People v. Burge

2021 IL 125642

195 N.E.3d 1135

457 Ill.Dec. 719

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Chaleah BURGE, Appellant.

Docket No. 125642

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed March 18, 2021.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Catherine K. Hart, Deputy Defender, and Mariah K. Shaver, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether the admonishment requirement of section 113-4(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) ( 725 ILCS 5/113-4(c) (West 2016)) applies to guilty pleas other than those entered at arraignment and whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

¶ 2 Defendant, Chaleah Burge, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) who was formerly employed as a home health care provider, pled guilty to one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor ( 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (West 2016)), after stealing $280 from a client receiving home health care services. Ten days after pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and vacate the judgment, claiming that her plea was not voluntarily entered. The circuit court of Champaign County denied defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (4th) 170399, 439 Ill.Dec. 221, 147 N.E.3d 896. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).

¶ 3 STATUTE INVOLVED

¶ 4 At the time defendant pled guilty in this case, section 113-4 of the Code provided as follows:

"(a) When called upon to plead at arraignment the defendant shall be furnished with a copy of the charge and shall plead guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty.

(b) If the defendant stands mute a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him and the trial shall proceed on such plea.

(c) If the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the court shall have fully explained to the defendant the following:

(1) the maximum and minimum penalty provided by law for the offense which may be imposed by the court;

(2) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, the sentence for any future conviction may be increased or there may be a higher possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; (3) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be registration requirements that restrict where the defendant may work, live, or be present; and

(4) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be an impact upon the defendant's ability to, among others:

(A) retain or obtain housing in the public or private market;

(B) retain or obtain employment; and

(C) retain or obtain a firearm, an occupational license, or a driver's license.

After such explanation if the defendant understandingly persists in his plea it shall be accepted by the court and recorded.

(d) If the defendant pleads guilty but mentally ill, the court shall not accept such a plea until the defendant has undergone examination by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist and the judge has examined the psychiatric or psychological report or reports, held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental condition and is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.

(e) If a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that time or at any later court date on which he is present that if he escapes from custody or is released on bond and fails to appear in court when required by the court that his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the witnesses against him and trial could proceed in his absence." 725 ILCS 5/113-4 (West 2016).

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In November 2016, the State charged defendant with one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor ( 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (West 2016)), alleging that on September 1, 2016, defendant knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the victim's property, namely United States currency having a value not in excess of $500, intending to permanently deprive the victim of the use or benefit of the property. An arraignment hearing was held on December 7, 2016, where defendant was advised of the charges against her and the potential penalties for those charges, as well as admonished of her various rights. After defendant acknowledged that she understood the charge against her and the possible penalties, the trial court granted her request to appoint the public defender to represent her. The trial court also accepted defendant's plea of not guilty, set the case for a pretrial hearing, and released defendant on her own recognizance upon posting a $1000 bond.

¶ 7 On March 20, 2017, defendant entered a fully negotiated guilty plea to the charged offense. Prior to accepting her guilty plea, the trial court admonished defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). According to the State's factual basis, the victim had undergone knee replacement surgery and was receiving home health care from defendant, who worked for Help at Home. The State further alleged that on or about September 1, 2016, while the victim and defendant were running errands, the victim cashed a $280 check. The State claimed that the cash was later stolen by defendant when the victim went into a store and left her purse in the vehicle with defendant. The State concluded that it was not until after running additional errands that the victim discovered the money was missing.

¶ 8 The trial court accepted the State's factual basis and entered judgment on defendant's plea of guilty, sentencing her to 12 months’ conditional discharge.

¶ 9 Ten days after pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and to vacate the judgment, claiming her plea was not voluntarily entered. In her motion, defendant claimed she was unaware that she would lose her job if she pled guilty. Specifically, defendant asserted that the trial court failed, as required by section 113-4(c) of the Code, to inform her of the collateral consequences of a theft conviction on her ability to obtain and retain employment. 725 ILCS 5/113-4(c) (West 2016). Defendant concluded that she lost her employment as a direct result of her guilty plea.

¶ 10 At the hearing on defendant's motion held in May 2017, defendant testified that, when she pled guilty, she was no longer working for Help at Home, the home health care company that had employed her when the State brought the underlying charge. Rather, defendant testified that she had been working for a different home health care company, Aging in Place, for three months when she pled guilty. Defendant further stated that it was not until after she pled guilty and was sentenced that Aging in Place terminated her employment. According to defendant, she had been unable to find additional employment in the home health care career field.

¶ 11 Following arguments on defendant's motion, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that defendant's plea was voluntary because she was properly admonished under Rule 402 and, therefore, informed of the nature of the charge, the range of penalties, and her constitutional rights. The trial court further held that withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea was not required by section 113-4(c) because the provision is directory and the legislature lacked authority to mandate additional admonishments beyond those required under Illinois Supreme Court Rules governing admonishments. In particular, the trial court stated:

"I think that the statute that the defendant cites is directory. There are no direct, immediate and automatic consequences under the court's control that deal with employment. What Rule 402 is about is advising the defendant of those constitutional rights that she has that are involved with the criminal process and that she is made aware of and then is advised giving up through the entry of a plea of guilty. It's clear that this is done in a voluntary fashion by—according to the record, that this is done in a voluntary fashion by [defendant]. She was advised, as she was supposed to be, by Supreme Court Rule 402 of the nature of the charge, the range of penalties and those essential constitutional rights that are in Rule 402. That is the right to require the presumption of innocence, the right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront and cross[-]examine witnesses, the right to proceed to trial, trial by jury or trial by judge, the right to present witnesses and evidence on your behalf, [and] the right to testify or choose not to testify. Those are the fundamental constitutional rights that are at issue when someone enters a plea of guilty and those [defendant] was advised of. That's what's consistent with Rule 402. So, in addition to the statute being one that's directory, the consequences that I believe on the facts [defendant] did suffer are collateral. ***

The supreme court has decided what's—what a person has to be advised of when they enter a plea of guilty. That is not what's in the, the statute. And I, I think it's correct that the legislature cannot add to what's constitutionally required by the supreme court rule.

So really the, the question then becomes, because I think the statute cannot be imposed on the court, it is directory rather than mandatory and it does deal with collateral consequences. To say they're collateral doesn't mean they're not important because these things are important. Housing, employment, the ability to have an occupational license or a firearm, driver's license are important. They're not trivial. These are important

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