People v. Cook

226 N.E.3d 162

2023 IL App (4th) 210621

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Shaitan L. COOK Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-21-0621

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Filed March 9, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 15CF1119, Honorable Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Judge Presiding.

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Brian L. Josias, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Scott Rueter, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Allison Paige Brooks, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a fully negotiated plea agreement, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to a charge of nonfirearm first degree felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2014)), defendant Shaitan L. Cook Jr., was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Although he filed a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days of sentencing, defendant failed to file an accompanying notice of motion as required by section 5-4.5-50(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2020)). Thirteen months later, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied, and this appeal followed.

¶ 2 The State urges us to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on defendant’s noncompliance with section 5-4.5-50(d); specifically, the State argues that defendant’s failure to file a notice of motion with the motion to reconsider rendered the postsentencing motions untimely. We disagree and conclude that jurisdiction exists.

¶ 3 Defendant raises various issues concerning ineffective assistance of counsel surrounding his negotiated guilty plea agreement and requests a remand pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), to further explore these issues. We conclude that no obligation to conduct a Krankel inquiry was triggered in this case and affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Defendant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder arising out of his alleged participation as a 16-year-old accomplice in a robbery during which two people were shot, one of whom later died.

¶ 6 A. Negotiated Plea Agreement

¶ 7 On February 24, 2020, on the eve of trial, defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement, wherein he agreed to plead guilty to first degree felony murder (amended count IV of the information) in exchange for receiving the statutory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2014). Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights; he specifically stated that he understood he was giving up his rights to trial and to confront or cross-examine witnesses and further that he was agreeing that the State could prove him guilty of the amended count beyond a reasonable doubt. He further acknowledged that no one forced him into the plea agreement and that his lawyer answered his questions.

¶ 8 At that time, the following factual basis was read into the record:

"[O]n September 7, 2015, just after 9 o’clock, this defendant, Daiquan Cline, and Darion Evans, and Ryan O’Neal planned the robbery of Cesley Taylor. On the night of September 7, 2015, Ryan O’Neal was inside shooting dice with Cesley Taylor. Her girlfriend, Brittney Wilson, was in the back of the apartment.

Mr. O’Neal texted Daiquan Cline that they could come in, and Daiquan Cline, along with Darion Evans, who had a Spiderman mask and a .22 caliber handgun, this defendant, who had masked his face and had a BB gun, knocked on the door and entered the apartment. Darion Evans produced his gun. All the defendants took items from the apartment, whether it was money, a change purse, or a phone.

Darion Evans then *** fired a dangerous weapon repeatedly. Brittney Wilson was shot, but lived, and Cesley Taylor passed away that night in her apartment."

¶ 9 Following this factual recitation, the trial judge delivered admonishments pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) to defendant, advising him of his appeal rights and applicable time frames.

¶ 10 The trial court entered its sentencing judgment on February 28, 2020.

¶ 11 B. Motion to Reconsider Sentence

¶ 12 On March 3, 2020, defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider his sentence. He argued that the sentence was excessive, his youth should have played a bigger role in consideration relating to his guilt and sentencing, and the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty by accountability. The pro se motion did not argue that the assistance provided by his counsel was ineffective, and he did not raise any specific Krankel argument. The motion was not, however, accompanied by a notice of motion as required by section 5-4.5-50 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50 (West 2020)). It remained in the court file without any action being initiated for over one year, until he filed a pro se motion for trial transcripts and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in June 2021. At that time, a public defender took note of the recent motion and her own office’s prior appointment in the case. She appeared at a status hearing and advised the trial court that the motion on transcripts "triggered" her to look at the earlier pro se motion to reduce sentence and that she would "potentially make amendments, such as changing it to a motion to withdraw a plea."

¶ 13 C. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 14 In August 2021, defendant’s newly appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, asserting that (1) defendant’s plea was "not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made"; (2) he "felt coerced into pleading guilty" after the trial court denied his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) he "felt coerced into entering an unfair plea agreement that he did not want to accept under circumstances where the evidence was insufficient to convict him on an accountability theory"; and (4) his sentence was "excessive, given his age, level of involvement, and the totality of the circumstances," and "his attorney, the Court, and the prosecutor would not agree to a more appropriate sentence under 20 years."

¶ 15 On his second point, defendant incorporated the arguments made during the hearing on his motion to suppress police statements and added that "the police engaged in coercive tactics to obtain his inculpatory statements" (pursuant to new section 103-2.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-2.2 (West Supp. 2021)), which became effective in January 2022 (see Pub. Act 102-101, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2022))). A certificate of counsel under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) was filed shortly thereafter. The record makes clear that the newly filed motion was an amendment of the pro se motion, and the trial court noted that it had "allowed [defense counsel] to file the amended pleading."

¶ 16 Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was heard on October 14, 2021, at which time arguments were made and the following testimony was received from defendant.

¶ 17 According to defendant, he felt coerced into entering his guilty plea. When asked to explain, defendant stated, "I feel like the plea wasn’t intelligently made." When asked to explain further, he testified:

"Because there’s a bill that I was actually looking up and this bill was critical to my position in the case because my case around other people, you know, it—it—me out in—in the case. But there as a shooter that admitted to being the shooter and there was things taken from the house that put me in the position of felony murder, but no proof has ever been brought up that I took anything from the house."

¶ 18 He continued:

"It was—it was specific things that were taken and these specific thingswere found on another person’s person but I never been caught with anything, but I’m still under the accountability act because of my juvenile statement of me placing myself at the scene and other things, but it’s a bill that come out in January that helps me,"

¶ 19 Counsel then clarified that the statute in question was part of Public Act 102-101 (eff. Jan, 1, 2022), and said, "that’s the bill now the law that takes effect in 2022." Defendant agreed that the applicability of the statute was one of the things he wanted to challenge in his case. Defendant’s counsel then remarked that defendant wanted to challenge the suppression ruling on appeal and added, "that’s one of the things he’s concerned about is statements made to police and not having access to family, that [court ruling is] part of the reason he felt coerced into entering the plea."

¶ 20 Counsel then asked defendant about his remaining allegations in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant agreed that he did not feel the evidence was sufficient to convict him, that he did not know that a robbery was going to take place, and that his sentence was excessive. Defendant added:

"[I]t’s a bad case, but at the end of the day I didn’t participate. I didn’t partake because I came doesn’t make me accountable. What makes me accountable is participation, and they would have to show that but nobody ever showed that.

I sat almost five years nobody ever showed it."

¶ 21 Counsel then asked defendant if he believed he was "coerced into entering the plea because nothing was moving forward and nobody was helping [him] with his case," to which defendant agreed. Defendant stated that:

"The case was built off of inconsistent statements and what scared me into the plea deal if the State is prepared to take me on trial with just inconsistent statements, which everybody in the case made inconsistent statements, so when you go against those statements and they’ve prepared to go to trial with that, I’m—I’m not—I couldn’t go to trial about it I couldn’t."

¶ 22 On...