People v. Coddington

96 Cal.App.5th 562

314 Cal.Rptr.3d 610

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.James McKenzie CODDINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.

A166124

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Filed October 17, 2023

As Modified November 2, 2023

Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Irvine, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Humes, P.J.

The trial court granted appellant James McKenzie Coddington's request to have a sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term struck under legislation passed following his conviction under a plea agreement. Coddington argues for the first time in this appeal that he was entitled to seek further reductions of his prison term under recent legislation affecting other aspects of his conviction. We agree, and we therefore remand to the trial court for a full resentencing.

We also agree with respondent, however, that if the court on remand indicates it is inclined to further reduce Coddington's sentence, the prosecution may withdraw its assent to the plea agreement. ( People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 704, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 467 P.3d 168 ( Stamps ).) Although the Legislature clearly intended that the striking of a sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term would not provide a basis for rescinding a plea agreement, this intent cannot be understood to govern other possible sentence reductions merely because they happen to occur during the same resentencing. Thus, if Coddington successfully seeks additional reductions on remand, he will be subject to the resulting consequences to the plea agreement under Stamps .

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Coddington has an extensive criminal history. The case establishing the basis of this appeal arose in connection with an incident in October 2016 in which he attacked a fellow inmate at the Del Norte County Jail. As a result of the incident, Coddington was charged by felony information with one count of assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury ( Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) )¹ and one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422), both with a special allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The information contained three additional allegations: that Coddington previously had been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a), "serious felony allegation"), that he had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, "prior strike allegation"), and that he had served three prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b), "prison priors").

In May 2017, Coddington pleaded guilty to the count of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, and admitted the special allegation of great bodily injury.² He also admitted two enhancements as alleged in the information—the serious felony allegation ( § 667, subd. (a) ), and the prior strike allegation ( § 1170.12 )—and one of the three prison priors (former § 667.5, subd. (b) ). The indicated sentence was 13 years. Had Coddington been convicted on all charges in the original complaint, he faced up to 17 years, four months, calculated as follows: four years on the assault charge (the upper term of four years, § 245, subd. (a)(4) ), plus eight months for criminal threats (one-third the midterm of two years, §§ 422, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h), 1170.1, subd. (a) ), doubled because of the strike ( § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) ), plus five years for the prior serious felony ( § 667, subd. (a) ), plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement ( § 12022.7, subd. (a) ).

Based on the plea, the trial court sentenced Coddington to 13 years in prison, calculated as follows: the lower term of two years for the assault conviction ( § 245, subd. (a)(4) ), doubled because of the prior strike allegation ( § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) ), plus three years for the great bodily injury allegation ( § 12022.7, subd. (a) ), plus five years for the serious felony allegation ( § 667, subd. (a)(1) ), plus one year for the prison prior.

By motion filed in the trial court in August 2022, Coddington moved to be resentenced to remove his one-year prison-prior enhancement. His motion was based on two laws relating to prison priors that were enacted after his conviction. The first, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136), amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2020, to eliminate sentence enhancements for prison priors unless the prior term was for a sexually violent offense. ( People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ( Burgess ); see Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The second, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483), was enacted in 2021, and it extended Senate Bill No. 136 to all persons, such as Coddington, currently incarcerated in jail or prison. Burgess at p. 380, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ; see Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) As a result of these enactments, section 1172.75, subdivision (a),³ renders legally invalid any prison prior imposed before 2020 except where the prison prior was for a sexually violent offense. Other than seeking to remove his one-year prison-prior enhancement, Coddington did not seek any further sentencing relief.

At a brief hearing on the motion, the trial court vacated Coddington's one-year prison-prior sentencing enhancement. This reduced Coddington's sentence from 13 years to 12 years, which was the entire relief Coddington had requested. Proceeding without an attorney, Coddington filed a notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Coddington argues that the trial court failed to provide him with a full resentencing hearing, meaning a hearing in which he could have sought further sentencing relief under at least two other statutes that were enacted after his conviction. We agree he may seek further sentencing relief on remand.

Coddington acknowledges that his trial counsel sought to remove only his one-year prison-prior enhancement.⁴ He nevertheless contends that he did not forfeit the ability to seek further sentencing relief and, alternatively, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel if we conclude otherwise. We do not reach the ineffective-assistance claim, because we decline to find forfeiture under the circumstances. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345 ( Monroe ) [appellate court has authority to consider issue not preserved for review].)

Turning to the merits, when a sentence is subject to recall, "the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall." ( People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 84, 422 P.3d 531.) Coddington relies on this general "full sentencing rule," along with the language of the statute making retroactive the elimination of prison priors. The statute provides that when resentencing occurs, the trial court shall apply "any other changes in law that reduce sentences" when striking a prison prior ( § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) ). Thus in Monroe , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345, as here, the trial court struck a one-year prison prior under Senate Bill No. 483. ( Monroe at p. 398, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court also should have exercised its discretion to strike a firearm enhancement that is not at issue here. ( Id. at pp. 398–399, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.) And he argued, as Coddington argues here, that on remand he was entitled to have the trial court consider striking his five-year serious felony conviction under Senate Bill No. 1393. ( Monroe at pp. 398–399, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.) Division Two of this court agreed that the defendant was entitled to have the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss both the firearm enhancement and the five-year enhancement under Senate Bill No. 1393. ( Monroe at p. 399, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.) Monroe held that the legislation, while not independently available to final judgments, was available during a resentencing under section 1172.75 since the statute requires (subd. (d)(2)) the trial court to apply " ‘any other changes in law that reduce sentences.’ " ( Monroe at pp. 401–402, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.

Coddington points to two other legislative amendments that could potentially reduce his sentence. The first one, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393), amended sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2019, to give courts discretion to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony allegation. ( Stamps , supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 699, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 467 P.3d 168 ; People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 965, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 558 ; see Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.) Under this amendment, the trial court has the discretion to strike Coddington's serious felony allegation, reducing his sentence by five years. The second one, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81), effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1385 "to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant's sentence in the interest of justice." ( People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ; see Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Under this amendment, the trial court has new guidance in deciding whether to strike his enhancements.

Although Coddington may seek further sentencing relief on remand, he will not necessarily be entitled to retain the other benefits of his plea agreement if he is successful. As respondent notes, the defendant in Monroe was sentenced after a jury trial and thus not under a plea agreement as was Coddington. ( Monroe , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 396, 301 Cal.Rptr.3d 345.) "[L]ong-standing law limits the court's unilateral authority to...