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 345, fn. 11, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 842 P.2d 100; Candelario, supra, at pp. 705-706, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729.) The references to discretion in those cases are best read to identify the judicial...