People v. Coleman

2020 IL App (4th) 180098-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN C. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-18-0098

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

September 2, 2020

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County

No. 15CF1036

Honorable John M. Madonia, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant forfeited his claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence based on an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop and failed to establish the occurrence of plain error.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Stephen C. Coleman, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2014)), being an armed habitual criminal (id. § 24-1.7(a)), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). After finding the three offenses merged, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years in prison for being an armed habitual criminal. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence that was discovered by the police following an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In October 2015, defendant was the sole passenger of a vehicle owned and operated by Trish Rennier. During a traffic stop, the police searched the vehicle and located a handgun under the front passenger seat. They also conducted a "pat down" of defendant's person and found he was wearing a bullet proof vest under his clothing. As a result of that incident, defendant was arrested, and the State charged him with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)) (count I), being an armed habitual criminal (id. § 24-1.7(a)) (count II), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)) (count III). The State alleged defendant, who had not been issued a valid Firearm Owner's Identification card, knowingly possessed and carried a firearm while wearing body armor and after having been previously convicted of certain specified felony offenses.

¶ 5 In May 2016, defendant filed a "Motion To Suppress Evidence And Quash Arrest." He alleged Rennier's vehicle was improperly searched during the traffic stop. He also asserted that the purpose of the stop was "to issue a traffic citation" and "[t]he time of the stop far exceeded what would be considered an appropriate time for that purpose." Defendant asked the court to suppress all evidence obtained from the allegedly improper search.

¶ 6 In June 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion. Defendant presented Rennier as a witness. Rennier testified she was friends with defendant and on the day of the October 2015 traffic stop, she picked defendant up in her car and the two went "driving around." She denied noticing "anything unusual" about defendant when he got into her car or as they were driving. At some point, Rennier's car was stopped by the police. Rennier recalled seeing two police officers. She denied that the officers told her why her vehicle was stopped. She stated the police officers asked for her "information" and she provided them with her driver's license and her proof of insurance. She believed they also asked defendant for his "information," but she wasnot sure if defendant provided anything to the officers.

¶ 7 According to Rennier, after the police officers received and "ran" her information, they asked both her and defendant to step out of the car. Rennier stated she was searched by the police. Although she did not recall giving the police officers permission to search her person, she "imagine[d]" that she did. Rennier stated she did not hear any interaction between the officers and defendant. She also did not remember the police officers asking for permission to search her car. Nevertheless, the car was searched, and the officers reported to Rennier that defendant "had a vest on and a gun under his seat." Rennier told the police she did not know where the gun came from, she did not know it was there, and she did not know to whom it belonged. She testified she had been in the car for about 30 minutes before the traffic stop and never saw a gun. Finally, Rennier testified she was not issued a traffic citation as a result of the stop.

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Rennier admitted she and defendant were closer than just friends and the two had a "romantic relationship." She clarified that she did not remember whether the police officers asked for permission to search her person or her car. Rennier reiterated that while in the car prior to the traffic stop, she never saw a gun or defendant "with his hands on a gun." When questioned about defendant's reaction when her vehicle was being pulled over, Rennier testified as follows: "[W]hen we got pulled over I had *** a bottle of liquor, so I was trying to hand it to him. *** I ended up just sticking it under my seat. And he said something about not being able to go down for this charge." Rennier stated she did not know what defendant was talking about. Also, she testified she was "more focused on" herself and hiding the liquor bottle and did not see what defendant was doing.

¶ 9 Rennier additionally testified that the car she and defendant were in when stopped by the police belonged to her. Defendant had no financial or ownership interest in the vehicle anddid not regularly drive it.

¶ 10 Following Rennier's testimony, defendant rested. The State moved for a directed finding, arguing defendant failed to establish that he had "a legitimate privacy interest in" Rennier's vehicle and, thus, lacked standing to move for suppression based on an improper search of that vehicle. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with the State and found defendant did not have standing to challenge the vehicle search. However, based upon defense counsel's assertion that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy "on his person" and his assertion that no evidence showed he consented to a pat down, the court found defendant had shifted the burden to the State regarding whether the search of his person, resulting in the discovery of body armor beneath his clothing, was valid.

¶ 11 The State then called Matthew Dowis, a police officer for the City of Springfield, as a witness. Dowis testified that on the date of the traffic stop, he was on patrol with another officer, Rikki Castles, when they observed a red Ford Fusion make "a very close sharp turn" toward their vehicle and into their lane of travel, i.e., into the opposite direction of traffic for the Ford Fusion. According to Dowis, the driver of the Ford Fusion had to "cut really hard back into their lane *** to avoid hitting" the police vehicle. As a result, a traffic stop was initiated. Dowis testified he approached the passenger side of the stopped vehicle while Castles approached the driver's side. Dowis requested and documented the passenger's name and date of birth. He identified defendant as the passenger of the vehicle.

¶ 12 Dowis testified that the area where the traffic stop occurred was "a known drug area." Based on both "the time [of the stop] and the area," the officers "ran" the "names" and "criminal histories" of both the vehicle's driver and defendant. He stated he learned that defendant "had a known drug history *** and also weapons offenses." When the officers approached thevehicle the second time, Castles asked the driver, whom they identified as Rennier, if they could search the car. According to Dowis, Rennier gave verbal consent for a search.

¶ 13 After obtaining Rennier's consent for the vehicle search, Dowis asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. Once defendant exited the car, Dowis asked if he could "pat him down for weapons" and defendant consented. Dowis testified he conducted the pat down "based on the area and also based on [defendant's] past history." He also testified that was what he did with every person anytime he had them exit a vehicle. During the pat down, Dowis checked "the exterior of [defendant's] clothing just to see if he had any unusual bulges in his clothing, his waistline, anything like that." Dowis felt "an uncommon feature underneath [defendant's] shirt," which defendant stated "was a bullet proof vest." Defendant reported that he had been receiving threats and was wearing the vest for protection. Ultimately, Dowis and Castles searched Rennier's vehicle and discovered a loaded "9-millimeter Taurus handgun" underneath the passenger seat. After the gun was found, defendant was placed in handcuffs.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Dowis testified that during the traffic stop, he did not notice any "alarming" behavior from either Rennier or defendant. He described defendant as cooperative and stated he did not appear nervous. Dowis, however, would not agree that there was "no officer safety issue" at the time of the "first approach" to Rennier's vehicle, noting the officers "didn't know who the individuals were in the vehicle." Dowis further testified that it took "30 seconds to a minute" to check the information he and Castles received from Rennier and defendant and that their second approach to the vehicle occurred within two to three minutes. The officers "ran" Rennier's information first and then defendant's information. According to Dowis, "[a]t that point *** [they] made the decision *** to ask to search the car." He acknowledged that the "sole reason" he and Castles asked to search the car was due to defendant's prior record. The reason defendantwas asked to exit the vehicle was because Rennier gave her consent for a search. Dowis stated the officers could not search the vehicle if defendant remained inside.

¶ 15 Following Dowis's testimony, the State rested. The trial court then...