People v. Claiborne

2014 IL App (1st) 121581

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK CLAIBORNE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-12-1581

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT First Division

Order filed: June 2, 2014

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County.

No. 09 CR 10876 (01)

Honorable

Brian Flaherty,

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Connors and Justice Delort concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The defendant's constitutional challenges to the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act are rejected based upon established precedent of this court; the defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory enhanced sentence is without merit, where the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his conduct in the offense; and the defendant's sentence was not based upon emotion or an illicit double-enhancement, and was not otherwise an abuse of discretion.

¶ 2 The defendant, Frederick Claiborne, was charged with robbery with a firearm under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2008)), and was transferred fortrial as an adult under the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)(iv) (West 2010)). He was tried along with a co-defendant, Lorenzo Richardson, after which a judge found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction, plus the mandatory 15-year sentence enhancement under section 18-2(b) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/18(b)), for his use of a firearm during the commission of the offense. He now appeals, contending that (1) the statutory scheme under which he was prosecuted and sentenced violated his rights under the State and federal constitutions by mandating that he be sentenced as an adult and giving no regard to his youthfulness and its attendant circumstances; (2) the mandatory sentence enhancement under section 18-2 as applied to him was unconstitutional; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence by failing to properly consider substantial mitigating evidence, and applying its own "emotional attachment" to the case, along with an improper double enhancement. We affirm.

¶ 3 The evidence established that, about 2 a.m. on May 14, 2009, the victim, London Hall, was sitting in his car with his girlfriend, Emma Beans, in the back of Beans's apartment complex, when he heard a sound resembling "metal hitting wood." Hall told Beans that the noise "didn't sound right" and that he wanted to leave, but before he was able to do so, three males descended the stairwell of the complex and surrounded Hall's car. Two of the males were positively identified as the defendant, then age 16, and Richardson. Beans indicated that she initially thought that the perpetrators, whom she knew from the neighborhood, were hiding from the police, and told them to go stand next to her car instead. However, the defendant then pulled out a gun and pointed it towards Hall's head, while Richardson ordered Hall and Beans to get out of the vehicle. After they complied, the defendant continued to point the gun at Hall's face from adistance of about two feet away, while Richardson went through Hall's pockets retrieving his cell phone, money, driver's license and social security card.

¶ 4 Beans testified that during the commission of the offense, she said to Richardson "[w]hat are you doing? We both have kids." According to Hall's testimony, the defendant's hand appeared to be shaking as he held the gun, and Hall briefly considered snatching the weapon away from him but then reconsidered when he saw that the third man had a gun tucked into his pants. When they finished taking Hall's belongings, the men escaped towards the front of the complex, while Hall and Beans ran upstairs to Beans's apartment and called the police. Officer A. Sinnott arrived at the scene, and Hall and Beans provided him with a description of the perpetrators and the details of the offense.

¶ 5 Later that morning, Beans knocked on the door of her neighbor, but no one answered. She heard noises coming from an apartment several doors away and knocked on that door. When a man answered, Beans stated that she had just been robbed and asked whether "Zo," meaning Richardson, was in the apartment. The man let Beans into the apartment where she saw Richardson sitting in the front room. Beans told Richardson that she had just seen him in the robbery, to which Richardson replied that he had seen her too. According to Beans, she felt afraid at this point and left the apartment, walked a short distance and called the police. The defendant and Richardson also left the apartment, walked in her direction and then entered the apartment Beans had initially visited.

¶ 6 Officer Sinnott and another officer responded to Beans's call, and she directed them to the apartment where she had seen the defendants enter. The officers performed a search of the apartment and discovered the defendant and Richardson in one of the bedrooms. According to Officer Sinnott, the defendant "seemed to be *** engaged in some type of activity because hewas perspiring a lot. He was laying on the floor." The officers then discovered a milk crate near where the defendant was found, containing a loaded handgun, along with what was later proven to be the money, social security card, identification and cell phone belonging to Hall. Officer Sinnott also found a sawed-off shotgun protruding from the top of a storage tote in the same room.

¶ 7 Beans testified that the officers then brought three suspects out of the apartment for a show-up, and that she identified an individual later proven to be the defendant as having had the "gun to [Hall's] head." Beans told the officers that one of the men was not involved in the robbery, and identified the third man, later shown to be Richardson, as one of the perpetrators.

¶ 8 Hall later went to the police station, where he viewed a lineup and picked the defendant as the one that held the gun aimed at his head during the robbery. Hall also identified Richardson from a lineup, as the man who went through his pockets.

¶ 9 Officer Manuel Escalante testified that he spoke with the defendant on the day of his arrest. The defendant initially denied knowing anything about a robbery but later admitted his participation in the offense. He claimed, however, to have used a toy or a "BB" gun in the robbery.

¶ 10 Following arguments, the court found the defendant guilty of armed robbery with a firearm. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the State referred to evidence that both Hall and Beans were very shaken by the offense, with Hall also appearing upset during his testimony, and to the fact that Hall had a semi-automatic weapon pointed inches from his face. The State also pointed out that Hall was "just a trigger-pull away from a *** fatal injury" and that the defendant "is not an experienced gun owner." The defense presented mitigating evidence of the defendant's youngage, his difficult childhood, his work experience and rehabilitative potential. In imposing sentence, the court made remarks, which included the following:

"You know, it's one thing for somebody to say this person had a gun put up to his head.

You know, it's kind of cold facts, we're not, necessarily, emotionally attached to that, but when you actually listen to the witnesses talking about the gun being pointed at his head and [Beans] talking about she told the individuals that I have children, he has children, don't do this to us, we both have children.

I mean, that is what she is thinking about at this time, that she is going to be dead, he is going to be dead and there are children that are going to suffer all because somebody wants to get an easy way out and make some easy money.

Stupid, easy money.

And I don't know, it never happened to me, but I can't imagine what would happen if somebody putting right to my head a loaded gun and yelling and screaming and asking for the person's money.

***

This is the case that, again, as the State pointed out correctly under the factors in aggravation, your conducted [sic] caused or threatened serious harm.

They were - these individuals were one pull of the trigger away from serious injury or death.

Also, a message has to kind of go out to the neighborhood, so I think the sentence here is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. We *** can't just go up and stick up people."

¶ 11 The court then stated that it would also take into consideration that the defendant had no criminal background, which the court found "weighs heavily" in the defendant's favor. Finally, the court stated, after considering all evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and reviewing the presentence investigation, the defendant would be sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction, plus the mandatory 15-year enhancement for the use of the firearm. The court then denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, and this appeal followed.

¶ 12 On appeal, the defendant first argues that the Act's automatic transfer provision violates the proportionate penalty clauses (U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11), and the due process clauses (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 2) of the federal and state constitutions by mandating that he be tried and sentenced as an adult and disallowing any consideration of his youthfulness and its attendant circumstances. The relevant section of the provision requires removal from juvenile jurisdiction of any minor who, at the time of an offense, was at least 15 years of age, and who is charged with the offense of "armed robbery when the armed robbery was...