People v. Brown

224 N.E.3d 815

2022 IL App (4th) 220171

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.David Preston BROWN, Defendant- Appellant.

The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Duane Perrion Simmons, Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 4-22-0171 & 4-22-0311 cons.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed November 23, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 06CF576, No. 11CF426, Honorable Katherine S. Gorman, Judge Presiding

Donald R. Jackson, of Peoria, for appellants.

Jodi M. Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delflno, David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendants, David Preston Brown and Duane Perrion Simmons, appeal orders denying their respective petitions for certificates of innocence pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West Supp. 2021)). We consolidated the appeals because the cases present identical legal issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In unrelated cases, defendants were charged with multiple offenses in the circuit court of Peoria County. In June 2006, Brown was charged with (1) armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 2006)), a Class X felony; (2) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2006)), a Class 2 felony;. (3) unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2006)), a Class 2 felony; and (4) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)), a Class 4 felony. In May 2011, Simmons was charged with (1) aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2010)), a Class X felony; (2) attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 18-2(a) (West 2010)), a Class 1 felony; and (3) AUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2010)), a Class 4 felony. The AUUW charges against both Brown and Simmons alleged that they possessed uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearms.

¶ 4 Both defendants pleaded guilty to AUUW in exchange for the dismissal of all other charges. Pursuant to Brown’s August 2006 negotiated plea agreement, he was sentenced to eight years in prison. Pursuant to Simmons’s March 2012 negoti- ated plea agreement, he was sentenced to two years in prison.

¶ 5 Subsequently, our supreme court held that the subsection of the AUUW statute to, which defendants pleaded guilty was void ab initio because it violated the second amendment to the United States Constitution. See People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321 (invalidating the Class 4 form of section 244.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) of the AUUW statute, which relates to uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearms); People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 25, 413 Ill.Dec. 810, 79 N.E.3d 159 (clarifying that section 244.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute is facially unconstitutional "without limitation"). Defendants petitioned to vacate their AUUW convictions in light of this new case law. The trial court granted defendants’ petitions.

¶ 6 Brown petitioned for a certificate of innocence in August 2021, and Simmons petitioned for one in February 2022. To obtain a certificate of innocence, the petitioner must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

"(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence;

(2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information dismissed; or (B) the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois;

(3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State; and

(4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his or her conviction." 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West Supp. 2021).

The court denied defendants’ petitions for certificates of innocence, determining that defendants could not establish elements three or four. The court reasoned that the orders vacating defendants’ convictions restored the status quo as it existed before defendants pleaded guilty; at that point, defendants faced multiple other felony charges. The court also found that defendants voluntarily caused or brought about their own convictions by pleading guilty.

¶ 7 Defendants timely appealed.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

[1, 2] ¶ 9 On appeal, the State concedes the trial court was incorrect insofar as its orders could be interpreted as suggesting that defendants can still be prosecuted for charges that were nol-prossed long ago. The statute of limitations on those offenses is three years (see 720 ILCS 5/3-5(b) (West 2020)), and that period was not tolled when the State nol-prossed the charges as part of defendants’ plea agreements (People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 16, 417 Ill.Dec. 608, 88 N.E.3d 760). Nevertheless, we review the trial court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we may sustain the judgment on any basis in the record. See People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 28, 463 Ill.Dec. 764, 211 N.E.3d 325.

¶ 10 The parties dispute whether defendants satisfied elements three and four of the certificate-of-innocence statute. Again, element three is that "the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State " 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3) (West Supp. 2021). Element four is that "the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his or her conviction." 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(4) (West Supp. 2021).

[3] ¶ 11 "Generally, granting a certificate of innocence is within the sound discretion of the court." People v. Amor, 2020 IL App (2d) 190475, ¶ 11, 449 Ill.Dec. 756, 180 N.E.3d 170. However, de novo review is appropriate where the issue involves statutory interpretation. People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, ¶ 11, 453 Ill.Dec. 847, 188 N.E.3d 816. Here, the parties’ arguments require us to interpret the certificate-of-innocence statute. Thus, de novo review is appropriate.

[4, 5] ¶ 12 Our goal in interpreting the statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent, which is "best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language." People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672. We may consider "the purpose of the statute, the problems to be remedied, and the consequences of interpreting the statute one way or another." Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672. We presume "the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results." Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672.

¶ 13 A. Element Three

[6] ¶ 14 We must decide the following question: If a criminal defendant facing multiple charges enters a negotiated guilty plea to one charge in exchange for the dismissal of the others, and the conviction is later determined to be void ab initio, must the defendant prove his or her innocence of the dismissed, valid charges to be entitled to a certificate of innocence? The First District recently answered this question in the affirmative under operative facts that are virtually identical to those of the present cases. See People v. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 28, 465 Ill.Dec. 360, 215 N.E.3d 156. Specifically, like the defendants here, the defendant in Warner was charged with multiple offenses, pleaded guilty only to AUUW, and then petitioned for a certificate of innocence once his conviction was vacated pursuant to Aguilar. Upon reviewing the certificate-of-innocence statute, we reach the same conclusion as the court in Warner.

[7] ¶ 15 The title of the statute is "Petition for a certificate of innocence that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated" (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West Supp. 2021). Although "[t]he titles of statutory sections are of course not controlling" (People v. Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶ 22, 466 Ill.Dec. 162, 216 N.E.3d 995), subsection (b) of the statute contains similar language:

"Any person convicted and subsequently imprisoned for one or more felonies by the State of Illinois which he or she did not commit may, under the conditions hereinafter provided, file a petition for certificate of innocence in the circuit court of the county in which the person was convicted. The petition shall request a certificate of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated," (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-702(b) (West Supp. 2021).

Viewed in isolation, the italicized language might suggest that defendants here must prove their innocence only of AUUW, as that was the offense for which they were convicted and incarcerated. Clearly, defendants are innocent of that offense, as the subsection of the AUUW statute to which they pleaded guilty is void ab initio. See Smith, 2021 IL App (1st) 200984, ¶ 24, 466 Ill.Dec. 162, 216 N.E.3d 995 (AUUW under the void provision is "not a crime").

¶ 16 However, subsection (c)(2) of the statute requires a petitioner to provide documentation demonstrating that

"his or her judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either he or she was found not guilty at the new trial or he or she

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