People v. Campbell

229 N.E.3d 840

2023 IL App (1st) 220373

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Tony CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-22-0373

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIFTH DIVISION.

Opinion Filed June 2, 2023

Modified Opinion Filed October 13, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 01 CR 12003, Honorable Kenneth J. Wadas, Judge Presiding.

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Joseph Michael Benak, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Retha Stotts, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After this court vacated his initial 140-year sentence, defendant Tony Camp- bell was resentenced in 2009 to 110 years in prison for first degree murder and armed robbery, offenses committed when he was just 17 years old. Under the statutory sentencing scheme then in place, the shortest sentence the court could impose on remand was just over 50 years.

¶ 2 Since then, the law governing juvenile sentencing has changed significantly. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile violates the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Several years later, our own supreme court held in People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884, that the same is true where a juvenile has received a lengthy term-of-years sentence that is the functional equivalent of a natural life sentence.

¶ 3 Based on these authorities, in 2019, Tony sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging the constitutionality of his 110-year sentence. The circuit court denied his motion. It agreed that Tony had received a de facto life sentence but concluded that his resentencing hearing, held three years before Miller was decided, had nevertheless been Miller-compliant.

¶ 4 The State acknowledges on appeal that because the minimum sentence available by statute was a de facto life sentence, the sentencing scheme applied here "violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller." It urges us to conclude, however, that this was harmless because Tony received well above the minimum sentence. The State’s rationale, in other words, is that it is clear from the record that even if the trial judge had been given the discretion to impose something less than a life sentence, he would not have done so.

¶ 5 But as our supreme court just reemphasized in its very recent decision in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, 468 Ill.Dec. 289, 220 N.E.3d 1068, the core takeaway from Miller and the cases that have followed it is that sentencing a child to die in prison must be an exercise of real discretion. Crucially, the sentencing court must have the ability to impose something less than a life sentence. Where, as here, the minimum sentence available is a sentence deemed by our supreme court to be the legal and functional equivalent of a natural life sentence, there can be no constitutionally significant exercise of discretion.

¶ 6 We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Tony’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, vacate his sentence, and remand for reassignment and resentencing.

¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 8 A. Charges, Pretrial Proceedings, and Trial

¶ 9 The State alleged that 17-year-old Tony and 18-year-old Melvin Gaddy shot and killed their mutual friend, Garvey Bernard, and robbed him of $3500. Mr. Gaddy pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Tony was offered but declined a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence.

¶ 10 Tony was allowed to represent himself at trial. The evidence, summarized at length in our earlier decisions, consisted of Tony’s statement to the police and the testimony of two eyewitnesses. It generally showed that, just before his death, Mr. Bernard had boasted about a $3500 insurance settlement he received from a car accident, prompting three of his friends—Tony, Mr. Gaddy, and a third individual—to form a plan to rob him. On April 10, 2001, they brought Mr. Bernard to the alley outside Mr. Gaddy’s apartment, where Tony was also living. Mr. Gaddy and Tony went up to the apartment on the pretense of getting a magazine that listed cars for sale. They returned with a gun, and Tony told Mr. Bernard to "give it up." When Mr. Bernard ran, Tony began shooting him. Mr. Gaddy then took the money from Mr. Bernard’s pockets and scaled a nearby fence, while Tony stood over Mr. Bernard and shot him again. The medical examiner testified that Mr. Bernard was shot a total of 11 times.

¶ 11 The jury found Tony guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery. It also found that he had personally discharged the firearm that caused Mr. Bernard’s death.

¶ 12 B. Initial Sentencing and First Direct Appeal

¶ 13 The public defender was reappointed to represent Tony at sentencing and presented two witnesses in mitigation: Tony’s mother, Bonnie Campbell, and his sister, Tamika Campbell Thompson.

¶ 14 Ms. Campbell testified that Tony’s father "never had any part of [his] life" and never provided them with financial support. His stepfather was cruel to Tony and Tony’s sister and "didn’t accept them because they weren’t his own." Ms. Campbell eventually ended the relationship because of this. Tony also had a hard time academically and socially. He was picked on by his classmates. Ms. Campbell explained that when Tony went to live with his friend, Melvin Gaddy, Mr. Gaddy’s influence on his life was "[v]ery bad." Tony was afraid to go home some nights because Mr. Gaddy would be "high or drunk" and "very violent." She described her son as "always sweet and very polite and well mannered." He never disrespected her, and she had never seen him be violent.

¶ 15 Ms. Thompson, who was three years older than Tony, agreed that her brother was picked on in school and added that she often had to intercede on his behalf. Tony never joined a gang, but he used to run home crying because gang members chased him and aggressively tried to recruit him. Like her mother, Ms. Thompson had also never seen Tony behave violently.

¶ 16 According to the pretrial investigation report, Tony’s mother and father were never married, and he rarely saw his father growing up. Tony’s stepfather, a security officer for the Chicago Housing Authority, physically abused him. Tony was expelled from school at the end of ninth grade because of excessive absenteeism. He explained that it was a "‘bad school’ with a lot of ‘gang bangers.’" Tony was diagnosed with dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in third grade and placed in special education classes. He first consumed alcohol when he was 12 years old and began smoking marijuana when he was 14. Tony reported that, while incarcerated, he had spent time working in the law library and attending church services. He had one prior juvenile adjudication for a drug offense and no prior adult criminal convictions.

¶ 17 Defense counsel asked the court for leniency, arguing that Tony’s refusal to join gangs, despite his difficult upbringing, demonstrated that he had rehabilitative potential. The State conversely asked the court for a harsh sentence, citing the brutal nature of the crime. The sentencing judge, concluding that none of the statutory factors in mitigation applied, sentenced Tony to 140 years in prison—an aggregate sentence consisting of the maximum sentences of 60 years for first degree murder and 30 years for armed robbery, plus a 50-year firearm enhancement.

¶ 18 Defense counsel moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the sentence was excessive in light of Tony’s background and youth. The court denied the motion, calling Tony a "coldblooded murderer" and stating that 140 years in prison was "maybe not enough."

¶ 19 On direct appeal, we remanded for resentencing based on the fact that the sentencing judge had indicated on the record that he viewed Tony as a convicted felon. The trial court had improperly based this on the fact that Tony had been adjudicated delinquent and was serving a period of juvenile probation. People v. Campbell, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 352 Ill.Dec. 1007, 955 N.E.2d 183 (2008) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 20 C. Resentencing on Remand and Second Direct Appeal

¶ 21 Tony was resentenced on March 25, 2009. The sentencing judge noted at the start of the hearing that he had not been able to find a copy of the pretrial investigation report in the record. He said to defense counsel, "[l]et me have a copy. I will give it back to you in a second." Defense counsel asked the judge to also consider a two-page letter Tony had written, in which he expressed remorse and said he had taken a wrong turn but asked the court to believe that he would "never leave that road again." The judge refused to consider the letter.

¶ 22 The State introduced victim impact statements from Garvey Bernard’s parents and presented no other evidence or testimony. It argued that Tony had killed his friend for money, a gruesome act for which he deserved the maximum sentence the judge could impose.

¶ 23 Defense counsel summarized the testimony of Tony’s mother and sister from his initial sentencing hearing but did not recall them as witnesses. The family was poor, counsel argued, and their poverty was what motivated Tony to commit this impulsive crime.

¶ 24 Tony’s counsel initially represented to the court that he was 18 at the time of his offenses; she was corrected on the record by her client. Tony’s decision not to accept a plea deal and to represent himself at trial, counsel posited, demonstrated "that immaturity causes people to make bad decisions." She argued that Tony had matured while incarcerated and noted that there...