People v. Castillo

2022 IL 127894

215 N.E.3d 780

465 Ill.Dec. 575

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Jose CASTILLO, Appellant.

Docket No. 127894

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed November 28, 2022.

Rehearing denied January 23, 2023

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Catherine K. Hart, Deputy Defender, and Natalia Galica, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Aaron M. Williams, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Jose Castillo, was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c), (d)(4)(i) (West 2018)), following a bench trial in the circuit court of Livingston County. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction on the basis that, inter alia , the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery because (1) a cellblock in a maximum-security prison that is inaccessible to the public is not "public property" for purposes of the aggravated battery statute and (2) the State failed to prove ownership of Pontiac Correctional Center, the public property at issue.

¶ 2 The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. 2021 IL App (4th) 190633-U, 2021 WL 5322441. For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The incident giving rise to the aggravated battery charges against defendant, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), occurred on February 9, 2016. In count I, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery in that, in committing a battery, defendant

"knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Correctional Lieutenant John Thorpe [sic ], in that the defendant struck John Thorpe with an unknown liquid substance about the face and body, knowing John Thorpe to be a correctional institutional employee of the State of Illinois Department of Corrections, who was engaged in the performance of his authorized duties,"

in violation of section 12-3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018)).

¶ 5 Count II charged defendant with aggravated battery in that defendant, in committing a battery, "knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Inmate John Eilers, in that defendant struck John Eilers with an unknown liquid substance about the face and body, knowing Pontiac Correctional Center to be public property," in violation of section 12-3.05(c) of the Criminal Code (id. § 12-3.05(c)). Only count II is at issue in this appeal.

¶ 6 At defendant's bench trial, correctional officer John Thorp testified that he was employed at Pontiac. On February 9, 2016, Thorp was escorting inmate John Eilers from the north cell house of Pontiac to the east cell house. Eilers, in restraints, walked approximately 8 to 12 inches in front of Thorp. As Eilers and Thorp walked past defendant's cell, defendant threw a liquid substance that smelled of feces, striking both Eilers and Thorp.

¶ 7 Jeremy Olson testified on behalf of the State that he was employed by the Department of Corrections as an investigator. Olson's role was to investigate possible infractions or incidents at Pontiac. Olson was assigned to investigate the allegations against defendant. Olson interviewed defendant in Olson's office at Pontiac. In his statement, defendant told Olson that he had thrown the feces at Eilers because Eilers had threatened to kill defendant's family and to beat up defendant. Defendant also told Olson that he did not think Thorp was anywhere near Eilers when he threw the substance.

¶ 8 Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant stated that he was currently imprisoned in the Department of Corrections. Regarding the incident at issue, defendant testified that Eilers had threatened to kill defendant's family and to rape defendant's mother when Eilers was released from prison. In response to those threats, defendant threw four milk cartons containing feces, urine, and semen at Eilers, hitting Eilers in his face and mouth. Defendant denied that Thorp was escorting Eilers when Eilers walked by defendant's cell. Defendant testified that Thorp was not in the area when he threw the substance at Eilers and denied that any of the substance hit Thorp.

¶ 9 Following closing argument, the trial court found defendant guilty on both counts of aggravated battery and sentenced defendant to a term of 10 years on count I and 5 years on count II, to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to the sentences for which defendant was imprisoned. The trial court later denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶ 10 Defendant appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty of count II because a cellblock in a maximum-security prison does not constitute "public property" within the meaning of the aggravated battery statute. In the alternative, defendant argued that the State failed to prove ownership of Pontiac.¹

¶ 11 In affirming defendant's conviction, the appellate court first noted that defendant had not raised either issue in the trial court by way of objection, motion, or posttrial motion. 2021 IL App (4th) 190633-U, ¶ 9, 2021 WL 5322441. Defendant did not ask the appellate court to forgive the procedural forfeiture or to consider the issues under the plain error doctrine, and he instead simply argued the issues. Id. The State likewise failed to raise the procedural forfeiture issue. Id. Given its discretion to review otherwise forfeited issues, the appellate court chose to consider the merits of defendant's claims. Id.

¶ 12 Turning to those claims, the appellate court then noted that, contrary to defendant's framing of his first claim of error, defendant's public property issue did not require the court to decide whether a particular cellblock within Pontiac was "public property." Id. ¶ 12. The appellate court explained that the charges against defendant were not drawn so narrowly. Id. Count II of the indictment charged that defendant committed a battery, "knowing Pontiac Correctional Center to be public property." Accordingly, the State need only prove that, at the time of the offense, defendant knew that it was occurring on public property, namely Pontiac, rather than on a particular cellblock within the facility. Id.

¶ 13 The appellate court then noted a conflict among the districts of the appellate court concerning whether "public property" meant that property must be accessible to the public to be defined as such. Id. ¶ 13. The Fourth District in People v. Hill , 409 Ill. App. 3d 451, 454, 351 Ill.Dec. 85, 949 N.E.2d 1180 (2011), concluded that there was nothing to indicate that the General Assembly intended the plain and ordinary meaning of "public property" to be anything other than government-owned property. Accordingly, Hill held that the defendant could be found guilty of aggravated battery based on a battery occurring within a pod in the county jail. Id. at 455, 351 Ill.Dec. 85, 949 N.E.2d 1180.

¶ 14 The Appellate Court, Third District, likewise found that the plain and ordinary meaning of "public property" was simply property owned by the government. People v. Messenger , 2015 IL App (3d) 130581, ¶ 22, 396 Ill.Dec. 764, 40 N.E.3d 417. The Messenger court thus held that the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery for a battery that occurred inside the county jail.

¶ 15 The Appellate Court, Second District, however, found that "public property" for purposes of the aggravated battery statute is property that is both owned by the government and is accessible to the public. People v. Ojeda , 397 Ill. App. 3d 285, 336 Ill.Dec. 876, 921 N.E.2d 490 (2009). At issue in Ojeda was whether a high school was public property for purposes of the aggravated battery statute. Id. at 286, 336 Ill.Dec. 876, 921 N.E.2d 490. Ojeda concluded that "public property" must be both accessible to the public, even if that access was limited, and funded by taxpayers. Id. at 287, 336 Ill.Dec. 876, 921 N.E.2d 490.

¶ 16 In the appellate court, defendant relied "heavily" on Ojeda in support of his argument that Pontiac was not "public property" for purposes of the aggravated battery statute because Pontiac was not accessible to the public. 2021 IL App (4th) 190633-U, ¶ 13, 2021 WL 5322441. The appellate court noted that it had rejected the Ojeda analysis in Hill and declined defendant's invitation to reconsider that holding. Id. The appellate court stated that, as in Hill and Messenger , the battery in this case occurred within Pontiac, which is public property, regardless of the specific location of the battery. Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 17 The appellate court next addressed defendant's claim that the State offered no evidence concerning the ownership of Pontiac. Id. ¶ 17. At trial, neither party contested the fact that Pontiac was public property owned by the State, and neither party argued that issue in their closing arguments. Id. ¶ 18. The trial witnesses testified that the offenses took place at Pontiac. Id. ¶ 17. The appellate court held that it could take judicial notice that Pontiac was owned by the State. Id. ¶ 18. The appellate court explained that it could take judicial notice of matters generally known to the court and not subject to reasonable dispute, even if the judicial notice is of a fact that constitutes an element of the offense. Id. ¶ 17. Given the evidence that the offense occurred at Pontiac, along with the judicial notice that Pontiac was owned by the State, the appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of the aggravated battery charged in count II. Id. ¶ 18. The appellate court therefore affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 18 Defendant filed a petition for leave to...