People v. Cofer

322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891

103 Cal.App.5th 333

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Christopher Lee COFER, Defendant and Appellant.

H050122

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

Filed June 28, 2024

Trial Court: Monterey Co. Sup. Ct. Case Nos: 20CR010763; 20CR008059; 21CR000245; 21CR001076; 21CR001243, Trial Judge: Hon. Stephanie E. Hulsey (Monterey County Super. Ct. Nos. 20CR010763; 20CR008059; 21C500245; 21CR001076; 21CR001243)

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent The People: Ron Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorney General, Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Christopher Cofer: Mary Jo Strnad, By Appointment from the Sixth District Appellate Program

Grover, J.

Defendant Christopher Lee Cofer was sentenced at a single hearing as part of a negotiated disposition of five open cases. All of the sentences were concurrent with the six-year principal term. Relying on a previous decision by a different panel of this court in People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 739 (Jacobs), the trial court did not award presentence custody credits in all of the cases for all of the days defendant was in actual custody. We respectfully disagree with Jacobs and conclude that when a defendant is sentenced concurrently at a single hearing to resolve multiple cases that were not previously the subject of a judgment of conviction or probationary disposition, Penal Code section 2900.5 requires the trial court to apply presentence credits for all periods of actual custody toward all of those concurrent sentences.

I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

This case involves the award of presentence credit in five criminal cases that were resolved together. We omit the facts of the offenses as they are not relevant to the analysis and disposition of this appeal.

The information in case No. 20CR008059 ("case A") charged Cofer with vehicle burglary (Pen. Code, § 459); possession of burglar’s tools (Pen. Code, § 466); driving without a license (Veh. Code § 12500, subd. (a)); and grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)). The information alleged two prior strike convictions. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.)

Several months later, Cofer was charged by information in case No. 20CR010763 ("case B") with vehicle burglary (§ 459). The information alleged one prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) Another information filed the same day in case No. 21CR000245 ("case C") charged Cofer with second degree burglary (§ 459) and vandalism under $400 (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). That information also alleged a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)

Also that day, Cofer was charged by information in case No. 21CR001076 ("case D") and case No. 21CR001243 ("case E"). The information in case D charged him with second degree burglary (§ 459); possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466); and possession of paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code § 11364, subd. (a)). The information in case D contained one prior strike allegation (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and alleged that Cofer committed the charged offenses while released on bail or his own recognizance (§ 12022.1, subd. (d)). The information in case E charged Cofer with second degree burglary (§ 459), and it also alleged a prior strike. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)

Cofer resolved all five cases by plea agreement some ten months later.¹ Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court sentenced Cofer to a six-year term in case B and concurrent terms in the other cases. In case A, the court awarded presentence custody credits of 66 actual custody days and 66 days conduct credit; in case B, the court awarded 21 days of actual custody and 20 days conduct credit; in case C, the court awarded 225 days of actual custody and 224 days conduct credit; in cases D and E, the court deemed the sentences served with 183 days of actual custody and 182 days conduct credit in each.

Cofer filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court granted a certificate of probable cause to challenge the calculation of presentence custody credits. Cofer then moved in the trial court under section 1237.1 to correct his presentence credits. Cofer provided information with the section 12371.1 motion as to his custody status in each of the five cases:

In case A, Cofer was arrested on September 27, 2020, and remained in custody until November 10, 2020, when he posted bail and was released. He was in custody on the new charges brought in cases B and C from January 12 to January 18, 2021. When Cofer was released on his own recognizance in those cases, the court did not revoke his bail in case A. On February 13, 2021, he was arrested and remanded in cases D and E. While in custody in cases D and E, he remained technically out of custody in cases A, B, and C. On August 18, 2021, the court revoked Cofer’s bail status in cases A, B, and C when it remanded him for a competency evaluation. On September 1, 2021, the court found him competent to stand trial, discharged the bail bond, and released Cofer on his own recognizance in cases A and B, but ordered him to remain in custody in cases C, D, and E. On March 25, 2022, the trial court remanded Cofer in cases A and B pending sentencing, and on March 30, 2022, the court sentenced him in all five cases.

In his section 1237.1 motion, Cofer requested an award of dual presentence credit for the time that he was on bail or on his own recognizance in cases A, B, and C while simultaneously in custody on cases D and E. He also asked that any presentence credits in excess of the one-year sentences deemed served in the misdemeanor cases D and E be applied "to another case."

The trial court denied the request for dual presentence credits, ruling that under Jacobs, Cofer was not entitled to dual credits for cases where he remained on bail or on his own recognizance while in presentence custody in other cases. The trial court awarded 15 additional days in case C and an additional 15 days in case B based on its interpretation of the records Cofer submitted in support of the motion. The court denied Cofer’s request to reduce his term of imprisonment with the credits exceeding one year in cases D and E.

II. DISCUSSION

[1] Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that in "all felony and misdemeanor convictions … when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail … all days of custody of the defendant, including days … credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019 … shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment." Section 2900.5, subdivision (b) states: "For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed." Applying that statute to defendant’s case is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 394 P.3d 1074.)

A. Supreme Court Authorities

The Supreme Court has interpreted section 2900.5 in multiple opinions. In In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967 (Joyner), Joyner was charged with crimes committed in California and was later arrested in Florida for additional crimes he committed there. (Id. at p. 489, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) After he was convicted of the Florida charges, the Florida court awarded presentence custody credit for all days Joyner spent in custody there. Joyner was thereafter convicted and sentenced to concurrent time on the California charges, with the California court denying his request for presentence custody credits. (Id. at p. 490, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) On review, the Supreme Court identified "two purposes for awarding presentence credits: (1) eliminating the unequal treatment suffered by indigent defendants who, because of their inability to post bail, serve a longer overall confinement for a given offense than their wealthier counterparts," and "(2) equalizing the actual time served in custody by defendants convicted of the same offense." (Id. at p. 494, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) The court observed that in resolving "presentence credit issues, our aim is to provide for section 2900.5 a construction which is faithful to its language, which produces fair and reasonable results in a majority of cases, and which can be. readily understood and applied by trial courts." (Id. at p. 495, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) The court affirmed the denial of credits, holding that "a period of time previously credited against a sentence for unrelated offenses cannot be deemed ‘attributable to proceedings’ resulting in a later-imposed sentence unless it is demonstrated that the claimant would have been at liberty during the period were it not for a restraint relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence." (Id. at p. 489, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) The court stated that "duplicative credits against separately imposed concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses will be granted only on a showing of strict causation." (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court returned to section 2900.5 in People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 892 P.2d 1277 (Bruner). While on parole following a robbery conviction, Bruner was arrested for multiple parole violations. Bruner possessed "a substantial quantity of rock cocaine" when he was arrested. He was cited for the cocaine possession and released on...