People v. Collins

1

2024 IL App (2d) 230577-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JORDAN M. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-23-0577

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District

March 8, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. No. 23-CF-677 Honorable Joseph C. Pederson, Judge, Presiding.

BIRKETT, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

BIRKETT, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The order of detention is vacated and the cause remanded because the trial court failed to make findings as to whether any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat that defendant's pretrial release would pose.

¶ 2 Defendant, Jordan M. Collins, timely appeals the December 6, 2023, order of the circuit court of De Kalb County granting the State's petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Acts. 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104 § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023).^[1] Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. Defendant further argues that the trial court's findings summarizing its reasons for denying him pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not have adequately protected any person or the community, were insufficient. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand with instructions.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On December 6, 2023, defendant, an Elgin police officer, was charged by complaint with five counts of possession of child pornography, all Class 2 felonies (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2022)). That same day, the State filed a verified petition to detain defendant, alleging that he was charged with detainable offenses and that his pretrial release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.

¶ 5 The matter immediately proceeded to a detention hearing. Relying on a synopsis prepared by an investigator with the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, the State emphasized that the offenses concerned defendant's possession of "dozens[,] if not hundreds" of video files depicting prepubescent females engaged in various sexual acts, including with adult males and adult females. The files were located on defendant's laptop and two flash drives. The State argued that defendant's release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community, and that there were no conditions that can mitigate that. It emphasized that (1) the videos primarily depicted pornography of children under the age of 13 and, in at least two videos, "you can actually see and hear them being extorted to create [child sexual abuse] material for the person who is filming;" (2) defendant held a position of authority in the community and was obligated to protect children, not exploit them; (3) defendant resided across the street from a high school; and (4) defendant owns a large number or weapons and a significant quantity of ammunition.

¶ 6 The State also apprised the court as to the progress of the investigation. It stated that digital forensic examiners had not yet completed their review of the evidence, including defendant's cell phone, and that the State was "still determining whether or not some of those offenses are going to include dissemination, solicitation, reproduction, or [whether] it is just going to be all possession charges." The State explained that it "filed five [counts] to get the ball rolling." It also noted that, during the search of defendant's residence, investigators "observed a large mattress on the [basement] floor with a nightstand and lamp next to it and a large number of Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs)," as well as a sex toy near the laundry area and plastic mattress covers in the laundry basket. The State asserted that, "[h]onestly, it's too soon to know exactly what is going on there, but[,] given the nature of the charges [defendant is] facing, it's certainly something that caused the investigators concern during their search of [defendant's] house." Nevertheless, "at this point, we can't say that the person filming or creating that [material] is the defendant."

¶ 7 In response, defense counsel argued that he should be released pending trial because the State failed to present any specific facts that indicated that he posed a threat to anyone, as well as that defendant was alleged only to possess illicit material, and not that he produced or publicly disseminated it. Counsel also pointed to several mitigating factors, including defendant's lack of a criminal record and that he scored a 0 out of a possible 14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment, meaning that there was a 96% probability that he would appear for all future court dates and that he would not reoffend during the pendency of the case. Counsel further argued that the trial court's decision regarding pretrial detainment should be based "on the charges that are before the Court, not on any speculative charges that may appear in the future."

¶ 8 Following the parties' arguments, the trial court recounted the evidence and made a series of findings. First, it found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the qualifying offense of possession of child pornography, stating that "[t]he information contained in the synopsis is more than sufficient." The court next evaluated whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community. It noted that the investigation was ongoing as to whether "defendant was involved in the production or dissemination of any child pornography," but that defendant was nevertheless charged with possession of child pornography, which is a detainable offense. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West 2022). The court acknowledged that defendant "has no criminal history," but the evidence showed he had engaged in criminality over a prolonged period of time prior to his arrest, because he downloaded "numerous files *** involving child pornography" starting in March 2023. It also found that defendant posed a threat to any minors that he may come into contact with, because he possessed child pornography, lives across the street from a high school, and "may or may not have been involved in producing" child pornography. The court further noted that defendant possessed "numerous firearms, as he is a police officer." Based on these factors, the court found that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community "by his conduct, including possession of child pornography that's alleged in the complaint, as well as the other information contained in the *** synopsis," and that there was no condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate that real and present threat. In granting the State's petition, the court signed a preprinted form order, and it checked the boxes that were applicable to reflect its ruling. The form provided space for the court to elaborate regarding its reasons for concluding defendant should be denied pretrial release, but that portion of the order was left blank.

¶ 9 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on December 18, 2023, and, on February 2, 2024, he filed a memorandum in support of his appeal as contemplated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff October 19, 2023).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release, which is governed by article 110 of the Code, as amended by the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5 110-2(a) (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, a defendant may be denied pretrial release where he or she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(a). To overcome the presumption that a defendant is eligible for pretrial release, the State bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an offense that qualifies for pretrial detention, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person in the community based on the specific and articulable facts of the case, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on the specific and articulable facts of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(e).

¶ 12 We review the trial court's decision to deny pretrial release under a bifurcated standard. People v Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. That is, we apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court's factual findings, including whether a defendant poses a threat and whether any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re Marriage of Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853, ¶ 65. As for the trial court's ultimate determination of pretrial release, we review for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion only...