People v. Chester (In re Chester)

2017 IL App (1st) 160979

87 N.E.3d 338

IN RE COMMITMENT OF Earl CHESTER

(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.Earl Chester, Respondent-Appellant)

No. 1-16-0979

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Opinion filed September 20, 2017

Stephen F. Potts, of Des Plaines Law Group PC, of Des Plaines, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Matthew P. Becker, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a stipulated adjudication as a sexually violent person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)), respondent, Earl Chester, appeals from the circuit court's denial of his motion to withdraw his stipulation and its order committing him to the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) for institutional treatment. He contends that the trial court erred in accepting his stipulation because (1) the Act does not provide for stipulations and (2) the court failed to conduct a fitness hearing prior to accepting the stipulation. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 16, 2007, the State filed a petition to commit respondent as a sexually violent person under the Act. In its petition, the State alleged that respondent (1) was found guilty of sexual assault in the circuit court of Cook County and sentenced to 22 years in the Department of Corrections, (2) had been diagnosed with paraphilia, not otherwise specified, non-consenting persons (PNOS), a mental disorder which predisposes respondent to commit acts of sexual violence, and (3) was dangerous because his mental disorder created a substantial probability that he would engage in acts of sexual violence in the future.

¶ 4 In support of its petition, the State included the report of a psychological evaluation of respondent conducted by Dr. Ray Quackenbush, Psy.D. Prior to the evaluation, the doctor informed respondent of the nature and structure of the proceedings under the Act. In his report, Dr. Quackenbush indicated that respondent articulated his understanding of the information and consented to the interview. As part of the evaluation, Dr. Quackenbush interviewed respondent, reviewed his arrest and conviction history, and examined respondent's prison disciplinary and medical files. Several assessment methods were used to determine respondent's level of risk for committing future sexually violent offenses. Respondent was diagnosed with (1) PNOS, (2) polysubstance dependence, and (3) antisocial personality disorder. Based on the evaluation, Dr. Quackenbush concluded that respondent showed a substantial and continuing risk for sexual offense recidivism and his actions met the criteria for PNOS. As such, he recommended that respondent be found to be a sexually violent person under and the Act and subject to civil commitment for clinical intervention to prevent respondent from engaging in future acts of sexual violence. On September 11, 2007, the court found probable cause to believe that respondent was a sexually violent person and, pursuant to section 30(c) of the Act ( 725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West 2006)), ordered respondent to participate in an evaluation to determine whether he was a sexually violent person. On that same date, both respondent and the State filed a demand for a jury trial.

¶ 5 On January 9, 2008, upon respondent's request, the court ordered Dr. Eric Ostrov to conduct any and all examinations of respondent in preparation of his defense in the commitment proceeding.¹ The matter was continued by agreement of the parties over the course of the next several years. On July 13, 2010, the court granted the State's motion for a current sexually violent person evaluation of respondent. Because Dr. Quackenbush was no longer available, the State requested that the Department of Corrections be directed to assign an evaluator to perform a current evaluation of respondent. Although the State asserts that Dr. John Arroyo submitted evaluation reports concerning respondent on December 2010, September 25, 2013, and November 25, 2013, and that Dr. Kimberly Weitl submitted reports on October 26, 2007, February 15, 2010, June 18, 2013, and October 31, 2013, those reports do not appear in the record.

¶ 6 Trial in this matter commenced and the jury was sworn in on March 9, 2015. On March 10, 2015, prior to proceeding with trial, the parties tendered a stipulation in which they agreed that respondent was waiving his right to a jury trial, the State's evaluators would opine that respondent had been convicted of a sexually violent offense, respondent suffers from mental disorders and is substantially probable to reoffend, and, thus, based on the stipulation, the Court would find respondent to be sexually violent person. In presenting the stipulation, defense counsel indicated that he had reviewed each paragraph with respondent and answered any questions respondent had regarding the agreement. Before accepting the stipulation, the following colloquy occurred :

"THE COURT: *** Did you review this document with your lawyer?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Did you review each and every one of these 16 paragraphs with your lawyer regarding the stipulation that you're asking to enter at this time?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm showing you page three of the stipulation and agreement. Is that your signature on this stipulation?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: And is it your intention at this time to waive or give up your right to a jury trial in this matter?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: And proceed by way of stipulation where you're admitting that at this time you're currently a sexually violent person under the statute; is that correct?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you do have a right to a trial in this matter, either a right to a trial before a jury or a judge? Do you understand that?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, if you're stipulating as laid out in the written stipulation and agreement, you're giving up the right that you have to a jury trial. Do you understand that?

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: You're also giving up the right you have to a trial before a judge. Do you understand that?

[RESPONDENT]: What you're saying I can't have a jury trial no more.

THE COURT: Well, you could have if you decided to, but the agreement that you're entering into says you would give up your right to the jury trial.

[RESPONDENT]: Yes.

THE COURT: And you would agree to the allegations in the petition, that you're a sexually violent person. Is that what you would like to do?

[RESPONDENT]: Yeah, yeah.

THE COURT: All right."

The trial court accepted the stipulation, adjudicated respondent as a sexually violent person, and remanded him to the custody of IDHS.

¶ 7 On March 31, 2015, respondent filed a pro se motion to vacate the stipulation. In his motion, respondent argued that despite having agreed to the stipulation and asserting on the record that he understood the rights he would have been relinquishing, he had changed his mind. In response, the State argued that respondent failed to allege good cause as to why the stipulation should not be binding. Defense counsel did not supplement the respondent's pro se motion. However, at the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that it was in the interest of justice, based on respondent's "mental illness," that the court allow respondent to withdraw the stipulation. Defense counsel acknowledged that he thoroughly reviewed the stipulation with respondent, that the provisions in the stipulation were true, and that that the court properly admonished the respondent. He noted that on the day of trial, respondent approached him concerning the stipulation. Respondent had never been through jury selection before; he was tired, wanted it to be over with, and did not want to face the witnesses.

¶ 8 The trial court denied the motion. In so doing, the court commented that,

"I don't think his mental illness or any other disability that he may be suffering impacted his understanding of the nature of the stipulation or the consequences thereof at the time. There is no reason based in law or the facts surrounding the actual stipulation that would warrant the [c]ourt to allow the respondent to withdraw the stipulation or to set aside the stipulation at this time."

On January 28, 2016, following a dispositional hearing, respondent was committed to institutional care for treatment. Respondent appeals.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to vacate his stipulation as a sexually violent person and committing him to IDHS. Specifically, respondent contends that the trial court erred when it initially accepted a stipulation that respondent was a sexually violent person because (1) the Act does not provide any procedure or mechanism to stipulate as a sexually violent person and (2) the court failed to make any preliminary inquiry into his mental capacity to either understand or comprehend the stipulation.

¶ 11 Respondent's claim regarding the propriety of accepting a stipulation in civil commitment proceedings under the Act involves statutory construction and presents a pure legal question subject to de novo review. In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 40, 342 Ill.Dec. 555, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (2010). When construing a statute, our goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent, best indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole, words and phrases should not be construed in isolation but should be interpreted considering other relevant provisions of the statute. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). As such, each word, clause, and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be...