People v. Clark

732 N.W.2d 605

274 Mich. App. 248

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul CLARK, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 265776.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 7, 2007, at Detroit.

Decided February 13, 2007, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication May 14, 2007.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Thomas M. Chambers,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Adil Haradhvala, Detroit, for the defendant.

Before: KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, P.J., and DAVIS and SERVITTO, JJ.

KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, P.J.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3). We reverse.

I. Facts

This case arises from the armed robbery and shooting of a 55-year-old man in 1987. Defendant was charged with felony-murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, for which he was convicted and received a sentence of life in prison and two years in prison. On appeal as of right, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction. Subsequently, defendant appeared in propria persona and filed two separate motions for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied in turn. It is undisputed that defendant never asserted that his jury instructions were improper in his appeal or in either motion for relief from judgment.

Later, defendant filed a third motion for relief from judgment in which he argued for the first time that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of the necessarily included offense of second-degree murder and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failure to object to the instructions given.¹ At the hearing on this motion, the trial court found that the instructions were inadequate and that defendant suffered actual prejudice because, if properly instructed, the jury could have found him guilty of a lesser offense. The prosecution argued that defendant was required to show good cause, under MCR 6.508(D)(3), for not raising these claims in his prior appeal and motions for relief from judgment. The trial court ruled that defendant fulfilled the good cause requirement because his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the instructional issue before. The prosecution then argued that defendant was also required to show good cause for not raising the instructional issue in his two prior motions for relief from judgment filed in propria persona. But defendant argued, "Judge, I don't think you have to rule on that. He's asking you to rule on a negative. I think if you adopt the arguments that I made that that's sufficient for the record." Agreeing with defendant, the trial court granted defendant's motion.

II. Analysis

The prosecution contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3). We agree. "It is well established that we review a trial court's grant of relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and that we review a trial court's findings of fact supporting its ruling for clear error." People v. McSwain, 259 Mich.App. 654, 681, 676 N.W.2d 236 (2003). The interpretation of Court rules is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Walters, 266 Mich.App. 341, 346, 700 N.W.2d 424 (2005).

A. Good Cause

The first issue we must address is whether MCR 6.508(D)(3) requires a defendant, who has filed both an appeal and prior motions for relief from judgment and asserts a new claim in a subsequent motion for relief from judgment, to show good cause for not raising the claim in both the appeal and his or her prior motions. We hold that it does.

MCR 6.508(D) provides in pertinent part:

The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion

(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence that still is subject to challenge on appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter 7.300;

(2) alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior appeal or proceeding under this subchapter, unless the defendant establishes that a retroactive change in the law has undermined the prior decision;

(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and

(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. As used in this subrule, "actual prejudice" means that,

(i) in a conviction following a trial, but for the alleged error, the defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal;

* * *

The court may waive the "good cause" requirement of subrule (D)(3)(a) if it concludes that there is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of the crime. [Emphasis added.]

Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the language of the court rule. The same principles of statutory interpretation govern when interpreting and applying a court rule. Walters, supra at 346, 700 N.W.2d 424. Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. People v. Hock Shop, Inc., 261 Mich.App. 521, 527-528, 681 N.W.2d 669 (2004). Nothing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself. Id. at 528, 681 N.W.2d 669. "The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with the rules of statutory construction, and when it is promulgating new laws it is presumed to be aware of the consequences of its use or omission of statutory language." Id. However, if statutory language is ambiguous, the court may go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. People v. Gatski, 260 Mich.App. 360, 365, 677 N.W.2d 357 (2004). An ambiguity may be found only if the language, as used in its particular context, has more than one common and accepted meaning. Id.

As in Gatski, the issue in this case focuses on the use of the word "or." In Gatski, this Court stated, "It is well-established that the word `or' is often misused in statutes and it gives rise to an ambiguity in the statute because it can be read as meaning either `and' or `or.'" Id. This Court further cautioned that although "or" is generally a disjunctive term, "the popular use of the word is frequently inaccurate and this misuse has infected statutory enactments." Id. Because we agree that the term "or" in this case renders MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) somewhat ambiguous, we are permitted to go beyond the words of the court rule to ascertain the intent of the drafter. See id.

Our Supreme Court, the drafter of the court rules, has held that MCR 6.508 protects unremedied manifest injustice, preserves professional independence, conserves judicial resources, and enhances the finality of judgments. People v. Reed, 449 Mich. 375, 378-79, 535 N.W.2d 496 (1995) (Boyle, J.).² While discussing MCR 6.508, the Court stated, Neither the guarantee of a fair trial nor a direct appeal entitles a defendant to as many attacks on a final conviction as ingenuity may devise. Reed, supra at 389-390, 535 N.W.2d 496.

Keeping in mind the purpose of MCR 6.508, we conclude that, in MCR 6.508(D)(3), the phrase good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in a prior motion requires a defendant to show good cause for failure to raise a claim in an appeal if one is filed, or in a prior motion if one is filed, or in both if both are filed. To conclude otherwise would impermissibly result in absurdity and frustrate the purpose of the rule. Morris & Doherty, PC v. Lockwood, 259 Mich.App. 38, 44, 672 N.W.2d 884 (2003). If we were to read the rule to require a showing of good cause in either an appeal or a prior motion for relief from judgment, regardless of whether both were filed, defendants could always avoid the good-cause requirement simply by filing both.

Additionally, we note that the trial court, though not explicitly saying so, appeared to believe that if a defendant files a prior motion for relief from judgment in propria persona, he or she need not show just cause for failing to raise an issue in that motion. However, MCR 6.508(D)(3) makes no such exception. And, as stated above, [n]othing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself. Hock Shop, supra at 528, 681 N.W.2d 669. Because the court rule itself does not make an exception for motions filed in propria persona, we will not read one into the rule. Furthermore, it would frustrate the purpose of the rule to allow defendants acting without legal representation to file unchecked an unlimited number of motions for relief from judgment devising new bases for overturning their convictions. Reed, supra at 378-379, 389-390, 535 N.W.2d 496. Therefore, we conclude that regardless of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with representation, he or she is required to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3).³

We next apply MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) to this case. Initially, we note that the trial court did not waive the good cause requirement by concluding that there was a significant possibility that defendant [was] innocent of the crime. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to apply MCR 6.508(D)(3). Defendant filed both an appeal and two prior motions for relief from judgment, but he failed to show good cause why he did not raise the instructional and ineffective assistance of counsel issues in his...