People v. Cabrera

207 N.Y.S.3d 18

230 N.E.3d 1082

41 N.Y.3d 35

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Ramon CABRERA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided November 21, 2023

Jenay Nurse Guilford, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Barbara Zolot of counsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Joshua P. Weiss, Yael V. Levy, David M. Cohn and Matthew B. White of counsel), for respondent.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York City (Ester Murdukhayeva, Andrew W. Amend, Barbara D. Underwood, Nikki Kowalski, Jodi A. Danzig and Anthony Raduazo of counsel), in her statutory capacity under Executive Law § 71.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HALLIGAN, J.

₃₈Two primary issues are raised in this appeal. The first is whether, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision ₃₉in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022), New York’s criminal prohibition on the unlicensed public carry of a loaded firearm is unconstitutional (see Penal Law § 265.03[3]). Because defendant Ramon Cabrera’s Second Amendment arguments were not preserved as required by New York law, we do not reach the merits of these constitutional challenges. The second is whether Cabrera was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), when he was handcuffed and questioned by law enforcement officers. Because the conclusion below that he was not in custody is unsupported by the record, we reverse and remit the case for a new trial.

In August 2016, Cabrera was pulled over for speeding in South Carolina and revealed to a police officer that he had firearms in his car and was driving to his mother’s home in the Bronx. Although the defendant held a Florida license for the guns and was legally permitted to possess them in South Carolina, the officer warned him that possession of the guns would be unlawful in New York, and notified the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) about the defendant and his travel plans. That information was relayed to New York City Police Department Detective Kevin Muirhead, who was assigned to the ATF Joint Firearms Task Force. The South Carolina officer shared the details of his encounter and Cabrera’s license plate number with Detective Muirhead, and Muirhead determined that the car was registered to a Bronx address associated with Cabrera’s mother.

Around 8:00 p.m. that evening, Detective Muirhead and two colleagues, Lieutenant Peter Carretta and ATF Special Agent Adam Schultz, began a stakeout of the mother’s residence. When Cabrera arrived at approximately 10:00 p.m., Detective Muirhead pulled up behind his car. The officers exited their vehicle and approached the defendant as he emerged from his car. Muirhead identified himself as a police officer and asked for the defendant’s name and his destination. Cabrera was "calm and cooperative," and provided his name and stated that the house belonged to his mother. Detective Muirhead later testified that Cabrera was handcuffed, though he could not recall at what point in the encounter the handcuffs were applied or who had done so.

When asked for identification, the defendant permitted one of the officers to retrieve his wallet from the vehicle’s center console. In removing the driver’s license from the wallet, the ₄₀officer also found a Florida Concealed Carry Permit. Detective Muirhead then asked Cabrera whether "there were any firearms in the vehicle [he] should be aware about"; Cabrera informed him that there were three handguns and a rifle in the trunk and permitted him to open it. Upon doing so, Detective Muirhead observed the top portion of a rifle. He asked Cabrera whether he had a New York State Carry Permit, and Cabrera responded "no." Cabrera was then arrested and brought to the Task Force’s office, along with his vehicle.

An hour and a half after the officers apprehended him, Cabrera was placed in an interrogation room and his handcuffs were removed. Special Agent Schultz read Cabrera each of the Miranda warnings from a form, and Cabrera acknowledged them by nodding affirmatively, ini- tialing next to each warning, and signing the bottom of the form. Detective Muir-head then read to Cabrera from a "consent to search" form, which informed him that, among other things, he had the right to refuse to give consent, that he could withdraw his consent at any time before the search’s termination, that any contraband found during the search could be used against him, and that he could consult with an attorney before he consented to the search. While apprising Cabrera of both the Miranda waiver and "consent to search" form, Special Agent Schultz referred to them as "formalit[ies]" and suggested the search needed to be completed before the car could be returned to the defendant’s mother. When asked if he was authorizing the search of the car, Cabrera nodded affirmatively and signed the form. Immediately after, Cabrera said he wanted a lawyer and no further questioning occurred. Cabrera did not, however, withdraw his consent to the search or ask to consult with an attorney about the search. Given Cabrera’s consent, Detective Muirhead searched the trunk, recovering a disassembled rifle, three handguns, and several boxes of ammunition.

Cabrera later moved to suppress both the statements he made to police while handcuffed and the physical evidence found in his vehicle. He argued that he had been placed in custody when "confronted by three officers who immediately handcuff[ed] him" and that the officers failed to read him his Miranda rights prior to questioning him. He further argued that he never voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle because his initial verbal consent was involuntary and a fruit of an improper custodial interrogation, and the consent form signed at the Task Force’s office was tainted by the prior un lawful₄₁ custodial interrogation and involuntary in light of certain comments by the police.

Supreme Court denied the suppression motion. The Court assumed, as the People conceded it should, that Cabrera was handcuffed before he was questioned, but it nonetheless concluded that the detective was permitted to question Cabrera without first issuing Miranda warnings. The handcuffing, the Court explained, ensured the officers’ safety and "did not transform the encounter into a full-blown arrest requiring probable cause." The court further concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, both the defendant’s on-scene consent to search his trunk and written consent at the office were voluntary.

Cabrera pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3]). The Appellate Division rejected Cabrera’s suppression claims and affirmed the judgment. It held that the hearing court correctly determined that even if the defendant was handcuffed when he was questioned about the guns outside his mother’s house, the handcuffing did not elevate what was otherwise an investigatory detention to custody for Miranda purposes, and thus the officers did not first have to provide Miranda warnings before questioning Cabrera about the guns. The court also rejected Cabrera’s challenge to admission of the physical evidence, noting that the officers acquired probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception once the defendant admitted to possessing the firearms. Further, the court agreed with Supreme Court’s conclusion that Cabrera voluntarily consented to a search of his car both at the scene and in the Task Force office. A Judge of this Court granted Cabrera leave to appeal.

On appeal to this Court, Cabrera claims to have been in custody for Miranda pur- posen when he was handcuffed and asks this Court to adopt a rule that a handcuffed person is per se in custody for purposes of Miranda, He further contends that there is no record support for the Appellate Division’s finding that he was not in custody under the circumstances and that both his oral and written consent to the search were tainted by the Miranda violation and independently involuntary. In addition, the defendant raises several constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence for the first time on appeal to this Court in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bruen.

₄₂I.

We begin with Cabrera’s Second Amendment challenges. Cabrera argues that, because Penal Law § 265.03(3) criminalizes unlicensed possession of a firearm, the constitutionality of that statute necessarily rose or fell with the constitutionality of the licensing regulations in effect at the time he was charged. In his view, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Briten rendered unconstitutional the entirety of New York’s licensing regime, and that in turn meant that Penal Law § 265.03(3) was facially unconstitutional. Cabrera further argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him on several grounds. He contends that because he was able to obtain a valid gun license in Florida, we must assume that New York’s proper cause requirement alone made his unlicensed possession criminal. Cabrera also alleges a violation of his right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause based on what he construes as a residency requirement for New York licenses. Finally, Cabrera argues that the felony classification and authorized sentencing range for violations of Penal Law § 265.03(3) violate the Second Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause in light of Bruen.

It is undisputed that Cabrera did not raise these constitutional arguments before the trial court, as is generally required to preserve such challenges for this Court’s review (see People v. Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 404, 408, 813 N.Y.S.2d 27, 846 N.E.2d 457 [2006]; see also e.g. People v. Davidson, 98 N.Y.2d 738, 739, 751 N.Y.S.2d 161, 780 N.E.2d 972 [2002] ["Because defendant’s constitutional challenge...