People v. C.F. (In re J.C.)

2019 IL App (1st) 182226

141 N.E.3d 348

435 Ill.Dec. 838

IN RE J.C., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.C.F., Respondent-Appellant).

No. 1-18-2226

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SECOND DIVISION.

July 23, 2019

Amy P. Campanelli, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frank M. Adams, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Gina DiVito, and Iris G. Ferosie, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Charles P. Golbert, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain, of counsel), guardian ad litem.

JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Respondent C.F. appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights with respect to her daughter, J.C., following a September 19, 2018, hearing in which she was found unfit under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)) and the Adoption Act ( 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2016)). C.F. does not challenge the trial court's termination of parental rights findings but argues solely that the court erred in denying her motion to compel nine-year-old J.C. to testify at the termination hearing. Finding no error, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 J.C. was born to C.F. on February 17, 2009. In August 2012, an anonymous call was made to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) reporting a child left alone in a park. Police reported to the scene and found J.C. sitting alone in a stroller. Fifteen minutes after the police arrived, C.F. came and tried to push the stroller away. She told police that she was J.C.'s mother and they were homeless. She admitted that she slept in the park and left J.C. alone on a daily basis while she went to public restrooms to change her clothes and use drugs. Police found "many syringes" wrapped up in a diaper in the stroller with "evidence of recent use." C.F. was arrested for child endangerment, and J.C. was taken to a hospital for observation.

¶ 4 On August 29, 2012, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship over J.C., alleging that J.C. was neglected due to lack of care and an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of physical injury. The State alleged that C.F. had "a long history of substance abuse that has not been addressed." Based on prior indicated reports, an intact family case was opened in 2011 to offer substance abuse treatment to C.F., but C.F. refused to participate in services, and the case closed in May 2012. The State further alleged that J.C.'s father was deceased. (The father's death certificate was later introduced into evidence.)

¶ 5 On March 7, 2013, after an adjudication hearing, the trial court entered a finding that J.C. was neglected due to C.F.'s lack of care and an injurious environment. Following a dispositional hearing on May 9, 2013, the trial court found C.F. unable to care for J.C. and entered an order making J.C. a ward of the court.

¶ 6 On May 27, 2016, after three years of periods of progress followed by lack of progress on C.F.'s part, the trial court found that C.F. had not made substantial progress toward J.C.'s return, stating that C.F. "still needs to participate in services in order to change the conditions that led to [J.C.] being placed in DCFS care." Shortly thereafter, on July 15, 2016, J.C. was placed with a preadoptive foster home. On May 3, 2017, the trial court entered a permanency goal of substitute care pending a court determination on termination of C.F.'s parental rights.

¶ 7 On October 5, 2017, the State filed a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of a Guardian with the Right to Consent to Adoption," requesting the court find C.F. an unfit parent, permanently terminate C.F.'s parental rights, and appoint a guardian with the right to consent to J.C.'s adoption. The State alleged that J.C.'s foster parents wished to adopt her and adoption was in her best interest.

¶ 8 The termination hearing was set for September 19, 2018. On August 31, 2018, C.F. moved to compel then nine-year-old J.C. to appear and testify at the hearing. In response, J.C.'s attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL) filed a motion to quash the notice to compel, arguing that it was not in J.C.'s best interest to appear or testify. The GAL alleged that, during the past two years, J.C. had not wanted much, if any, contact with her mother, and she continually voiced this opinion to her caseworker, her therapist, and the GAL. Following her last two supervised visits with her mother on February 26 and April 27, 2018, J.C. did not want to resume visitation, because she was focused on her life at home and at school. The GAL stated that J.C. "has been subject to several very stressful and turbulent years" and opined that requiring her testimony would risk causing further emotional damage.

¶ 9 Termination of Parental Rights Hearing

¶ 10 The September 19, 2018, hearing began with the court addressing C.F.'s motion to compel J.C.'s testimony. As an offer of proof, C.F.'s counsel stated that, if called to testify, J.C. would state that she wanted to say goodbye to her mother and was not able to interact with her during visitation. J.C. would additionally testify that she wished to continue seeing her mother and did not want to cease all contact.

¶ 11 In further support of his motion, C.F.'s counsel argued that "the mother has the right to hear what the child is going to say." He stated that the GAL's allegation that J.C. did not want to see her mother was contrary to the mother's experiences during visitation, in which J.C. was "very affectionate," running up to her, hugging her, asking "Where have you been?" and "When am I going to see you * * * again?" He therefore argued that C.F. should be allowed to hear J.C.'s testimony so she could know her daughter's true wishes. He suggested that, if testifying in front of her mother would be difficult for J.C., she could instead give testimony in camera .

¶ 12 In response, the GAL stated that there was no compelling reason to demand J.C.'s testimony, since, at best, it would pertain only to the question of her best interests and not to C.F.'s fitness as a mother. The GAL asserted that demanding her presence under those circumstances would amount to "harassment, oppression, and undue hardship." The State joined in the GAL's objection, pointing out that C.F. could testify to her relationship with J.C., thus rendering J.C.'s testimony redundant. The State also presented a letter from J.C.'s former therapist in which the therapist stated: "[T]riggers of her biological mother have adversely impacted [J.C.]. * * * Given that both her biological mother and court are stressors for [J.C.] at this time, testifying will likely be troublesome for [J.C.]."

¶ 13 The trial court denied the motion to compel J.C.'s testimony, finding that it was not in her best interest "given the history of the case and minor's own emotional needs and her special needs that have come out over the course of this case over the years." C.F.'s counsel then requested sanctions, asking that J.C.'s out-of-court statements regarding C.F. not be allowed even if they fell under an exception to the hearsay rule. (Counsel was unclear against whom these sanctions would be imposed.) The trial court denied the request, finding sanctions to be inappropriate where no party had failed to comply with a court order.

¶ 14 The case proceeded to a hearing on C.F.'s fitness as a parent. The State called Alexa Vander Hye and Scott Wolff-Klammer, both of whom were foster care supervisors at Children's Home & Aid and oversaw J.C.'s case. Hye was J.C.'s caseworker from October 2016 to April 2018, and Wolff-Klammer took over starting on April 30, 2018. During this time, C.F. was assessed for domestic violence services, parenting classes, parent coaching, individual therapy, family therapy, and substance abuse treatment. Of those, she only successfully completed domestic violence services and parenting classes.

¶ 15 C.F. was assessed for parent coaching because she was overly authoritarian: she was "very rigid * * * in terms of how a child should behave" and blamed J.C. for the DCFS proceedings. C.F. also called J.C. manipulative and a liar and, on one occasion, threatened to "whup" her. C.F.'s negativity harmed J.C.'s self-esteem. Nevertheless, C.F. did not successfully complete parent coaching; she wanted to end the coaching sessions because "she thought she was not the one with the problem * * * [and] that [J.C.] was the only one who needed help."

¶ 16 C.F. also failed twice to complete an individual therapy program. The first attempt failed because C.F.'s attendance was inconsistent, she refused to accept responsibility for her own actions as a mother, and she failed to develop proper parenting strategies. The second attempt failed because of C.F.'s poor attendance: she missed half of the sessions and frequently came late and/or left early for the remaining ones. Because C.F. did not complete either individual therapy or parent coaching, family therapy was never started.

¶ 17 With regard to substance abuse treatment, C.F. completed intensive outpatient treatment but did not complete the aftercare program. She frequently missed meetings with her assigned recovery coach. She also missed the majority of requested "drops" (drug tests), including all scheduled drops from October 2016 to January 2017. Eventually, she was removed from the program due to nonattendance. On cross-examination, Hye admitted that C.F. did not test positive for illegal substances in any drops she participated in and, during Hye's brief meetings with C.F., Hye never had cause to believe that C.F. was under the influence of drugs.

¶ 18 Hye and Wolff-Klammer also testified regarding C.F.'s visitation with J.C. (Hye's testimony was based upon case notes, the agency file, and meetings with a caseworker she supervised; she never personally observed C.F. with J.C. As for...